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This dissertation consists of three studies in the field of corporate governance. The
research examines the impact of the way Dutch firms are managed and controlled on risk
characteristics and the implications for shareholder value. The first study examines the
relation between board interlocks and firm risk. In particular, we measure the effect of
supervisory directors’ connectivity on firm risk. We find yet unknown aspects of connecti -
vity and based on our findings the validity of the motivation behind recent Dutch civil law
amendments can be questioned. In the second study we examine how firms adapted their
communication with investors to the changing demands of the financial markets in the
1990s. Using Royal Philips NV as a case study we find that Philips’ communication was not
able to satisfy the demands of the changing financial markets. As a consequence, its share -
holders have suffered billion euro value losses. In the third study, we measure the effect of
managers’ discretion offered by takeover defenses on shareholder wealth. Dutch firms are
known for the frequent use of takeover defenses, protecting managers and providing them
a relatively strong position towards shareholders. We find that acquisitions conducted by
Dutch firms generate significant positive abnormal announcement returns, which suggests
that shareholders have other means to control management.
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Preface 
 
Why would someone who is happily married, with two beautiful growing teenage 
daughters, with a demanding work life on top of that be engaged in academic research? 
Why would he invest significant amounts of time in gathering and analyzing data, and 
subsequently formulating his thoughts meticulously in academic papers? The answer is 
’curiosity’. And while writing this preface I am thinking back at how this all started….. 
In my work life, I became more and more aware of the effects of human behavior 
on corporate finance decision making. I observed that the CEO’s that I worked with were 
relying on their experience and gut feel often more than on a rational decision making 
process. I noticed that in decision making many unwritten rules of thumb were being 
applied. I experienced the value of informal contacts and the power of being part of a 
network. I could feel the intrinsic board room tension between members of a Supervisory 
Board and members of the Executive Board, at times vehemently arguing and challenging 
each other’s views. With human behavior playing such an important role in a firm’s 
corporate governance and decision making, what would be the implications for that firm 
and its value?  Out of curiosity I picked up the phone and contacted my Alma Mater: the 
Rotterdam School of Management at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. A friendly 
and knowledgeable PhD (Reggy Hooghiemstra, now at the Faculty of Economics and 
Business, University of Groningen) warmly welcomed my curiosity and invited me to 
come speak with him. He introduced me to Abe de Jong, who later became my promoting 
Professor. This is how it all started.  
In 2006, with full support from my wife and after the necessary preparations, 
training and extensive catch up reading, I decided to embark on this research journey. 
The aim was to investigate the relation between several aspects of corporate governance 
and finance.  Abe and I considered that it would be good to do a series of projects so as to 
grow my research skills gradually with increasing research complexity.  
The first project was a governance/M&A event study (chapter 4), which was 
published as a co-authored paper in 2007.  Marieke van der Poel and Abe de Jong co-
authored this paper and introduced me to the world of empirical research, gathering and 
analyzing data, ultimately leading to a publishable paper. Marieke very often was my 
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sounding board and my initial daily mentor. She truly is a very thorough researcher, with 
a keen eye for detail, and has been a much appreciated guidance in this project. Needless 
to say that Abe played an important oversight role and kept helicopter view throughout 
the entire project. His guidance in bringing this project to publication was very valuable. 
The second project (chapter 3) involved a study on thirty years Philips CEO 
communication to the financial markets, which I conducted together with my promoter, 
with help from Marieke. My starting point was a carton box with dust all over it, from an 
archive, that contained 30 years hardcopy annual reports of Philips. Coming home with 
this box, I was greeted with laughter. This box, plus all the subsequent research, turned 
out to be an enormous well of information on Philips’ past financial market 
communication. Good, bad and ugly…This project has taken some time frame to come to 
fruition, but the results are striking. The aim is to get this paper published in a history 
journal. 
The third and last study (chapter 2), I conducted solo, under supervision of Abe. It 
investigates the relationship between connectivity of a firm’s supervisory board directors 
and certain of that firm’s risk characteristics.  The authorities’ concern about overly busy 
directors has found its way to regulations that limit the number of connections for 
Supervisory Board members.  I was wondering to which extent this assumed positive 
relationship between board members’ connections and firm risk would be supported by 
empirical research.  I spent a good part of a year, including the full Summer holiday, 
manually gathering and categorizing relevant data.  As a next step I ran regressions with 
Stata software. The outcome is quite astonishing. In none of the 36 tested relations did I 
find any of the assumed positive relation.  I found that, if anything, the opposite is true 
and board connections reduce firm risk. I aim to publish this article in a governance 
journal.    
It is now seven years since I have started my research. In this period I have 
combined my academic efforts with a family life and a career in business. This has been 
quite busy at times and I do owe a lot to those that have supported me though this period.  
I realize that I have taken away much time from my family. I have not always been there 
for them, and that does not feel good. But the joy, inspiration and energy that this 
research has given me is immeasurable. And more than once during all these years, I have 
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pondered whether the journey itself would be more fulfilling than reaching the goal (my 
PhD graduation).  
I am deeply indebted to my wife Carla and our two great daughters Simone and 
Christina. They have always supported me,  as they seemed to understand that this quest 
had to be fulfilled. I am grateful for their understanding and patience with me. I dedicate 
this book to them and hope that someday I can repay them for the time that I have not 
been able to spend with them.  
A special thank you is for Abe, my promoting professor. Abe combines deep 
insights in business relations with high research standards and a vast amount of academic 
experience. I had the luck to be able to tap his talents as often as I needed to. At times, 
when I was questioning the purpose of my mission or felt that I was drowning, Abe stood 
right behind me and motivated me to go on.  
At this place I would like to thank my colleagues from the Finance and 
Investments team at the RSM, and in particular Marieke, Flora,  Dimitrios, and Reggy. 
Always there to lend a helping hand. What great colleagues to have ! 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction to the three studies in this book. All three studies are about 
the implications of corporate governance to firms and their shareholders.  And all three 
studies have been conducted in the Dutch setting. Much extant research is based on US 
data. One reason that US data are often used is the readily availability of these data 
through large international databases. Another reason for using US data is that this 
usually facilitates a much desired publication in international journals. We have chosen to 
base our research on the Dutch setting. The Dutch corporate setting is the environment 
where we have gained our experience in, and where we can authoritatively argue possible 
business implications of our findings.  This choice, however, has had major implications 
for our research. Much of our data had to be collected manually. This is a laborious 
process. And of course, we do realize possible restrictions in publishing our results in 
international journals. Some of the findings are specific for the Dutch setting and might 
capture limited international attention. However, our hand built datasets are unique and 
have provided us insights that otherwise we would not have been able to achieve.  
 
1.2 What is corporate governance? 
Corporate governance deals with the way how firms are managed and controlled and how 
accountability is assured. Well directed and controlled firms are important for a good 
functioning and competitive economy. The income of millions of citizens and the value 
Chapter 1 
2 
 
of their pensions and savings depends directly on the performance of firms and the way 
how they are managed and controlled (report Monitoring Committee 2005, page 4).  
 
1.3 Trends in corporate governance 
At the beginning of the millennium, a series of governance failures at US firms such as 
Enron and WorldCom, and European firms such as Ahold and Parmalat, caused a wave 
of regulatory initiatives aimed at improving corporate governance. The debate on 
corporate governance has continued to thrive since.  Most recently, the OECD reported 
that “The financial crisis can to an important extent be attributed to failures and 
weaknesses in corporate governance” (OECD, 2009, page 1). 
F. Martens states (2005 CGA Accounting Research Centre conference) that 
“Internationally, trends in corporate governance can be viewed from the perspective of 
board stewardship, operations, independence, and disclosure. The rules and guidance 
relating to these board activities illustrate a number of interesting trends. First of all, there 
continues to be a move from guidance to regulation. In the US this trend is being 
reflected primarily in the areas of codes of ethics, audit committee structure, and the 
separation of CEO and chairman of the board”.  The Netherlands still operates more from 
a principle based background and uses the “comply or explain” principle that allows 
firms to either comply with the Corporate Governance Code or explain why it deviates 
from the Code. 
Developments in firms’ governance are also visible in the board’s skills. Initial 
initiatives were aimed at improving a firm’s governance structure. But in recent 
developments, greater attention is given to skills and ethics. This reflects back on the 
efforts of board members. The overall effort required from board members continues to 
increase due to the increasing number of boards meetings and the increasing number of 
subcommittee meetings they are supposed to attend. The enhancement to the roles and 
responsibilities of corporate boards has tended to heighten the natural tension between the 
dual roles required of these boards. They must be advisors to senior management, and, as 
well, carry a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders (Martens, 2005).  
Introduction 
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Another trend is that the boards’ responsibilities are expanding. So far, a firm’s 
supervisory board monitored the firm’s responsiveness to risk reporting. Following the 
now widely accepted “Enterprise Risk Management Framework”  as developed by COSO 
(Committed of the Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission), supervisory 
boards are more and more monitoring the effectiveness of management’s response to risk 
that might prohibit a firm from reaching its goals. As a result, supervisory boards are 
playing an essential role in the firm’s compliance and ethics issues.  
 
1.4 Governance and firm value 
A common view is that there is a positive relationship between a firm’s corporate 
governance and that firms’ performance. However, the direction of the causality is 
controversial (Hermalin, 2008).  Is a firm with strong governance better positioned to 
perform well or do firms that perform well have to most to lose with weak governance?  
Empirical studies measuring the overall relationship between governance and 
performance measure firm performance using profits, firm value and/or Tobin’s Q and 
develop an index to measure a firms’ overall governance. Such an index is a composite 
index measuring a series of governance items from categories like disclosure, board 
composition and functioning, ownership and control structure, and shareholder rights. 
Our research consists of three studies.  Each study focuses on specific aspects of a firm, 
certain of its governance aspects and the implications on shareholder wealth. 
 
1.5 Do board interlocks reduce firm risk?  Evidence from the Netherlands. 
In 1997 the first report on corporate Governance in The Netherlands was issued by the 
so-called “Committee Peters”. This report contained recommendations for good corporate 
governance. With respect to the number of supervisory board memberships any one 
member of the supervisory board could hold the reports states (section 2.10 of the report): 
“The Committee advocates that the number of Supervisory Board memberships which 
one person can hold in (listed) companies should be limited so as to guarantee a proper 
performance of duties. In particular, the workload also that resulting from posts held in 
Chapter 1 
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non-listed companies and other institutions, is a point that needs to explicitly taken into 
consideration. The number of Supervisory Board memberships should be determined by 
the time available for a proper performance of duties.” 
Since Dutch firms were not very forthcoming in implementing these 
recommendations, a new committee was asked to draft a Corporate Governance Code. 
The Committee Tabaksblat presented the Corporate Governance Code 2003, to be 
effective January 1, 2004.  From January 1, 2005 onwards, every Dutch quoted firm has 
to clarify the implementation of the Code in its annual report in accordance with the 
‘comply or explain’ principle. With respect to the number of Supervisory Board 
memberships any one member of the Supervisory Board could hold the best practice 
provision of the Code states (III.3.4): 
“The number of supervisory boards of Dutch listed companies of which an individual 
may be a member shall be limited to such an extent that the proper performance of his 
duties is assured; the maximum number is five, for which purpose the chairmanship of a 
supervisory board counts double.” 
The limitation of the number of supervisory Board memberships any one 
individual can hold is primarily driven by fear for ‘busyness’.  An added factor limiting 
the number of board memberships is the wish to assure the supervisory board members’ 
independence. The Code Tabaksblat limits the number of supervisory board memberships 
to five, with a presidency counting double. In practice, this has led to widening of the 
circle of potential board members. From January 2013 onwards the limitation of the 
number of supervisory board memberships any one person may hold is incorporated in 
Dutch civil law (articles 2:197a and 2:197b BW).  This states that a membership of a 
supervisory board may be combined with a maximum of 4 other memberships with other 
large firms. An appointment in violation with this provision will be void.  The motivation 
for this civil law amendment is to assure the quality of management and supervision, 
prevent conflicts of interest and to contribute to breaking through the ‘old boys 
Introduction 
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network’(Explanation of the Irrgang Amendment, from House of Representative 
Consultation of legislation June 25, 20121). 
In our study we investigate the relation between board interlocks and firm risk in 
Dutch firms, more in particular the effect of supervisory directors’ connectivity on firm 
risk. We find that supervisory board interlocks reduce the firm’s systematic risk and that 
bankers on the board increase the firm’s ability to mitigate downside risk. Both effects 
are empirical support for the view that interlocks are a node through which information 
on business practices flows and network resources are engaged. Our findings are a yet 
unknown aspect of connectivity and based on our findings one could question the validity 
of the motivation behind the most recent civil law amendments.  
 
1.6 Punished by discontented financial markets; investor relations of Royal Philips 
NV 1971-2001 
Our second study goes back to the 1990s.  During the second half of the 1990s, Western 
economies experienced one of the longest economic expansions in history. The 
characteristics of this period, when the general perception was that the world was moving 
towards a “New Economy”, were high growth rates in productivity, output, employment, 
wages and investments, and booming financing coupled with soaring stock markets.  We 
investigate how firms have adapted their communication to these changing market 
demands. Philips Electronics NV is selected for a case study.  Philips is a well-known 
household name in the Netherlands, with a two-sided reputation. It has a strong reputation 
for its technology and innovations, but is also known for its weak marketing. The latter 
resulted in its technologically outstanding products not always making it in the market 
place. This has led to costly and high profile product failures such as Video2000, CD-I, 
DCC and HDTV. We investigate Philips investor communication efforts in the 
exogenously changing financial markets in the 1990s.   
                                                 
1Report of the consultation on legislation by the House of Representatives, held on  June 25, 2012, 
regarding the change of Book 2, Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), explaining the articles 297a en 297b. 
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Firms generally are concerned about shareholder wealth maximization, a process 
of making a firm’s share as desirable as possible.  The investor relations function plays a 
pivotal role between the firm and the financial markets. We have investigated the 
importance of investor relations in communicating Philips’ strategic intentions, and found 
a remarkable parallel. Both in developing products and in developing financial reporting, 
Philips has been technologically strong and innovative. But, in the 1990s Philips’ 
weakness in marketing communication is mirrored by its weakness in communicating its 
strategy to the market.  Philips’ communication obviously was not able to satisfy the 
demands of the changing financial markets and as a consequence its shareholders have 
suffered wealth losses of billions of euros.   
 
1.7 Corporate governance and acquisitions 
Our third study investigates another aspect of governance. We examine the effect of 
manager’s degrees of freedom offered by takeover defenses on shareholder wealth. Dutch 
firms are known for the frequent use of takeover defenses. Such defenses protect 
managers and give them a relatively strong position towards shareholders.  With less 
shareholder constraints managers might be tempted to pursue acquisitions that do not add 
value for the shareholders. We investigate 865 acquisitions and several takeover defenses 
commonly used in the Netherlands and find positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement date. This indicates that in the Netherlands, with relatively concentrated 
ownership, shareholders have other means to control management. 
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Chapter 2: 
Do board interlocks reduce firm risk? 
Evidence from the Netherlands 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The effect of non-executive directors’ interlocks on firms is controversial. Generally, 
non-executive board members are appointed based on their experience. Some of them 
may be active in demanding full time positions; others may be sought after for similar 
non-executive roles. A concern often heard is that busy directors are unable to spend 
sufficient time on each board position. But the opposite view is that these so-called busy 
directors are in fact appointed because their possible lack of time is offset by other 
aspects beneficial to the firm. Researchers are attempting to empirically test these two 
effects separately, but have not reached a consistent conclusion yet (Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2008).   
A vast amount of busy board research points in the same direction. Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) find that multiple directorships place an excessive burden on directors 
and that firms with busy directors have a lower market to book ratio. Busy boards are 
associated with weaker corporate governance. And firms with weaker governance and 
poor monitoring generally have a higher risk (Brick and Chidambaran, 2008) and have 
riskier investments (King and Wen, 2011). Following this so-called ‘busy board’ strand 
of research, interlocks might be expected to increase firm risk. This has found its way 
into regulations. Virtually all corporate governance codes of best practices highlight the 
importance of the monitoring function. 
This chapter investigates the effect of board interlocks on firm risk in the 
Netherlands. Dutch firms have a two tier board structure, with an executive board, 
responsible for daily management, and a supervisory board, responsible for monitoring 
the firm’s managers, for ratifying relevant decisions and for setting the firm’s strategic 
Chapter 2 
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guidelines. This separation between operational management and monitoring allows us to 
measure the effect of supervisory board interlocks on risk. Our aim is to test whether 
interlocks can reduce firm risk.  Regarding interlocks, the Dutch Corporate Governance 
code (Corporate Governance Committee, 2003), hereafter called “Code Tabaksblat”, 
provides detailed rules limiting the number of board seats that any one board member 
may have. The purpose is to strengthen the supervisory board’s monitoring role. The 
underlying assumptions are that multiple directorships place a burden on supervisory 
board directors, and busy boards lead to weaker corporate governance and monitoring 
(Committee on Corporate Governance, 1997, hereafter called “Committee Peters”). 
An aspect that has received no attention is the possibility that board interlocks 
may reduce risk. Board interlocks may serve as a node through which information and 
experience are shared and network resources can be engaged. We perceive two routes for 
interlocked directors to obtain information. The first route is passively, when information 
flows through the network and is disseminated in every meeting. The second route is 
more actively, when resources within the network are mobilized and actively contacted 
for specific needs (Heemskerk, 2007).  Fracassi  (2012) finds that corporate practices are 
spread through interlocks and that social peers have a significant influence on corporate 
finance decision making.  Ghita, Cuyvers and Deloof (2012) conduct a longitudinal 
study. They find that since the 1950s financial connections do not seem to have a relation 
with firm risk anymore. The negative and positive relationship found for earlier periods 
(WW1 and the Great Depression respectively) seems to have loosened in later periods. 
Arguably, this is caused by loosing of intercorporate ties and internationalization leading 
to a decreasing importance of financial connections. Such findings might be an indication 
that interlocks may reduce risk.   
Bank interlocks may serve different purposes. Some research in this area focuses 
on the expertise provided by bankers, for instance on corporate investment policy (Güner 
et al, 2006) or corporate capital structures (Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005). Other research 
assumes that bankers on the board merely serve to monitor the bank’s interest when the 
bank is also a lender to the firm (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Whether they provide 
additional expertise to the firm or whether they perform an additional monitoring role, 
bankers on a firm’s board might be expected to lead to lower firm risk.  
Do board interlocks reduce firm risk? 
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Our dataset covers 140 non-financial firms quoted on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange in the period 1998-2009. We use three variables to measure firm risk and 
twelve variables to measure connectivity of the supervisory board. We find that board 
interlocks reduce the firm’s systematic risk and that bankers on the board increase the 
firm’s ability to mitigate downside risk. We also find that interlocks of the chairman of 
the board reduce the firm’s ability to avoid downside risk.  
An explanation for this effect could be busyness, arguing that the chairman’s 
interlocks reduce his monitoring role. Another explanation is that the chairman actively 
uses information and network resources obtained through his interlocks to steer the firm’s 
decision making towards higher risk decisions. 
The contribution of our research is to add a yet unknown aspect on corporate 
governance. We empirically test the relationship between board connectivity and firm 
risk. To the best of our knowledge this has not been tested before, and our results provide 
an empirical contribution to the existing body of research. Board composition and board 
interlocks are an important aspect of a firm’s governance. Careful composition of a 
board’s interlocking directorates, with other firms and with banks, can reduce a firm’s 
risk.  Corporate Governance Code policy makers should provide more detailed rules than 
a mere limitation of the number of board seats that any one board member may have.  
This chapter is organized as follows. First, in section 2.2 we provide a selection of 
relevant literature, we formulate our hypotheses and explain the Netherlands setting. In 
section 2.3, we give a description of our dataset, our connectivity variables, our risk 
variables, and control variables and the method that we use to examine the effect of board 
interlocking on firm risk. The results of applying this method to our dataset are described 
in section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses possible explanations for the negative effect of 
supervisory board interlocking on firm risk, and the positive effect of the chairman’s 
interlocks on firm risk. In Section 2.6 we elaborate on sources of endogeneity and 
robustness checks. Last, section 2.7 summarizes our findings. 
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2.2 Literature and hypotheses 
 
2.2.1 Networks 
Research on interlocks has grown, with early research in the 1970s and 1980s to more 
extensive research in the 1990s and beyond.  All this research, however, has not been 
able to formulate one consistent view of the effect of interlocks on firms (see Mizruchi 
(1996) for a comprehensive review). The most relevant views for our research are as 
follows. Early research developed the view that cooptation and monitoring are an 
important motive for establishing interlocks when firms attempt to co-opt sources of 
environmental uncertainty (Dooley, 1969).   
Research on board interlocks has not reached unambiguous conclusions. Much of 
the research focuses on the importance of the board’s monitoring role, and point at a lack 
of time for busy directors to perform this role diligently. In short : when directors are too 
busy, too old or part of a board that is too large, boards become less effective monitors of 
management decision making. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that multiple 
directorships place an excessive burden on directors. They also find that busy boards are 
associated with weak corporate governance, lower market-to-book-ratios and weaker 
operating performance. Since control and governance are important instruments in 
managing firm risk, a board’s independence and monitoring are negatively related to firm 
risk (Brick and Chidambaran, 2008).   
An opposite view is that interlocks are a network node through which information 
on business practices flows. The majority of research indicates a positive relationship 
between social networks and investment returns. Valuable experience may be gained and 
insights can be shared with other firms dealing with similar issues. Corporate practices 
are spread through board interlocks, social peers have a significant influence on corporate 
finance decision making and firms with more social connections have more similar 
investment levels (Fracassi, 2012). Board interlocks affect the decision to acquire take-
over targets (Haunschild, 1993). Cai and Sevilir (2009) find that acquirers pay 
significantly lower takeover premiums in connected transactions. They suggest that 
interlocks help avoid overpaying for target firms. Firms with better networked boards 
engage in better transactions, and well-connected firms have a better post-merger 
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performance (Schonlau and Singh, 2009). Fund managers invest more in, and perform 
much better on, shareholdings of companies with board members they went to school 
with (Cohen, Frazelli and Malloy, 2008).  However, also some evidence is found from a 
negative effect of social ties on investment returns. Powerful CEOs hire directors that are 
more socially connected with them, leading to weaker monitoring and more value 
destroying mergers (Fracassi and Tate, 2008). Social ties at director level between 
acquirer and target have a negative acquirer announcement effect, hinting at poorer 
decision making (Ishii and Xuan, 2009).  
Many firms have bankers on their boards. Bankers may be appointed to corporate 
boards for the financial expertise they can provide or because they can perform a 
monitoring role for the firm’s lender. If a banker is appointed for his or her financial 
expertise, a parallel can be drawn with non-banker non-executive board members. Booth 
and Deli (1999) find that commercial bankers are appointed on a firm’s board to provide 
expertise on the market for bank debt.  Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2005) find that 
commercial and investment bankers on a firm’s board provide improved access to 
external finance.  
Banks may have a manager appointed on a client’s supervisory board with the aim 
to seek protection for the bank’s interest and credit (Mizruchi, 1996).  The board position 
then provides an extra mechanism for the bank to facilitate information transfer and 
control managerial decision-making. This degree of control may enhance the benefits of 
the relationship by, for example, strengthening a bank’s commitment to be 
accommodative during difficult financial times (Ongena and Smith, 1998).  Both Booth 
and Deli (1996) and Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) consider the extent to which bankers play 
a monitoring role. Boths confirm that a firm’s overall debt ratio is lower when a director 
is affiliated with the firm’s lender. This is in line with a view that banker-director can 
protect the bank’s interest by discouraging the firm from engaging in a relationship or 
taking loans with banks, which might increase the lender’s risk. For Germany, Dittmann, 
Maug and Schneider (2010) find no evidence for a bank monitoring explanation or that 
bankers support the interlocked firms with capital market expertise or help firms 
overcome financial constraints. They confirm that bank interlocks primarily serve the 
banks’ interest in selling banking services and their lending to firms in the same industry.  
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2.2.2 Risk 
Research is ambiguous as to its prediction of the overall effect of busy directors on firm 
risk. The value of financial assets, like a firm’s securities, depends on its return and on its 
risk.  Return is what an investor expects to receive and risk is as how that return differs 
from the investors’ expectations. Thus is it important to measure risk, since, if we cannot 
measure risk then we cannot measure value.  Measurement of risk has been subject of a 
large body of research in finance and accounting.  Generally, risk is measured using 
probability distributions. For discrete variables, for instance whether a firm goes 
bankrupt, risk is measured as the relative frequency reflecting with firms have gone 
bankrupt in the past under similar circumstances. For continuous variables, such as share 
returns, risk can be measured as the variance and standard deviation of the distribution of 
the returns.  But even though such a probabilistic measurement seems logical, we have to 
apply it with caution. In principle, all numbers are meaningless without proper 
understanding of the underlying theory of probability. Probability distributions all work 
the same mathematically but may represent different meanings depending on the 
probability theory used. In this research our starting point to approach risk is the CAPM 
(Sharpe, 1964 ; Lintner, 1965) as it is a widely accepted model.   
The CAPM is a portfolio approach that decomposes total risk into systematic risk 
and specific risk. Systematic risk, or non-diversifiable risk, is the risk due to market wide  
economic circumstances. As the market moves, each individual asset is more or less 
affected. To the extent that any asset participates in such general market moves, that asset 
incurs systematic risk. For a well-diversified investor systematic risk is the only risk that 
matters. 
Firm specific risk, or diversifiable risk, is the risk that is unique to an individual 
firm. It represents the component of a firm’s return which is uncorrelated with general 
market moves.  According to the CAPM, the marketplace compensates investors for 
taking systematic risk but not for taking firm specific risk. This is because firm specific 
risk can be diversified away. When an investor holds the market portfolio, each 
individual asset in that portfolio entails specific risk, but through diversification, the 
investor's net exposure is just the systematic risk of the market portfolio.  
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Systematic risk, or market risk, can be measured using beta. According to the 
CAPM, the expected return of a share equals the risk-free rate plus the portfolio's beta 
multiplied by the expected excess return of the market portfolio. Specifically, if  Zୱ  and 
ܼ௠  are random variables for the simple returns of the share and the market over some 
specified period, and ௙ܼ  is the known risk-free rate, expressed as a simple return, and ߚ 
is the share's beta, then equation (1)  applies: 
E(Zୱ) =  z୤ +  Ⱦ[E(Z୫) െ  z୤ ]     (1) 
In equation (1) E refers to an expectation. The equation states that the share's 
expected excess return over the risk-free rate equals its beta times the market's expected 
excess return over the risk free rate. This is the essence of the CAPM: a share's expected 
excess return depends on its beta and not on its volatility. Formulated differently, excess 
return depends upon systematic risk and not on total risk. 
In measuring risk, the probability distribution of future returns is an important 
aspect, for which variability measures are used as risk proxies. The CAPM assumes a 
normal (symmetrical) distribution of returns.  Behavioral decision theory, however, finds 
that such a proxy for risk does not reflect decision maker’s conceptualization of risk 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Managers and investors are proposed to be averse to 
downside risk, defined as below target performance. Downside risk is also being referred 
to as ‘loss aversion’ (Kahneman and Tvesrky, 1982) or ‘regret aversion’ (Bell, 1983). In 
order to capture a decision maker’s preference for aversion of below target performance, 
alternative measures had to be made, reflecting the fact that the probability of future 
returns may not be normally distributed.  
Early research by Markowitz (1959) provided two suggestions for measuring 
downside risk: a semi-variance computed from the mean return or below mean semi-
variance and a semi-variance computed from a target return or below-target semi 
variance. The two measures compute a variance using only the returns below the mean 
return or below a target return. Since only a subset of the return distribution is used, 
Markowitz called these measures partial or semi-variances. Unlike central moments, 
partial moments focus on a subset of the distribution rather than on the entire distribution. 
If the subset corresponds to the lower part of the distribution, and the upper bound of the 
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subset coincides with the target return, then we have the Lower Partial Moment (LPM). 
Hence, a downside risk measure captures the relative underperformance of the firm 
reflecting risk averse behavior (Fishburn, 1977). 
 
2.2.3 Hypotheses 
This chapter investigates the effect of board interlocks on firm risk. We combine insights 
from agency theory and management research with insights from social network studies 
and research on firm risk. Boards are part of a firms’ corporate governance. Since Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) many scholars have investigated various aspects of corporate 
governance and risk. 
A first strand of literature on focuses on shareholder portfolio diversification and 
firm risk. A central theme is that if shareholder wealth is largely concentrated in the firms 
they own, risk-averse owners will seek to avoid risk more than they would if they would 
hold a diversified portfolio.  In these studies ownership concentration is often used as a 
proxy for shareholder portfolio diversification.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that the 
presence of block positions held by founder families, whom they assume to be 
undiversified investors, is surprisingly associated with higher operating risk. Faccio, 
Marchina and Mura (2010) show that there are many cases in which large shareholders 
hold well diversified portfolios. They also show that while the large shareholders who 
hold smaller equity stakes tend to hold more diversified portfolios, this correlation is 
relatively low.  
We take a different approach, following the concept that risk averse shareholders 
influence the firm’s decision making through the selection and appointment of well-
connected directors. In general, the firm’s management is appointed by the shareholders, 
with large shareholders playing an important role in the selection and approval process. 
In concentrated equity markets large shareholders may even be directly represented on 
the firm’s board. With or without direct shareholder representation, board interlocks can 
therefore be used by shareholders to facilitate the flow of information on business 
practices and to effectively exert influence on the firms decision making. Risk averse 
shareholders will seek to mitigate their equity risk through influence on the firms’ 
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decision making. Our Hypothesis 1 therefore is that board interlocks have a negative 
effect on systematic risk. 
A second strand of literature focuses on the effect of managers’ employment 
aspects on firm risk. Since the manager's income from employment in general comprises 
a major portion of his total income, and his employment income is closely related to the 
firm's performance, the risk associated with managers' income is closely related to the 
firm's risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Such employment risk cannot be effectively 
diversified by managers in their personal portfolios, since unlike many other sources of 
income such as shares, human capital cannot be traded in competitive markets. Risk-
averse managers can therefore be expected to diversify this employment risk by other 
means, such as engaging their firms in conglomerate mergers, which generally stabilize 
the firm's income stream and may even be used to avoid the disastrous effects bankruptcy 
has on managers. Thus, conglomerate mergers, while not of obvious benefit to investors, 
may benefit managers by reducing their employment risk, which is largely un 
diversifiable in capital or other markets.  
Furthermore, managers receiving part of their compensation in equity display risk 
averse behavior. Low (2006) studies the effect of equity-based compensation on 
managers’ risk-taking behavior and finds that managerial risk aversion is a serious 
agency issue, which leads managers to reduce firm risk. In a changing legal regime, 
leading to greater takeover protection, managers respond by decreasing firm risk. 
Consequently, based on these considerations, we expect that risk averse managers use 
board interlocks to increase the firm’s ability to mitigate downside risk (Hypothesis 2)2. 
                                                 
2For the sake of completeness we note that a third strand of literature focuses on the effect of managerial 
entrenchment on risk.  Lane, Canella and Lubatkin (1998) study the strategies and performance of firms 
whose managers were neither under siege nor confronted with issues clearly conflicting with shareholders’ 
interests. They find no support for the agency theory prediction that management-controlled firms are 
associated with strategically inferior levels of diversification and acquisition types, lower levels of risk, and 
lower levels of returns than are firms with large block shareholders and/or firms with vigilant boards. Their 
findings are opposite to those predicted by agency theory, e.g. as reported by Amihud and Lev, and cited by 
many subsequent researchers.  Amihud and Lev (1981) conjecture that risk-averse managers might be 
expected to diversify their employment risk by other means, such as engaging their firms in conglomerate 
mergers.  A comparison between the Amihud and Lev (1981) and Lane, Canella and Lubatkin (1998) 
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Brick and Chidambaran (2005) find that board independence and monitoring is 
negatively related to firm risk. Boards with greater proportion of outsiders reduce 
variability of corporate decisions and hence reduce riskiness of investments. The 
consequential value loss to shareholders is driven by the value gain to debt holders, and 
that this effect is most visible in highly levered firms (Upadhyay, 2008). The empirical 
findings of Cheng (2008) suggest that larger boards lower the firm risk but the insiders on 
board have incentives to increase volatility (Coles et al., 2006). Bankers are outsiders on 
a firm’s board. Bankers on the board provide an extra mechanism for the bank to 
facilitate information transfer and control managerial decision making. Borrowing across 
all sources of funding may even be reduced if borrowing from the bank represented on 
the board displaces borrowing from other sources (Danisevska, De Jong and Verbeek, 
2006). We expect that bank interlocks will increase board independence and monitoring, 
reduce the variability of the firm’s decisions and riskiness of its investments. Hence, we 
expect that bank interlocks have a negative effect on systematic risk (Hypothesis 3), and 
that bank interlocks mitigate downside risk (Hypothesis 4). 
 
2.2.4 The Dutch setting 
Our hypotheses are generally formulated to apply to firms with a one tier board and to 
firms with a two tier board structure. The institutional setting in The Netherlands allows 
us to test the hypotheses specifically since a two tier board structure is embedded in 
corporate law. In 1971, the statutory two-tier regime was incorporated into the Civil Code 
as part of the mandatory rules of Dutch corporate law for large firms. This means that in 
such a firm the centre of power (control) is vested in the supervisory board (Groenewald, 
2005).  This control is effected (i) by granting important powers to the supervisory board 
                                                                                                                                                 
shows that the discrepancy can be explained by a different use of measures of diversification and by a 
different use of merger definitions.  In general, the insights provided by Lane, Canella and Lubatkin (1998) 
touch upon the boundaries of the application of agency theory to the governance of public companies.  
Governance of a public company is a complex phenomenon and there is growing evidence that agency 
theory by itself is too simplistic to adequately capture its subtleties. Behavioral and management theory, 
with their assumptions that managers are complex, multi-dimensional actors, may be more able to offer 
useful insights. 
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(such as the power to approve key decisions of the managing board, to appoint and 
dismiss the members of the managing board and to adopt the annual accounts) and (ii) by 
the procedure for the appointment of new members of the supervisory board. The Two-
tier Structure Reform Act of 2004 further enlarged shareholder power by giving 
shareholders more influence on the supervisory board and the firm’s strategic decisions 3.  
These changes, applicable as from September, 2004, are relevant for our research since 
they strengthen the accountability of the members of the supervisory board, and more in 
particular the chairman of the supervisory board, towards the shareholders. 
Well after the introduction of codes of best practices in the United Kingdom and 
France (the Cadbury and Viénot Committees respectively),  the Netherlands took the 
initiative to institute a ‘code of best practice’ in the field of corporate governance, only at 
the end of the 1990s. In 1997, the Committee Peters reported on ‘Corporate Governance 
in the Netherlands’, a report with forty recommendations. In December 2002, the 
Committee Peters reported further to reflect on the follow up and implementation of these 
recommendations in the five years since their initial report.  In their 2002 report, the 
Committee Peters advised to form a new committee with the task to not only formulate 
best practice guidelines, but also to examine actively its adoption and implementation and 
to monitor compliance. At the presentation of the 2002 report, the Minister of Finance 
threatened with legislation if the planned code of conduct would not make sufficient 
                                                 
3The Two-tier Structure Reform Act of 2004 requires that members of the supervisory board are appointed 
by the annual general meeting of shareholders. The annual general meeting of shareholders may (i) reject a 
nomination for the appointment of a member of the supervisory board or (ii) dismiss the entire supervisory 
board. Prior shareholder approval is required for decisions to (i) transfer of a firm’s business to a third 
party, (ii) enter or terminate a long term cooperation, such as a joint venture, with another party if that 
cooperation is of fundamental importance to the firm, and (iii) an acquisition or disposal of an interest in 
the shares of a firm when the value represents more than least one-third of the value of the firm’s own 
assets. The remuneration policy of both the executive board and the supervisory board and any option and 
share plans for the executive board must be approved at the annual general meeting of shareholders. The 
firm’s annual accounts must be approved by the annual general meeting of shareholders. At least once a 
year, the executive board elaborates in writing for the supervisory board, in writing, on the key aspects of 
the firm’s strategy.  
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progress towards implementing adequate corporate governance in listed firms. 
Subsequently,  Morris Tabaksblat (former CEO of Unilever) was mandated jointly by the 
Minister of Finance and representatives from publicly firms listed at Euronext 
Amsterdam to draft a new code of best practice for corporate governance of listed firms 
in the Netherlands (the so-called Code Tabaksblat).  
The Code Tabaksblat is in effect as of 2005 and contains twenty one principles, 
based on generally accepted modern concepts of good corporate governance, and one 
hundred and twenty one best practice provisions for the firm’s stakeholders (members of 
the executive board and supervisory board, investors etc.). These best practice provisions 
create a set of standards governing the conduct of members of the executive board and 
supervisory board, the relation to the firm’s external auditor and shareholders. Listed 
firms may depart from the best practice provisions: if the general meeting approves the 
corporate governance structure and authorizes the non-application of certain provisions, 
the relevant firm is deemed to be in compliance with the Code.  
The Code contains provisions pertaining to the executive board’s employment 
(appointment, term, remuneration, and severance) but also states that members of the 
executive board can be members of the supervisory board – not chairmen of a 
supervisory board – of a maximum of two other listed firms. Similarly, the Code contains 
provisions on the functioning of the supervisory board (qualifications, independence, 
conflicts of interest, education and training) and additionally states that no one may be a 
member of the supervisory board of more than five listed firms – a presidency role counts 
as two seats.  
The Dutch setting consists of a legally embedded separation between the 
executive board with daily operational responsibilities and the supervisory board, plus 
best practice recommendations on corporate governance, vested in the Code Tabaksblat. 
Within this framework, the supervisory board does not have operational responsibility but 
is responsible for monitoring for key investment/divestment decisions and oversight of 
the firm’s strategy as mandated by the shareholders. This separation allows us to analyze 
board interlocks at the supervisory board level separately and its effects on firm risk. 
From 2005 onwards, the Code provides that a member of the supervisory board can have 
a maximum four interlocks, with a presidency role counting as two seats. This provision 
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is relevant for our research as it is aimed at strengthening the monitoring function of the 
supervisory board. This provision seemingly assumes a negative relationship between 
supervisory board interlocks and monitoring, while at the same time it assumes a positive 
relation between supervisory board interlocks and firm risk. The purpose of this research 
is to test the latter relationship.  
 
2.3 Methodology and data 
 
2.3.1 Data sources and methodology 
Our sample consists of 140 industrial firms quoted on Euronext Amsterdam. We have 
comprised the dataset using all publicly quoted firms in the sample period and we have 
taken out financial institutions and investment funds due to the specific nature of their 
activities. Our sample period is 1997-2009.  All connectivity data are gathered from 
REACH database. We manually count the number of connections per individual board 
member, distinguishing between executive board and supervisory board, and analyze 
lock-in connection within the sample of firms.  Next, we aggregate connections for each 
firm.  Accounting data and market data are obtained from COMPUSTAT, outliers (values 
more than three standard deviations from the mean) are removed and the set is 
subsequently matched with the connectivity data.  In total, our dataset counts 1946 firm 
years of which 1707 firm years are used for our primary model. 
We conduct cross-sectional linear panel regression analyses. To investigate the 
effect of each connectivity (interlock) variable on firm risk we construct the following 
models: 
 
TotalRisk୲  =  ȕ଴ +  ȕଵConnectivity୲ିଵ + ȕଶReturnOnAssets୲ିଵ +  ȕଷLeverage୲ିଵ +
 ȕସMaturity୲ିଵ +  ȕହ Size୲ିଵ + ȕ଺RelativeMembers୲ିଵ + ȕ଻CurrentRatio୲ିଵ +
 ȕ଼RelativeR&ܦ୲ିଵ +  ȕଽ ShareReturn୲ିଵ +  İ୧    (2) 
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DownsideRisk୲ =  ȕ଴ +  ȕଵConnectivity୲ିଵ + ȕଶReturnOnAssets୲ିଵ +  ȕଷLeverage୲ିଵ +
 ȕସMaturity୲ିଵ +  ȕହ Size୲ିଵ + ȕ଺RelativeMembers୲ିଵ + ȕ଻CurrentRatio୲ିଵ +
 ȕ଼RelativeR&ܦ୲ିଵ +  ȕଽ ShareReturn୲ିଵ +  İ୧     (3) 
 
Beta୲ =
 ȕ଴ + ȕଵConnectivity୲ିଵ + ȕଶReturnOnAssets୲ିଵ +  ȕଷLeverage୲ିଵ +  ȕସMaturity୲ିଵ +
 ȕହ Size୲ିଵ + ȕ଺RelativeMembers୲ିଵ + ȕ଻CurrentRatio୲ିଵ + ȕ଼RelativeR&ܦ୲ିଵ +
 ȕଽ ShareReturn୲ିଵ +  İ୧       (4)4 
 
2.3.2 Risk variables 
Risk is a characteristic of organizations experiencing volatile income streams. We use the 
following dependent variables, based on the market return of the firm’s securities, to 
measure income stream volatility: 
TotalRisk is share price volatility for any given year based on weekly returns, 
defined asටσ( ܴ െ ܴ௜ )²    (5) , where R represents share return defined as (Ln(t+1) – 
Ln(t)). 
DownsideRisk is the downside risk on return, calculated as ඨ෍  (Ɏ୧,୲ െ R୧,୯)
గ
ோழగ
²  
(6), where ʌ equals a target return. We use the lower partial moment, as developed by 
                                                 
4 The focus on systematic risk is based on the assumption that shareholders are alike and can hold a 
combination of the market portfolio and a risk free asset, and therefore can diversify away idiosyncratic 
risk. Under these CAPM conditions, idiosyncratic risk doesn’t matter. However, asset pricing literature 
finds that idiosyncratic risk may also affect returns, for instance when shareholders do not hold a 
diversified portfolio. Therefore, we performed OLS tests with idiosyncratic risk similar to the tests 
performed for systematic risk. These measures generated insignificant results.  Results are available from 
the author. 
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Fishburn (1977), and especially the root lower partial moment. Downside risk is 
measured as the second order root lower partial moment. This downside risk measure 
captures the relative underperformance of the firm, and a high measure implies that the 
firm has a poor ability to avoid downside risk. Employing a second order coefficient 
enforces the effect of below target performance reflecting a risk adverse behavior 
(Fishburn, 1977; Miller and Reuer, 1996). This downside risk measure has shown to be 
robust for different threshold levels (Reuer and Leiblein, 2000) and therefore, we did not 
consider alternative measures in this study. Since we measure ‘loss aversion’ we set ʌ at 
zero. 
Beta is one year Beta calculated based on weekly returns. We compare the firm’s 
performance to the AEX index. This most important index on the Amsterdam Euronext 
Exchange is a market-value weighted index, representing the performance of the 25 most 
traded Dutch shares on the Amsterdam Exchange. 
 
2.3.3 Connectivity variables 
We limit our research to current board interlocks. Past board interlocks and social ties 
(school, education or otherwise) are not taken into account.  The concept of connectivity 
comes from social network theory.  Social network theory analyzes people, actors and/or 
groups from a network perspective (Wasserman and Faust, 1999 page 9). The concept of 
a network emphasizes the fact that each actor or group has ties, each of whom in turn is 
tied to others.  A social network thus refers to the set of actors and the ties among them.  
In social network theory the concept of connectivity often refers to ‘the minimum number 
of actors whose removal would not allow the group to remain connected or would reduce 
the group to but a single member’ (White and Harary, 2001 page 306). In our research we 
define interlocks as ’the aggregate number of relevant board links from one member of 
the network of public companies in the Netherlands to another member‘. 
We expect that the dataset may be characterized as there is a relatively large 
amount of extreme interlock observations. This is because our dataset contains a mixture 
of larger and smaller firms, and larger firms tend to have large boards with sometimes 
many interlocks. Therefore, in prevailing cases ‘scale’ variables are logscaled.  
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In developing connectivity variables we focus on the monitoring role as vested in the 
supervisory board and develop various variables measuring supervisory board 
connections with other publicly quoted firms. We furthermore focus on supervisory board 
banking connections to test our hypotheses. We use the following lagged independent 
variables: 
ConnectedMembers is the number of connected members of the supervisory board, i.e. 
serving as a member of the supervisory board in a firm within the network of publicly 
quoted firms. Connections is the cumulative number of connections of the supervisory 
board with firms within the network of publicly quoted firms. LogConnections is 
log(Connections+1). Chairman is the cumulative number of connections of the Chairman 
of the supervisory board to firms within the network of publicly quoted firms. 
LogChairman is log(Chairman+1). Bank is the cumulative number of connections of the 
supervisory board to Netherlands banks. LogBank is log(Bank+1). Active is the number 
of members of the supervisory board actively serving as a member of the executive board 
in a firm within the network of publicly quoted firms. LogActive is log (Active+1). 
PercentageConnectedMembersis the percentage of supervisory board members connected 
(is ConnectedMembers divided by the number of members in the supervisory board). 
AverageBoardConnection is the average number of connections of the supervisory board 
(equaling Connections divided by the number of members in the supervisory board). 
AverageMemberConnection is the average number of connections per connected member 
of the supervisory board (equaling Connections divided by ConnectedMembers). 
 
2.3.4 Control variables 
For each risk variable we perform a series of regressions testing the effect of each 
connectivity variable separately, controlling for a number of financial variables. Such 
financial variables are set up to include at least one performance related variable, at least 
one leverage related variable, at least one size related variable, at least one investment 
related variable, a liquidity (of assets) variable and a market return related variable. The 
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total set of control variables is constructed so as to minimize correlation among the 
control variables, whilst at the same time assuring the best statistical model fit 5. 
 
We initially consider a selection from the following independent control variables 
to build our control model: 
ReturnOnAssets is operating income divided by book value of total assets. 
ReturnOnEquity is net profit divided by book value of equity. FreeCashFlow is 
calculated as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and is (net profit plus depreciation minus 
investments in fixed assets) divided by book value of total assets. Leverage is total debt 
divided by book value of total assets. Maturity is long term debt divided by (long term 
debt plus short term debt). Members is the number of members of the supervisory board. 
Size is calculated as log(sales). CapitalIntensity is book value of fixed assets divided by 
book value of total assets. RelativeR&D is R&D expenditure divided by book value of 
total assets. In case no R&D expense is reported we assume R&D expenditure equals nil. 
CurrentRatio is current assets divided by book value of total assets. ShareReturn is 
average share return measured on an annual basis. 
To build the control model we investigate all correlations between the potential 
dependent variables and the explanatory power of the various possible control model 
variables. We find generally acceptably low correlations with the exception of a high 
correlation between Members and Size. Therefore, we decide to replace Members with 
RelativeMembers.  Rather than an absolute indicator of size of the supervisory board, the 
new variable RelativeMembersequates the relative size of the supervisory board related to 
the combined size of the supervisory board and the executive board together. We select 
ReturnOnAssets (rather than ReturnOnEquity or FreeCashFlow) as performance variable 
in the control model based on model fit.  We exclude CapitalIntensity as investment 
variable from the control model as this variable has by definition perfect correlation with 
CurrentRatio. 
Our final control model consists of the variables ReturnOnAssets, Leverage, 
Maturity, Size, RelativeMembers, RelativeR&D, CurrentRatioandShareReturn.  
                                                 
5 Using R², AdjR², F-value, B-coefficient, VIF scores and T-values . 
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2.4 Results 
 
In Table 2.1, Panel A the connectivity variables are displayed. We notice a large 
variability of most of the connectivity variables. This is caused by the fact that our dataset 
has connectivity data covering a period of 12 years (1997-2008). In a historical 
perspective the number of board interlocks with firms as well as the number of board 
interlocks with banks is decreasing over time (Heemskerk, 2008) and this effect is further 
strengthened by corporate governance reforms starting with the recommendations of the 
Committee Peters (1997) and the subsequent introduction of the Code Tabaksblat (2005). 
For each risk variable we perform panel regressions to test the effect of each connectivity 
variable separately while controlling for a number of financial variables (control 
variables).  
 
 
Panel A: Connectivity Variables
N min. max. mean st. dev.
Members 1707 0.000 14.000 4.712 2.026
RelativeMembers 1707 0.000 1.000 0.618 0.139
ConnectedMembers 1707 0.000 8.000 1.696 1.550
Connections 1707 0.000 24.000 3.136 3.525
LogConnections 1707 0.000 1.398 0.470 0.362
Chairman 1707 0.000 6.000 0.962 1.317
LogChairman 1707 0.000 0.845 0.214 0.250
Bank 1707 0.000 6.000 0.473 0.870
Logank 1707 0.000 0.845 0.118 0.190
Active 1707 0.000 4.000 0.241 0.526
LogActive 1707 0.000 0.699 0.067 0.139
PercentageConnectedMember 1707 0.000 1.000 0.331 0.272
AverageBoardConnection 1707 0.000 3.429 0.593 0.578
AverageMemberConnection 1707 0.000 7.000 1.290 1.062  
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Panel B: Financial Variables
N min. max. mean st. dev.
TotalRisk 1710 0.100 4.347 0.410 0.270
Beta 1501 -7.017 15.987 0.437 1.141
DownsideRisk 1709 0.000 1.336 0.259 0.173
StockReturn 1673 -0.137 1.557 0.015 0.083
ReturnOnAssets 1613 -1.246 3.000 0.032 0.155
ReturnOnEquity 1617 -9.491 5.665 0.066 0.675
Maturity 1456 0.000 1.000 0.558 0.313
CurrentRatio 1594 0.000 1.000 0.571 0.209
Size 1594 0.602 7.941 5.460 0.953
RelativeR&D 1594 0.000 0.449 0.012 0.039
CapitalIntensity 1594 0.000 1.000 0.429 0.209
FreeCashFlow 1587 -4.605 7.600 0.071 0.298
Leverage 1584 0.000 1.263 0.240 0.175  
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the connectivity variables and the financial variables. 
Connectivity variables are averaged over the years 1997-2008, and financial variables are averaged over the 
years 1996-2009. 
Table 2.2 displays the results of the effect of the various connectivity variables 
with TotalRisk. The model fit is relatively strong with F-values around 21, R-squared 
around 25% and adj R-squared at 24%. We notice strong correlation (r=-0.560) with high 
significance (p<1%) between performance (control) variable ReturnOnAssets and 
TotalRisk.  This is in line with research indicating a negative relation between firm 
performance and share price volatility. Simply put, share prices of well managed firms 
with better performance are likely to be more stable and to fluctuate less (Huan et al, 
2011). With regards to the relation between the various connectivity variables and 
TotalRisk generally we notice that correlation is low and statistically insignificant. 
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TotalRisk
Model () (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ReturnOnAssets -0.561*** -0.560*** -0.561*** -0.560*** -0.560*** -0.560***
(0.160) (0.160) (0.161) (0.159) (0.158) (0.159)
Leverage -0.0684 -0.0708 -0.0710 -0.0687 -0.0698 -0.0669
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.101)
Size 0.00264 0.00391 0.00593 0.000834 0.00121 0.00105
(0.0381) (0.0378) (0.0386) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0364)
Maturity 0.00411 0.00359 0.00516 0.00321 0.00278 0.00303
(0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0302)
RelativeMembers 0.0817 0.0823 0.0909 0.0751 0.0743 0.0769
(0.0751) (0.0758) (0.0739) (0.0763) (0.0759) (0.0768)
RelativeR&D -1.185 -1.178 -1.167 -1.201 -1.204 -1.195
(0.852) (0.851) (0.856) (0.851) (0.850) (0.853)
CurrentRatio 0.00234 0.00151 0.00265 0.00313 0.00331 0.000324
(0.0995) (0.0997) (0.0998) (0.0990) (0.0989) (0.0994)
StockReturn -0.146 -0.144 -0.138 -0.148 -0.149 -0.147
(0.0974) (0.0974) (0.0930) (0.0975) (0.0957) (0.0992)
ConnectedMembers -0.00441
(0.00983)
Connections -0.00321
(0.00402)
LogConnections -0.0522
(0.0603)
Chairman 0.00179
(0.00842)
LogChairman 0.0173
(0.0536)
Bank -0.00650
(0.00803)
R-squared 0.253 0.253 0.254 0.253 0.253 0.253
Adj-R2 0.240 0.240 0.241 0.239 0.240 0.240
F-stat 21.19 21.18 20.73 21.73 21.67 21.27
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154
Number of id 182 182 182 182 182 182  
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TotalRisk (continued)
Model () (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ReturnOnAssets -0.560*** -0.559*** -0.559*** -0.559*** -0.560*** -0.559***
(0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.157) (0.159) (0.160)
Leverage -0.0655 -0.0643 -0.0651 -0.0673 -0.0679 -0.0739
(0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100)
Size 0.00182 0.00117 0.000976 -0.00134 0.000339 0.00430
(0.0363) (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0374) (0.0371) (0.0374)
Maturity 0.00293 0.00262 0.00272 0.00217 0.00334 0.00439
(0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0304) (0.0297) (0.0301) (0.0301)
RelativeMembers 0.0796 0.0716 0.0722 0.0747 0.0751 0.0816
(0.0769) (0.0779) (0.0780) (0.0767) (0.0764) (0.0746)
RelativeR&D -1.189 -1.203 -1.202 -1.208 -1.198 -1.185
(0.854) (0.848) (0.849) (0.850) (0.851) (0.851)
CurrentRatio -0.000579 0.00458 0.00408 0.00231 0.00275 0.00501
(0.0989) (0.0995) (0.0995) (0.0984) (0.0991) (0.0994)
StockReturn -0.147 -0.153 -0.152 -0.150 -0.147 -0.139
(0.0996) (0.104) (0.104) (0.0973) (0.0971) (0.0945)
LogBank -0.0546
(0.0342)
Active 0.0124
(0.0154)
LogActive 0.0364
(0.0569)
PercentageConnectedMembers 0.0262
(0.0471)
AverageBoardConnection 0.000293
(0.0218)
AverageMemberConnection -0.0144
(0.0133)
R-squared 0.254 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.254
Adj-R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.239 0.241
F-stat 21.13 21.07 21.19 21.74 21.18 20.98
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154
Number of id 182 182 182 182 182 182
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 2.2: Total Risk 
This table presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression that explain the relation between 
each connectivity variable on Total Risk. Variables are explained in section 2.4.1 to 2.4.3. The regression 
includes year effects and firm fixed effects. A lagged model is used to confirm direction of causality. A 
robustness test is performed with contemporaneous models. P-values are in parentheses and based on 
Huber/White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. The table shows *, ** and *** for values that 
are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.3 displays the results of the effect of the various connectivity variables 
with Beta. Model fit is relatively low with F-stat around 4, R-squared around 7.5% and 
adj. R-squared around 5.5%. We notice strong correlation (around r=0.690) with some 
statistical significance (p<10%) between performance (control) variable ReturnOnAssets 
and Beta. The relationship between performance and Beta has been subject of some 
controversy since Fama and French (1992) study on the validity of the CAPM.  For the 
US Fama and French (1992) find that beta does not seem to help explain the cross/section 
of average share returns. Strong and Xu (1997) report similar insignificant relations for 
the UK. For other European countries Heston et al (1999) finds a significant positive 
relationship, however with the risk premium on beta concentrated in January.  Different 
approaches have been developed by Pettengill (1995) confirmed by Fletcher (2000), 
arguing a conditional relationship between beta and return. Both studies find that in 
periods with a positive excess market return, there is a positive beta/return relationship, 
whereas in periods with negative excess market return, the relationship is negative. Our 
study, however, is set up differently and therefore we cannot confirm support for the 
Pettengill/Fletcher findings.  
With regards to the relation between the various connectivity variables and Beta 
we notice that one correlation between LogConnections and Beta is negative and 
moderately strong (r=-0.410) and significant at the 10% level. With regards to the relation 
between the various other connectivity variables and Beta generally we notice that 
correlation is statistically insignificant.   
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Beta 
Model () (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ReturnOnAssets 0.709* 0.717* 0.714* 0.693* 0.689* 0.691*
(0.375) (0.373) (0.370) (0.376) (0.377) (0.378)
Leverage 0.462 0.440 0.447 0.486 0.486 0.504
(0.662) (0.667) (0.658) (0.665) (0.666) (0.666)
Size -0.350 -0.346 -0.345 -0.369 -0.365 -0.363
(0.232) (0.237) (0.231) (0.233) (0.234) (0.233)
Maturity 0.194 0.181 0.190 0.183 0.181 0.177
(0.123) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
RelativeMembers -0.168 -0.198 -0.138 -0.270 -0.271 -0.258
(0.292) (0.279) (0.297) (0.263) (0.264) (0.263)
RelativeR&D -2.333 -2.369 -2.336 -2.528 -2.562 -2.534
(1.751) (1.740) (1.739) (1.750) (1.756) (1.734)
CurrentRatio -0.565 -0.555 -0.550 -0.552 -0.544 -0.552
(0.453) (0.455) (0.449) (0.459) (0.460) (0.457)
StockReturn -0.231 -0.204 -0.179 -0.222 -0.232 -0.259
(0.519) (0.526) (0.520) (0.528) (0.525) (0.536)
ConnectedMembers -0.0700
(0.0471)
Connections -0.0333
(0.0205)
LogConnections -0.410*
(0.218)
Chairman -0.0132
(0.0325)
LogChairman 0.0235
(0.174)
Bank -0.0917
(0.0625)
R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.078 0.070 0.070 0.074
Adj-R2 0.057 0.057 0.060 0.052 0.052 0.056
F-stat 3.634 3.972 3.942 3.785 3.593 3.581
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046
Number of id 176 176 176 176 176 176  
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Beta (continued)
Model () (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ReturnOnAssets 0.692* 0.693* 0.692* 0.697* 0.706* 0.697*
(0.378) (0.379) (0.378) (0.370) (0.371) (0.372)
Leverage 0.510 0.517 0.507 0.460 0.451 0.457
(0.665) (0.663) (0.665) (0.656) (0.661) (0.666)
Size -0.361 -0.362 -0.364 -0.361 -0.362 -0.354
(0.232) (0.234) (0.233) (0.229) (0.233) (0.235)
Maturity 0.179 0.181 0.181 0.197 0.185 0.182
(0.121) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.121) (0.120)
RelativeMembers -0.248 -0.286 -0.281 -0.262 -0.274 -0.237
(0.265) (0.266) (0.265) (0.266) (0.264) (0.273)
RelativeR&D -2.505 -2.610 -2.591 -2.420 -2.456 -2.523
(1.743) (1.771) (1.766) (1.749) (1.742) (1.747)
CurrentRatio -0.545 -0.540 -0.543 -0.559 -0.552 -0.536
(0.456) (0.459) (0.459) (0.451) (0.454) (0.456)
StockReturn -0.264 -0.264 -0.256 -0.215 -0.206 -0.187
(0.535) (0.527) (0.527) (0.521) (0.526) (0.532)
LogBank -0.384
(0.265)
Active 0.0825
(0.104)
LogActive 0.207
(0.318)
PercentageConnectedMembers -0.314
(0.207)
AverageBoardConnection -0.141
(0.106)
AverageMemberConnection -0.0578
(0.0609)
R-squared 0.073 0.072 0.071 0.074 0.073 0.072
Adj-R2 0.055 0.054 0.053 0.056 0.056 0.054
F-stat 3.589 3.641 3.594 3.737 3.848 3.704
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046
Number of id 176 176 176 176 176 176
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 2.3: Beta 
This table presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression that explain the relation between 
each connectivity variable on Beta. Variables are explained in section 2.4.1 to 2.4.3. The regression 
includes year effects and firm fixed effects. A lagged model is used to confirm direction of causality. A 
robustness test is performed with contemporaneous models. P-values are in parentheses and based on 
Huber/White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. The table shows *, ** and *** for values that 
are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
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Table 2.4 displays the results of the effect of the various connectivity variables 
with DownsideRisk. Model fit is relatively strong with F-values around 25, R-squared 
around 32% and adj R-squared at 31%. We notice weak negative correlation (r=-0.211) 
with high significance (p<1%) between performance (control) variable ReturnOnAssets 
and DownsideRisk. With regards to the correlation between the various connectivity 
variables and DownsideRisk we notice a very weak positive correlation (r=0.0380) 
between LogChairman and DownsideRisk significant at the 10% level, a very weak 
negative correlation between Bank and DownsideRisk (r=-0.0115) and LogBank and 
DownsideRisk (r=-0.0674) both significant at the 10% level. With regards to the relation 
between the various other connectivity variables and DownsideRisk generally we notice 
that correlation is statistically insignificant.   
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DownsideRisk
Model () (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ReturnOnAssets -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.213*** -0.211***
(0.0743) (0.0748) (0.0748) (0.0743) (0.0740) (0.0745)
Leverage -0.00895 -0.0101 -0.00936 -0.0111 -0.0136 -0.00697
(0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0529)
Size 0.0384 0.0403 0.0400 0.0398 0.0403 0.0395
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0277)
Maturity -0.00487 -0.00459 -0.00438 -0.00498 -0.00580 -0.00530
(0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222)
RelativeMembers -0.0578 -0.0533 -0.0534 -0.0562 -0.0577 -0.0535
(0.0528) (0.0518) (0.0520) (0.0516) (0.0515) (0.0520)
RelativeR&D -0.317 -0.306 -0.309 -0.324 -0.331 -0.312
(0.296) (0.297) (0.298) (0.296) (0.296) (0.295)
CurrentRatio -0.0319 -0.0331 -0.0323 -0.0312 -0.0309 -0.0369
(0.0576) (0.0578) (0.0577) (0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0578)
StockReturn -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.126*** -0.129*** -0.125***
(0.0463) (0.0459) (0.0462) (0.0463) (0.0467) (0.0451)
ConnectedMembers 0.000921
(0.00500)
Connections -0.00151
(0.00238)
LogConnections -0.0107
(0.0232)
Chairman 0.00460
(0.00360)
LogChairman 0.0380*
(0.0210)
Bank -0.0115*
(0.00669)
R-squared 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.323 0.323
Adj-R2 0.308 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.310 0.310
F-stat 24.29 24.61 24.82 24.67 24.47 24.35
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131
Number of id 181 181 181 181 181 181
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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DownsideRisk (Continued)
Model () (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ReturnOnAssets -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.210***
(0.0745) (0.0746) (0.0745) (0.0741) (0.0746) (0.0745)
Leverage -0.00596 -0.00679 -0.00755 -0.00903 -0.00943 -0.0109
(0.0526) (0.0532) (0.0533) (0.0534) (0.0532) (0.0533)
Size 0.0399 0.0394 0.0392 0.0377 0.0392 0.0403
(0.0275) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0283)
Maturity -0.00520 -0.00520 -0.00506 -0.00548 -0.00454 -0.00444
(0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0221)
RelativeMembers -0.0513 -0.0581 -0.0576 -0.0563 -0.0568 -0.0543
(0.0520) (0.0521) (0.0521) (0.0518) (0.0519) (0.0516)
RelativeR&D -0.306 -0.317 -0.316 -0.322 -0.311 -0.311
(0.296) (0.294) (0.294) (0.296) (0.297) (0.295)
CurrentRatio -0.0369 -0.0310 -0.0314 -0.0321 -0.0324 -0.0311
(0.0574) (0.0579) (0.0579) (0.0574) (0.0577) (0.0576)
StockReturn -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.122***
(0.0443) (0.0471) (0.0471) (0.0471) (0.0464) (0.0466)
LogBank -0.0674**
(0.0285)
Active 0.00701
(0.0103)
LogActive 0.0169
(0.0340)
PercentageConnected 0.0189
(0.0226)
AverageBoardConnection -0.00463
(0.0125)
AverageMemberConnection -0.00522
(0.00570)
R-squared 0.324 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.321
Adj-R2 0.312 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.308 0.309
F-stat 24.23 25.60 25.90 24.41 24.47 26.16
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131
Number of id 181 181 181 181 181 181
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 2.4: Downside Risk 
This table presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression that explain the relation between 
each connectivity variable on Downside Risk. Variables are explained in section 2.4.1 to 2.4.3. The 
regression includes year effects and firm fixed effects. A lagged model is used to confirm direction of 
causality. A robustness test is performed with contemporaneous models. P-values are in parentheses and 
based on Huber/White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. The table shows *, ** and *** for 
values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
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2.5 Discussion 
 
We have performed panel regressions testing the correlation between twelve connectivity 
variables on three risk variables separately. After controlling for year effects and firm 
fixed effects we find four statistically significant relations. Three relations are at the 10% 
level and one is at the 5% level. At first sight there does not seem to be an overwhelming 
amount of support for a statistical correlation between board connectivity and firm risk. 
However, it is worthwhile to take a deeper dive into the statistically significant relations.  
A first finding is that there is no statistically significant correlation between a 
firm’s total risk and any of the connectivity variables. Consequently, a firm’s general 
share price volatility cannot be explained by board connectivity. That means we have to 
dive deeper. We find a relatively strong and negative correlation between a firm’s beta 
and its cumulative number of supervisory board connections. With regards to interlocks 
with other firms, we expect that such interlocks provide superior information at low or no 
cost. Board networks have been shown to be an important source of inter-organizational 
information about corporate practices, strategies, contacts, new business opportunities, 
and general business information (Davis, 1991; Mizruchi, 1996).  Recent research 
confirms that such information flow for instance includes inside information on corporate 
best practices and finance policies (Fracassi, 2012), or investment and acquisition 
opportunities (Ishii and Xuan, 2009). Superior information leads to better informed 
decision making. We conjecture that board interlocks serve as a node through which 
information flows and experience is shared. Passively, information flows through the 
network, and actively resources within the network can be mobilized and actively 
contacted for specific needs (Heemskerk, 2007). This enables firms to make better 
informed decisions leading to a lower firm Beta. This is confirmed with the negative 
relation between the firm’s beta and the number of its supervisory board connection. 
Interlocks with banks differ from interlocks with firms.  Banks have one of their 
managers on the supervisory board of a client, with the aim to seek protection for the 
bank’s interest and credit (Mizruchi, 1996).  Interlocks provide an extra mechanism for 
the bank to facilitate information transfer and control managerial decision-making. This 
degree of control may enhance the benefits of the relationship by, for example, 
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strengthening a bank’s commitment to be accommodative during difficult financial times 
(Ongena and Smith, 1998).  We conjecture that through board interlocks banks control 
the firms’ decision making processes and provide financial commitment as a consequence 
of which firms with bank interlocks experience lower sensitivity to risk.  This conjecture 
is confirmed with a (weak) negative relation between the firms’ downside risk and the 
number of bankers on its board. Bankers on a firm’s board increase the firm’s ability to 
avoid downside risk. According to the CAPM, lower systematic risk will be compensated 
with lower equity returns. The board interlocks of the lending bank, therefore, enable the 
bank to achieve its goal - protection of their credit – at the expense of the equity 
investors. 
Interlocks through the chairman of the supervisory board can be explained as 
follows. An obvious explanation for the positive relation between the firm’s downside 
risk and the number of interlocks from its chairman is busyness. Our finding could 
provide support for the busy board literature. When the chairman of the supervisory 
board is too busy, the supervisory board becomes less effective in monitoring 
management’s decision making. Since control and governance are important instruments 
in managing firm risk, a board’s monitoring is negatively related to firm risk (Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2008). A suggestion for further research is to investigate the nature of the 
board connectivity of the various members of the supervisory board. More in particular, 
the nature of a chairman’s connections may be different from those of the other members 
of the supervisory board. This might be the underlying reason for the statistically 
significant positive relation between the chairman’s connectivity and the firm’s downside 
risk versus no statistically significant relation between any of the other connectivity 
variables and the firms downside risk.  
An alternative for busyness to explain the positive relationship between the firm’s 
downside risk and the number of connections of its chairman is as follows. Similarly as 
other members of the supervisory board, the chairman may benefit from interlocks with 
other firms by having superior information and the opportunity to activity engage 
network resources. To the extent that members of the supervisory board influence the 
firm’s daily policies, this will be done in the context of a dialogue between the executive 
board and the supervisory board. This normally only concerns long term policies and the 
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most important decisions. Since such decisions are taken by the executive board, the role 
of the supervisory board is limited to advice rather than decision making. Decisions, for 
which the supervisory board has a veto right, will be marginally tested by the supervisory 
board. This means that such a decision will be tested to the articles of association, to the 
firm’s policy and to the adequacy of the decision making process. Decisions which are 
considered ‘difficult’ are usually pre-discussed with the chairman of the supervisory 
board (van der Knoop, 1991).  This informal mechanism makes that the role of the 
chairman is decisive in all major decisions.  
With regards to external representation, The Dutch corporate governance code 
defines the task of the chairman of the supervisory board as follows: “The chairman of 
the supervisory board shall ensure the proper functioning of the supervisory board and its 
committees, and shall act on behalf of the supervisory board as the main contact for the 
management board and for shareholders regarding the functioning of the management 
and supervisory board members. In his capacity of chairman, he shall ensure the orderly 
and efficient conduct of the general meeting (Monitoring Commission, 2008).” Treadwell 
(2006) posits that the ‘‘chairman is the primary interface with the institutions along with 
the CEO and the finance director’’.  
In his research over the period 1997-2007 Bezemer finds that chairmen of the 
supervisory board perceive an increasing influence of activist shareholders and 
implementation of shareholder value orientation. In addition, chairmen experience a role 
change in that their role becomes more visible to the outside world, such as institutional 
investors, with a higher profile (Bezemer, 2012). The combination of increasing 
shareholder activism and increasing shareholder value orientation, plus a much higher 
level of external visibility of the role of the chairman pushes the chairman to use the 
information obtained through his network to steer the firm’s decisions towards higher risk 
decisions.  This is confirmed through a positive relation between the firm’s downside risk 
and the number of connections of the chairman.  
 Back to our hypotheses. We do not find evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between a firm’s share price volatility and its board interlocks. Therefore, 
correlation between a firm’s share price and its board interlocks has to be explained 
through firm risk. Although we have some evidence, we do not have a large amount of 
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statistically significant evidence that corroborates Hypothesis 1 (board interlocks have a 
negative effect on systematic risk). We find only one moderately strong negative relation 
(significant at the 10% level) between beta and the number of supervisory board 
interlocks. All other eleven tested relations between beta and board interlocks are not 
statistically significant. 
Our expectation that risk averse managers use board interlocks to increase the 
firm’s ability to avoid downside risk (hypothesis 2) is rejected. We only find a rather 
weak positive relation (significant at the 10% level) between the number of interlocks of 
the chairman of the supervisory board and firm’s downside risk. This weak positive 
relationship confirms that interlocks of the chairman of the supervisory board decrease 
the firm’s ability to avoid downside risk. All other tested relations between the firm’s 
downside riskand board interlocks are not statistically significant. We find no evidence 
that bank interlocks have a negative effect on systematic risk (hypothesis 3). All tested 
relations between beta and the number of bank interlocks are not statistically significant. 
We do find evidence that bank interlocks mitigate downside risk. The negative relation 
between a firm’s downside risk and its bank interlocks is statistically significant (at the 
10% and 5% level) and corroborate our hypothesis 4. 
 
2.6 Robustness, endogeneity and causality 
 
We study the effects of board interlocks on firm risk in the period 1998-2009. For our 
model we use connectivity data for the period 1997-2008, and accounting and market 
data for the period 1997-2009. For our control model we use connectivity data for the 
period 1997-2008 and accounting and marketing data for the period 1996-2007. Our 
sample consists of 140 publicly quoted firms on the Euronext Amsterdam. This set of 
firms is relatively consistent over time. In prevailing cases, when firms are acquired and 
subsequently delisted, they are no longer part of the dataset. New firms entering the 
Euronext in any year become part of the dataset. Therefore, since our dataset covers the 
period 1997-2008, firms will appear more than once. Since such observations cannot be 
considered to be random observations, we control for these firm fixed effects.   
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In our panel dataset, we also need to consider the year effect. This refers to the 
aggregate effect of unobserved factors that affect firm risk of all firms equally in any 
given year. This could be a change in legislation of government regulation affecting all 
firms for instance. Such effects are not included in our panel dataset. If we do not take 
this into consideration, we may mistakenly attribute such year effects to connectivity. 
This would lead to inflated or deflated images of the effects of connectivity on firm risk. 
We therefore incorporate year dummy variables into our model and perform robustness 
checks for the same models without taking year dummy variables into account.  The 
results of the model without year dummies confirm the findings from the model with the 
year dummies. The relations are similar and have similar signs of the coefficients. In 
addition, the model without the year dummies finds several more statistically significant 
relations. Since we use the model with year dummy as our principal model, we will not 
further explore any additional relations brought forward by the model without year 
dummies6. 
When performing an OLS regression, a major assumption is that the independent 
variable x୧ is uncorrelated with the error term ߝ௜. When variable ݔ௜ is endogenous, this 
means that ݔ௜ is correlated with the structural error term. In that case  ݔ௜  is determined 
within the model and factors that affect  ݔ௜ will also affect independent variable  ݕ௜. Our 
OLS may then produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. As a consequence, 
our hypotheses tests can be seriously misleading.  We know that the potential for 
endogeneity exists in virtually all studies involving accounting, finance and economic 
variables (Chenhall and Moers, 2007). Generally, there may be various sources of 
endogeneity, the most common of which is the omitted variable bias. This is the case 
when there is another variable which is correlated with both ݔ௜ and ݕ௜ so that after fitting 
the model there still is a relationship with this other variable and the error term. In our 
research we will not further elaborate on this particular source of endogeneity. We have 
reviewed literature and have carefully designed a set of relevant control variables.  
Another source of endogeneity, called reverse causality, is more important for our 
research.  A major challenge in our study is to identify the direction of causality.  To truly 
                                                 
6 Results available from the author 
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be able to make a causal claim, we need a truly exogenous variable - that is, a variable 
which is not related to any of the other variables in the system, unobserved and observed.  
The problem with observational data generally is that there are an infinite number 
of unobserved variables which could render the observed relationship endogenous. A 
common test to deal with this problem is to lag the variable of interest. In our model we 
have lagged the connectivity variables.  Robustness tests with modeling the same 
variables contemporaneously produce comparable yet somewhat different results. The 
contemporaneous models show some different statistically significant correlations but 
with the signs of the coefficients similar to those in the lagged model7.  
However, in our setup the use of a lagged test to deal with reverse causality may 
be weak because our  inter firm connectivity variables of supervisory board members do 
not display many changes. And even though our lagged test results are different from the 
contemporaneous test results, we cannot exclude that our models contains a certain 
degree of endogeneity8.  
                                                 
7 Results available from the author 
8 A possible statistical approach to the estimation of causal relations in observed data could be the method 
of instrumental variables (IVs). This method can be used when standard regression estimates of the relation 
of interest are biased because of reverse causality (but also when there is selection bias, measurement error, 
or presumed unmeasured confounding effects). In this approach, a third, `instrumental' variable is used to 
extract variation in the (IV) variable of interest that is unrelated to these problems, and to use this variation 
to estimate its causal effect on an outcome measure. However, this method is “widely used in econometrics 
and rarely used elsewhere, is conceptually difficult and easily misused.” (Cameron and Trivedi, p.95). The 
reason is that it may be difficult to find variables that can serve as valid instruments. Many variables that 
have an effect on the included endogenous variables also have a direct effect on the dependent variable. 
Another concern is that IV estimators are innately biased, and their finite-sample properties are often 
problematic. Consequently, most of the justification for the use of IV is asymptotic. Performance in small 
samples may be poor and moreover, the precision of IV estimates is lower than that of OLS estimates. In 
the presence of weak instruments (excluded instruments only weakly correlated with included endogenous 
regressors) the loss of precision will be severe, and IV estimates may be no improvement over OLS.  In 
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We also perform an additional test to control for endogeneïty caused by 
correlation between control variables and connectivity variables. For this test we use the 
following model to predict the effect of control variables on each connectivity variable: 
 
Connectivity୲ିଵ =   Ⱦ଴ +  ȾଵReturnOnAssets୲ିଶ +  ȾଶLeverage୲ିଶ + ȾଷMaturity୲ିଶ +
 Ⱦସ Size୲ିଶ + ȾହRelativeMembers୲ିଶ +  Ⱦ଺CurrentRatio୲ିଶ +  Ⱦ଻RelativeR&D୲ିଶ +
 Ⱦ଼ ShareReturn୲ିଶ +  ɂ୧       (7) 
 
Endogeneity might occur if there is significant correlation between the control 
variables and any of the connectivity variables. Table 5 displays this correlation. In our 
analysis we limit our investigation to correlation between the control variables and 
LogConnections, LogChairman, Bank and LogBank respectively since these connectivity 
variables correlate with Beta and DownsideRisk (we refer to tables 2.3 and 2.4).   We find 
very weak correlation between RelativeMembers and LogConnections (r=0.249 with 
p<0.05) and between ShareReturn and LogConnections (r=0.211 with p<1%). Our 
robustness checks do not indicate that endogeneity influences the outcome of our analysis 
with regards to the correlation between LogConnections and Beta. We find very weak 
correlation between Size and LogChairman (r=-0.0968 with p<0.01) and between 
ShareReturn and LogChairman (r=0.227 with p<0.01). Our robustness checks do not 
indicate that endogeneity influences the outcome of our analysis with regards to the 
correlation between LogConnections and DownsideRisk. Of course this evidence cannot 
prove the absence of any endogeneity. 
With regards to Bank we find weak correlation with control variable ReturnOnEquity 
(r=0.00562 with p<0.1), weak correlation with control variable Leverage (r=0.321 with 
p<0.1), strong correlation with control variable RelativeMembers (r=0.473 with p<0.05), 
very strong correlation with control variable RelativeR&D (r=-1.300 with p<0.1) and 
                                                                                                                                                 
addition, the instruments may be weak: satisfactorily exogenous, but only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous regressors. As Bound, Jaeger, Baker (1995) argue “the cure can be worse than the disease”. For 
these reasons, we are not performing the method of Instrumental Variables in this research. 
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very strong correlation with control variable ShareReturn (r=0.855 with p<0.05). Our 
conclusions on the correlation between Bank and DownsideRisk have to be drawn 
carefully, since endogeneity may influence our analysis. A similar pattern applies for 
correlation between LogBank and various control variables. Also, any conclusion on the 
correlation between LogBank and DownsideRisk has to be drawn carefully.  In general, a 
limitation in our research is the use of publicly available data as reported. This implies 
that conclusions on the correlation of any connectivity variable and DownsideRisk may 
have to be drawn carefully. Accounting misstatements, or purposely used income 
smoothing and reporting techniques may weaken a possible positive correlation between 
DownsideRisk and any connectivity variable. 
By controlling for firm fixed effects, plus taking into account year effects and by 
using a control model we have - to the best of our knowledge - done everything we could 
have to avoid finding significant results attributable to factors other than the investigated 
relation between interlocks and firm risk. On the subject of endogeneity and causality we 
conclude that our approach, using lagged connectivity variables, has taken away some 
concern about the direction of the causality. However, given the static nature of the inter 
firm connectivity variables and their propensity to remain relatively stable over time, the 
lagged variable approach has not taken away all of our concern about the direction of 
causality. Some concern and doubt remain, therefore. Furthermore, the static nature of the 
inter firm connectivity variables reduces the power of the firm fixed effects estimation. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
In this study we explore the effect of board interlocks on firm risk for the period 1998-
2009 in the Netherlands. The Dutch two tier board structure allows separating out 
supervisory board interlocks and their effects on the firm’s firm risk. We find three 
effects. The first effect confirms a negative relation between the number of supervisory 
board interlocks and firm risk (Beta). The second effect confirms a negative relation 
between supervisory board bank interlocks and the firm’s ability to mitigate downside 
risk. Both effects are empirical support for the view that interlocks are a node through 
which information on business practices flows and network resources are engaged. The 
third effect confirms a positive relation between the number of interlocks of the chairman 
of the supervisory board and the firm’s ability to mitigate downside risk. An explanation 
for this effect could be busyness, arguing that more seats in other companies’ boards 
would reduce the chairman’s monitoring effectiveness in any one firm. An alternative 
explanation is that – in the spotlight of shareholder activism - the chairman actively uses 
network information and resources to push the firms decision making to higher risk 
decisions. Further research into the difference between interlocks of the chairman versus 
those of the other members of the supervisory board is required to provide an 
unambiguous explanation.  
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Chapter 3: 
Punished by discontented financial markets 
Investor relations of Royal Philips NV 1971-2001 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the 20th century, stock markets have become an important institution in economies. 
Especially in the period 1970-2000 capital markets have become increasingly larger when 
compared to countries’ gross domestic product. In the Netherlands stock market 
capitalization as percentage of gross domestic product grew from 0.42 to 2.03 in this 
period (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Similar trends, albeit occasionally less distinct, are 
visible in most other Western European economies and the US. With the increasing 
importance of equity markets, more regulations and laws have been introduced to protect 
investors. The aim of such laws and regulations is to have publicly traded firms act more 
transparently (La Porta et al., 1999). At the same time, investors became more demanding 
in terms transparency and communication. Firms responded to this trend with the 
inception of the investor relations function. This was first seen in the US in the late 
1960s, when brokers initiated commercial sessions for analysts and investors. The 
booming capital markets in the period 1970-2000 provided fertile soil for further growth 
of the investor relations function (Silver, 2004, p.70). With mounting demand and supply 
in the market for financial market communication, the effects of a mismatch may be 
costly.   
Corporate restructuring implies change. Successful communication of change 
depends on proper management of uncertainty associated with these changes (DiFonze 
and Bordia, 1998). Corporate restructuring announcements therefore provide an ideal set 
of events to measure the successfulness of the communication, or mismatches between 
demand and supply. In this study, the Dutch multinational Royal Philips NV (Philips) is 
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investigated over the period 1971-2001. We investigate how Philips has communicated 
corporate restructuring to the market and how it has dealt with changing financial market 
requirements. 
Within the thirty-year time frame the 1990s decade is the most interesting from 
the perspective of the exceptional growth of the financial markets and their demands to 
the firm’s communication requirements. The 1990s are also characterized by growing 
media influence, creating the conditions for an increasingly strong herding instinct among 
financial market participants (Hirschleifer and Teoh, 2003). The 1970s and 1980s will 
serve as a benchmark to evaluate the changes.  
The investor relations function evolved with the evolution of the capital market. 
After its inception in the 1960s the importance of the investor relations function 
significantly increased in the 1980s, as the active takeover market demanded that 
corporate managements be concerned about their share prices and communicate to the 
investing public the credibility of their vision and strategy. The threat of gambling 
shareholder loyalty in a takeover contest was looming (Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000). 
In the 1990s, booming capital markets, deregulation and increasing shareholder 
activism further boosted the importance of the investor relations function (Marston and 
Straker, 2001). Around the same time, in the 1990s, business media expanded rapidly 
causing changes in the way investors behaved. Both the density and the frequency of 
business news increased significantly (Schuster, 2005). Global information channels 
aroused the attention of many people, who became active in the markets in ever growing 
numbers. Business news channels, such as CNBC in the US, initiated regular broadcasted 
interviews with corporate executives. These interviews were generally considered non-
events, since no real news was published that would not have been known to the markets 
before. Meschke (2002) found that, although no news was generated, these non-events 
did not remain without consequences: attention generated in business news television 
programs resulted in short-term price increases and sharply increasing trading activity of 
the shares concerned. Marcus and Wallace (1997) confirmed that corporate disclosure 
and communication to the financial markets are important to assure that firms are fairly 
valued.  
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In the period 1971-2001 Philips transitions fundamentally. After being family run 
since its inception in 1891, Philips attracts outside professional managers for the first 
time in the 1970s. In the same period the firm suffered from fierce international 
competition. Philips is headquartered in the Netherlands, but has historically had a strong 
international orientation, which is also reflected in a widely dispersed ownership. 
European firms have weaker investor protection than US firms and the European capital 
markets are less developed than the US (LaPorta et al. 1998).  In line with the 
development of the capital market, the European investor relations practice developed 
behind that in the US.  Even though Philips is a Dutch firm, its’ shareholders expected 
Philips to meet more developed communication demands in line with international 
developments. 
We analyze Philips’ disclosure, investor relations and shareholder wealth effects 
around the announcement of restructuring decisions. Major restructuring announcements 
and the reactions of financial market participants are analyzed. We find wealth 
destruction particularly in the second half of the 1900s, periods generally characterized 
by increasing influence from US shareholders. Next Philips’ investor relations and 
financial disclosure are analyzed. Philips’ deployed innovative annual reporting models 
and used various accounting techniques for income smoothing purposes. We document a 
discrepancy between the financial information provided by the firm and the financial 
markets’ expectations. 
We conclude that Philips has not met the changing communication demands of 
the financial market and has not been able to convincingly communicate its strategic 
intentions to financial market participants. Particularly towards the end of the 20th century 
this has harmed Philips’ valuation. Our findings are relevant for many firms, because 
financial markets have the power to punish inadequate disclosure and inadequate 
communication with low valuation. These findings have important implications for 
instance for a firms’ securities issues, for a firm’s reputation aspects and for valuation 
driven incentives. Markets have evolved and trading behavior is fuelled with mass 
communication through expanded business media. Adequate disclosure and investor 
communication have become of paramount importance to be well understood by the 
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financial markets. Failure to adequately communicate a firm’s strategic intentions leads 
to significant shareholder wealth destruction.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we provide 
background on the development of the investor relations function and review relevant 
literature on corporate restructuring and the development of financial markets. In sections 
3.3 up to and including 3.8 we describe our case study analysis of Philips. Finally, in 
sections 3.9 and 3.10 we provide a synthesis of the effects of communication in changing 
financial markets and conclude. 
 
3.2 Background 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In this section we sketch the background of our study, as we describe the role of  investor 
relations and the effects of informative disclosure (3.2.2), corporate restructuring and the 
development of financial markets (3.2.3) and the role of CEOs in the decision making 
process (3.2.4).  
 
3.2.2 The role of investor relations and informative disclosure 
The efficient functioning of financial markets in general and stock markets in particular, 
to a large extent depends on timely and accurate firm disclosure. Publicly listed firms 
provide mandatory disclosure, such as periodical financial reports – including 
explanatory notes, press releases with price sensitive information and other filings 
required by the financial market regulators. In addition, firms provide voluntary 
disclosure, such as analyst briefings and calls, corporate websites and public 
communication. The extent to which voluntary disclosure mitigates resource 
misallocation in the capital market depends on the degree of credibility of information 
that is not available from other sources (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Higher voluntary 
disclosure may result in lower cost of equity (Botosan, 1997), more analysts following, 
with lower forecast dispersion and less volatility in forecast revisions (Lang and 
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Lundholm, 1996). The level of disclosure may increase through cross-listings, but the 
information effects may be limited (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2002).  
The information effect of disclosure is also reflected in trading volumes. Share 
trading volumes are evidence of investor activity. A continuous and positive relationship 
between share trading volume and the magnitude of earnings surprises has empirically 
been confirmed. The greater the absolute value of the earnings surprise, the greater the 
volume of trading around the announcement date (Bamber, 1986).  
Investor relations is charged with communicating information to the market. 
NIRI, the leading US Investor Relations association defines investor relations as  “a 
strategic management responsibility that integrates finance, communication, marketing 
and securities law compliance to enable the most effective two-way communication 
between a firm, the financial community, and other constituencies, which ultimately 
contributes to a firm’s securities achieving fair valuation” (NIRI, 2003). In the 1970s and 
1980s the importance of the investor relations function grew in concert with the growth 
of the financial markets, albeit that the investor relations function in the US developed 
ahead of that in the Netherlands (Figure 3.1). Marcus and Wallace (1997) argue that the 
nature of the investor relations function emerged in three phases. First, investor relations 
were aimed at communicating the firm’s actions, later it increased its focus on the firm’s 
financial performance. In the subsequent phase, investor relations actively marketed the 
firm’s securities to encourage investors to buy or hold the firms securities. In this phase 
investor relations ensures that the firm and its securities are fairly valued. Investor 
relations, therefore, are charged with managing analyst expectations. By providing 
information to analysts and influencing their valuation of the firm, investor relations can 
market the firm to potential investors (Rao and Sivakumar, 1999), help overcome low 
visibility and attract new analysts and new investors (Bushee and Miller, 2005). 
The relation between what and how a firm communicates and the price of its 
securities is multifaceted. In an efficient financial market, the price of a firm’s securities 
is a proper reflection of all available information, and, apart from maintaining the 
appropriate investment and financial policies, there is little that a firm can do about the 
price of its securities. The validity of this efficient market hypothesis is that information 
is free and available to every investor at the same time, and can easily be understood by 
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all investors alike. Empirical research confirms that firm disclosure is instrumental in that 
it reduces information asymmetry, and increases liquidity and the share price (Merton, 
1987), whereas uninformed investors ‘price protect’ against adverse selection (Welker, 
1995). This is confirmed by Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), who provide evidence for 
the relation between a firm’s investor relations policy and its share price. They 
demonstrate a positive relation between a firm’s disclosure policy and the number of 
analysts. The number of analysts that follow a security affects its liquidity, and Brennan 
and Tamarowski (2000) show that an increase in liquidity reduces the firm’s cost of 
capital and thereby increases the share price.  However, in addition to disclosure, also 
investor recognition is a determinant in the price of a firm’s security. Changes in investor 
recognition are more important than news about fundamentals in explaining 
contemporaneous returns (Lahavy, 2005). This reveals why earlier research has found 
that news about fundamentals explains a relatively small proportion of the variation in 
returns (e.g., Roll, 1988; Lev, 1989). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Development of investor relations 
This figure presents the development of the investor relations function in the Netherlands and in the US. To 
visualize this development for the US we counted the number of occasions that the words “investor 
relations” appeared per year in the Wall Street Journal. WSTJN represents the word count per year on the 
left vertical axis. For the Netherlands we counted the number of occasions that the words “investor 
relations” appeared per year in all Dutch papers. NL ALL represents the word count per year on the right 
vertical axis.
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3.2.3 Restructuring and the development of financial markets 
Firms are continuously restructuring through tactical and strategic decisions. 
Restructuring strategies can be classified in divestment decisions and investment 
decisions. Divestments include asset sales, management buy outs, spin-offs, and lay-offs 
(Lai and Sudarsanam, 1997). And the most prominent investment decisions are capital 
expenditures and acquisitions.  Mergers and acquisitions are an essential vehicle for a 
firm’s evolution and as such a phenomenon of all times. Merger and acquisition activity 
is propelled by a number of strategic factors, such as technological innovation, 
competition globalization and business rationalization. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
the number of US M&A transactions remained relatively stable, although the combined 
value of the transactions rose in the second half of the 1980s.  And even though the 1980s 
are considered to be an active period for mergers and acquisitions period, the 1990s were 
by far the most active decade in U.S. history. Starting in the early 1990s, the increasing 
availability of capital market financing has fuelled restructuring activities worldwide 
(Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000). Total M&A value for the 1990s exceeded $5 
trillion. The European M & A market developed similarly. Coming from less than $50 
billion per annum at the end of the 1980s, the total value of acquisitions with a European 
target increased ten-fold to over $592 billion in 1998, and then again doubled to $1.2 
trillion in 1999.  
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) analyzed mergers and acquisitions for 
U.S. domestic acquisitions by U.S. acquirers in the period 1980–2001. They found that a 
relatively small number of acquisitions accounts for significant losses in value due to 
extremely high valuations. If the explanation for this effect is the markets’ doubt to the 
firm’s ability to maintain a ‘growth through acquisition’ strategy, then these firms have 
failed in their communication with the market. 
 
3.2.4 The roles of CEOs in strategic decisions 
Management research has traditionally had a strong focus on top echelons and their 
impact on organizations.  A basic premise in strategic management research is that top 
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executives play a dominant role in formulating corporate strategy (Westphal, 2001).  
Various studies show that experience, such as prior positions in other firms, influence 
strategic decisions in the executive’s own firm. For instance, Westphal (2001) finds that 
the event of CEO succession provides an important opportunity for change. In line with 
earlier empirical studies, he finds that newly appointed CEOs often take office just prior 
to major corporate-level strategic change initiatives (Kessner and Sebora, 1994). Having 
experience with the current strategy, inside successors are more likely than outsiders to 
maintain the existing strategy (Tushman, 1985). However, the departure of a CEO may 
leave a vacuum that enables the selection of new outside CEOs, who have experience 
with the favored strategic change (Westphal, 2001).  
Traditionally the search for a new CEO takes place in a unique market: a market 
characterized by a combination of a small number of buyers and sellers, high risk to its 
participants and concerns about its legitimacy (Khurana, 2002, p. 27). Often an external 
search is initiated with extra ordinary emphasis on hiring a candidate with demonstrable 
“leadership” and “charismatic” qualities. Much less emphasis is placed on the firm’s 
strategic situation and how appropriate the candidate’s background is in the light of this. 
The entire search process is orchestrated to produce a corporate ‘savior’, a new CEO 
whom investors and the business media regard as star (Khurana, 2002, p. 20). These 
findings emphasize the premise that new outside CEOs, will direct strategic change. 
Based on a comprehensive dataset, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) empirically demonstrate 
that manager fixed effects are important determinants in a wide range of corporate 
variables. They conclude that managers have their own style, and that especially in 
acquisition and diversification decisions manager fixed effects play an important role.   
 
3.3 The case of Royal Philips NV, 1971-2001 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Philips Electronics NV provides the opportunity to investigate all aspects relevant for our 
research. Philips started as a family owned firm in 1891 and went public in 1912. A 
recognition of the importance of the capital markets is the cross-listing at the New York 
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Stock Exchange in 1987. Equity based incentives, granted to senior management from 
1986 onwards underscore the significance of a fair valuation of the firm’s shares to 
management. Philips shares have a widely dispersed international share ownership, 
reflecting a historically international orientation of the firm and its investors. Family 
managers were succeeded by professional managers, starting with Nico Rodenburg in 
1977. From the 1970s Asian competition, with more efficient production, entered Philips’ 
markets. This forced Philips to restructure its operations. At the same time, Philips 
wanted to maintain its strong reputation for product development and innovation. In the 
subsequent years, Philips experimented with corporate restructuring to deal with its 
growing problems. Restructuring programs initiated under various CEO’s included 
scaling down or selling certain production plants to create larger more efficient units. 
Acquisitions and joint ventures were sought to concentrate the firm’s resources in the 
most effective way. Throughout this process the firm strategy developed continuously. 
Our longitudinal approach allows investigation of how Philips under various CEO’s has 
communicated strategic announcements to the exogenously changing markets and to 
measure the markets’ reaction.  
We formulate our research question as follows: 
“How do firms adapt their communication about their strategy to changing demands of 
the financial markets?” This question will be investigated using Philips as a case study. 
In order to answer this question we first describe our sources (3.3.2), the firm 
history up to 1971 (3.3.3), Philips’ governance structure (3.4), strategy, financial market 
communication and shareholder wealth effects per CEO (3.5), and Philips financial 
reporting and annual report disclosure (3.6).  Next we discuss the financial markets’ 
appreciation of Philips’ investor relations (3.7) and financial market reactions in terms of 
analyst following, their forecasts and Philips’ trading volumes (3.8). We finalize with 
discussing our results (3.9) and conclude (3.10).  
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3.3.2 Analyses and sources 
Since the seminal paper by Fama et al. (1970), finance researchers use the event study 
method to measure the value effects of announced strategic decisions (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Event studies measure the change in the share price immediately following the arrival of 
new information in financial markets, controlling for share price effects in absence of 
new information. As such, event studies are testing a dual hypothesis of market efficiency 
and the value effects of a particular decision.  
The event study method has also been applied in case studies. Baker (1992) 
studies Beatrice, a U.S. creamery that grew to be a conglomerate firm. They use the 
announcements of 26 acquisitions and divestitures to evaluate the performance of three 
CEOs. They conclude that firm governance is an important determinant of both value 
creation and destruction. De Jong et al. (2007) study the announcement effects of Dutch 
retailer Ahold (a large Dutch retail firm). They study Ahold’s performance, its investor 
relations, strategy, accounting transparency and corporate governance. The case of Ahold 
shows remarkable insights on the influence of investor beliefs by investor relations, on 
the inefficiency of corporate governance self-regulation through accounting disclosure 
and on the role governance played in maintaining conflicting images provided by investor 
relations versus management’s control of the firm. 
To get a first impression of the evolution of the investor relations profession in the 
US and The Netherlands, we manually count the number of appearances of the words 
“Investor Relations” in both the Wall Street Journal and in Dutch business news media 
for 1970-2001. We build our event dataset on Philips’ announcements with regards to 
asset restructurings and alliances over the period 1971-2001. We define asset 
restructuring to include asset sales (divestments, management buy outs, spin offs) and 
investments (full acquisitions, partial acquisitions, joint-ventures and alliances). We 
exclude announcements with regards to capital expenditures, reorganizations and lay-
offs.  
We look up announcements in the Dutch financial daily, Het Financieele Dagblad. 
The electronic version is available starting 1985; we retrieve all newspaper articles with 
the firm name in the title or in de body of the text and we manually identify articles with 
the relevant events. For the period 1971-1985 we analyze Philips annual reports to 
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identify relevant events and subsequently verify announcement dates with the paper 
version of Het Financieele Dagblad. In total, we include 451 announcements in the period 
1971-2001. 
We measure the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
announcements using abnormal returns generated by a market model (MacKinley, 1997). 
Our estimation window runs from day -120 to day -20. We aggregate the abnormal 
returns over a period of seven days, starting three days prior to the event announcement 
date until three days after the event announcement date. Apart from the percentage 
returns, we also calculate the euro wealth effects by multiplying the seven days CAR by 
the beginning of the year’s market value of the acquirer’s equity. 
We collect financial data and corporate governance characteristics from several 
sources. We obtain share returns and index returns from Datastream (1973-2001) and the 
Officiële Prijscourant (1970-1973). We obtain firm financial and non-financial 
information from its annual reports. We take board and ownership data from the 
Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen, Jaarboek Nederlandse Ondernemingen and yearly 
overviews of legally obliged minimum share-ownership (‘WMZ’) notifications in Het 
Financieele Dagblad. We adjust for inflation9.  
Information with regards to communication of firm strategy is based on 
interviews given by the CEO within the first 18 months in office10, which we derive from 
Het Financieele Dagblad and other international business magazines.  A second source of 
information with regards to firm strategy is provided by financial and firm analyses in 
Het Financieele Dagblad and other international business magazines in the same period. 
A disclosure index is constructed based on Botosan (1997). The index of Botosan 
(1997) is based on recommendations provided in the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (1994) study of business reporting (i.e., the Jenkins Committee 
report), the SRI International (1987) survey of investor information needs, and the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1991) study of the annual report.  This 
index is adjusted to reflect voluntary disclosure by excluding the legally-required items. 
                                                 
9 Inflation adjustments are based on CPI data on www.iisg.nl to 2001 Euro amounts. 
 
10 The sixth CEO (Boonstra) postponed communication with regards to strategy and made several public 
statements to this effect. We therefore analyze interviews of the first 36 months in which he is in office. 
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In our index four more items are included based on Aksu and Kosedag (2006), called 
‘description of share classes’, ‘description of voting rights’, ‘segment analysis’ and 
‘discussion of corporate strategy’. The items now included in DSCORE reflect 
information identified by investors and financial analysts as useful in investment decision 
making, including background information, summary of historical results, key non-
financial statistics, projected information and voluntary information provided by 
management. Philips annual reports 1971-2001 are examined and DSCORE is calculated 
for each year counting for each annual report the index items with equal weight. 
With respect to the investor relations aspects of Philips’ communication strategy 
information is obtained from Rematch (Netherlands, Hong Kong) www.rematch.nl11. 
Rematch analyses perceptions of target audiences. As from 1990 Rematch conducts an 
annual investor relations survey among four constituencies: financial analysts, press, 
portfolio managers and retail investors. Based on the feedback of these target audiences 
the investor relations activities are evaluated and rated. The rating is averaged for each 
firm per constituent audience. Each corporate issuer subsequently receives an overall 
score, which is a weighted average (0.4 portfolio managers, 0.35 sell- and buy-side 
analysts, 0.15 financial press, and 0.1 retail investors) over all constituent groups. The 
relative weight per constituent group represents the relative importance from an Investor 
Relations perspective. This has been determined by Rematch and is being used 
consistently for all companies.  
The rating of Philips is benchmarked with the average rating of all major 
companies in the Amsterdam exchange index. Companies that have not been in the index 
for the entire period are excluded. The reason for this exclusion is that companies that are 
about to leave the index generally will be rated lower. Hence inclusion of the ratings for 
these companies would have a mitigating effect on the index average rating.    
For the investors’ relations, the CEO rating, and general disclosure ratings 
categories, Rematch data are a proxy for disclosure. Since the annual report is usually 
                                                 
11 Rematch was an independent capital market consultancy agency, advising corporate issuers in the area of 
strategic financial objectives and its resulting relation management between the firm and the financial 
markets, with an emphasis on investor relations and corporate governance. 
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released during the following year this disclosure category describes the lagged score on 
the annual report ratings of the annual report of the preceding year.  
Analyst data from the IBES database are used to analyze the number of analysts 
issuing earnings forecasts (NAL). This measure is computed by counting the number of 
analysts providing an annual earnings forecast. Annual assessment at calendar year end 
are used to identify the number of analysts following since there is not any one particular 
moment during the year when a specific disclosure cold be assumed to have a significant 
effect on analysts. Even though the annual report is formally issued at a specific moment 
in time, it is difficult to assess when the information contained therein reaches the market. 
In any event, the annual report information will influence analyst forecast accuracy for 
the entire year (Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  
Share price and share volume information are retrieved from Datastream. We 
follow existing research (Beaver, 1968, Bamber 1986) by applying a volume-liquidity 
metric defined as the percentage of shares traded on day t divided by the shares 
outstanding on that day. The liquidity-volume metric is calculated on a daily basis and 
averaged per calendar year.  
Our empirical analysis is presented in Tables 3.1 to 3.7 and Figures 3.1 to 3.3. 
Table 3.1 shows the shareholder distribution for Dutch listed firms. Table 3.2 contains 
firm characteristics over the period 1971-2001 in variables reflecting firm strategy and 
performance. In panel A size related variables are presented. Panel B presents variables 
on strategy and investments. Panel C presents performance related variables. Table 3.3 
shows the shareholder wealth effects around restructuring announcements per CEO, both 
expressed in percentages and euro returns. Table 3.4 contains the largest transactions 
based on shareholder wealth effects. Table 3.5 shows Philips’ annual report voluntary 
disclose and size in number of pages. In Table 3.6 we apply Rematch investor relations 
scores to proxy for investor appreciation. Table 3.7, panel A shows the trading volumes 
in Philips shares, analysts following and their EPS forecast accuracy. Table 3.7, panel B 
depicts the development of EPS forecasts per month. Figure 3.1, depicts the rise of the 
Investor relations profession. Figure 3.2 describes the number of asset restructuring 
transactions per year, where we distinguish between positive and negative announcement 
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effects. Figure 3.3 depicts the Philips share price and abnormal returns in a historical 
perspective and highlights the period Boonstra.  
 
3.3.3 The history of Philips prior to 1971 
Philips was founded by Gerard Philips and his father in 1892. Soon Gerard’s brother 
Anton joined the venture as a salesman. By the turn of the century, Philips was the 
number three light bulb production firm in Europe (Sluyterman, 2003). Initially, Philips 
focused on the production of light bulbs. Because of this single product focus, Philips 
was able to invest heavily on a continuous basis in modern production assets and 
facilities. Philips also invested significantly in research. As a result, Philips created 
technological advances, which enabled the firm to generate a healthy financial fundament 
(Bartlett, 2001). From 1900 onwards Philips penetrated foreign markets initially through 
export sales. Later on (from 1912) this was replaced with local sales organizations. All 
non-sales functions remained at the corporate headquarters in Eindhoven.   
From its initial single product focus on electrical light bulbs, Philips diversified 
into radio equipment (1925) with a 20% market share around 1935. In the 1930s Philips 
further diversified with the production of X-ray tubes. At the same time, the general 
economic conditions lead to many macroeconomic protection measures forcing Philips to 
build local production facilities to protect its market share. Anticipating the break-out of 
World War II, Philips took several far reaching measures: it transferred its foreign 
operations into two trusts – North American Philips Corporation and British Philips, all 
top management was moved to the US, and a substantial part of the research laboratory 
were moved to the UK (Sluyterman, 2003). 
During the war the national organizations increased their independence from Firm 
Headquarters and developed strong local market knowledge. With the loss of production 
capabilities in the war, Philips regarded the National Organizations as an important 
building block in the post war development of the firm. By letting the National 
Organizations develop their business in the way they see fit for local market, Philips 
developed prosperously (Metze, 1991). The National Organizations had the freedom to 
cater for many local differences, such as technological standards and consumer 
preferences. By doing so, they were able to build a strong local business resulting in 
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decentralized product development within Philips. Production typically took place in 
local (or at best regional) production facilities and factories.  
The organization model that emerged is the typical Philips matrix structure, where 
product divisions (lead from Firm Headquarters in Eindhoven) were formally responsible 
for the development, the production, and the distribution. The National Organizations 
owned the production assets, customers, and the sales channels (Bartlett, 2001). Upon the 
introduction of the EEC (European Economic Community) in the 1960s, the role of the 
National Organizations had to change. New product requirements demanded more 
production intensity. For economic reasons many of Philips competitors shifted 
production to low cost regions (Asia). Starting in the late 1960s, Philips’ ability to turn 
technological superiority into commercial success began to diminish. Asian competitors 
began to penetrate the markets that traditionally had been dominated by Philips. In the 
1970s, Philips management realized that the Philips organization needed to adapt to the 
changing circumstances (Metze, 1991) 
 
3.4 Philips’ governance structure, 1971-2001 
 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., a Dutch limited liability company, is the holding 
company of the Philips Group. The firm has been incorporated in 1891 as a limited 
partnership (a so-called ‘commanditaire vennootschap’ under Dutch law) called Philips & 
Co, was changed into a N.V. called N.V. Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken, in 1912.  
In1994, the name was changed into Philips Electronics N.V. which became Koninklijke 
(Dutch for ‘Royal’) Philips Electronics N.V. in 1998. As from 1913 Philips’ shares are 
quoted at Euronext Amsterdam, and traded in the US as from 1962. Since 1987 the shares 
are also quoted at the New York Stock Exchange.  
From its inception in 1892 until the early 1970s Philips was very successful. Even 
through periods of economic downturn, such as the war periods, the firm prospered and 
showed continuous growth (Heerding, 1980). However, since the 1970s Philips’ 
dominance in the traditional markets was diminishing. Eroding margins furthermore 
emphasized the need for change. The successful decentralized organization needed to be 
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replaced with a more centrally-managed organization in order to streamline production 
and provide a more competitive cost structure (Metze, 1991). At the same time, the new 
era increasingly demanded serious efforts in research and product development initiatives 
in order to keep up with the pace of technological developments (Manders and Brenner, 
1995).  
The change of business model was effected within the framework of the existing 
governance structure. For listed firms, Dutch corporate law requires a two tier structure, 
with a management board and a supervisory board. Shareholders have the right to elect 
the members of both the management board and the supervisory board, to approve the 
annual accounts, and to formally approve the firm’s dividend policy. However, 
shareholder rights can be restricted in several ways. De Jong et al. (2007) describe how a 
Dutch firm can mitigate shareholder influence in four different ways. First, through the 
incorporation of a trust office that holds the firm’s shares and issues nonvoting share 
certificates to the investors. Secondly, through issuing non-fully paid up, but full voting 
preference shares to friendly shareholders. Thirdly, to issue priority shares with special 
rights. Special rights attached to priority shares can be the nomination of board members, 
merger approval, new public offerings, and charter amendments. Lastly, firms exceeding 
a certain size (in terms of book value of shareholders’ equity or employees within the 
Netherlands) are required to adopt the structured regime. These firms are obliged to set 
up a supervisory board that takes over several powers from shareholders, including the 
authority over major decisions, the election of the management and supervisory board 
and the establishment and approval of annual accounts. Limited shareholder power leaves 
much room for managers to exercise discretion in their acquisition decisions.  
Historically, the above described mechanisms have been widely used by Dutch 
corporations as means to restrict shareholder power in general and particularly as 
takeover defense. Starting as of 1989, the provisions of Euronext Amsterdam only allow 
the use of a maximum of two out of the three types described above. Empirical research 
shows that the use of takeover defenses has implications for firm value. In line with 
earlier studies, De Jong et al. (2005) find that takeover defenses as used by Dutch firms 
are negatively related to firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s q. Subsequent 
research by De Jong et al. (2007) shows that an adequate corporate governance structure 
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has a minor influence on acquisition announcements. In explaining acquirer returns, the 
only governance factor that provides significant results is adoption the structured regime 
which resulted in lower acquirer returns.  
Historically, the Philips family held priority shares with special rights. The special 
rights allotted to the priority shares pertained to the binding nomination of the members 
of both the management board and the supervisory board. Through this mechanism the 
Philips family could exert influence for a long time. In this respect it is worthwhile noting 
that in the period 1991-2001 all CEOs were recruited internally, with the exception of the 
sixth CEO (Boonstra), who became CEO after only two years in the management board. 
Over time the Philips family has diminished their influence through a gradual transfer of 
the priority shares to the Dr. A.F. Philips Stichting. By 2002 all 10 priority shares had 
been transferred from the Philips family to the Dr. A.F. Philips Stichting. In 2005 the 
priority shares have been cancelled by shareholders resolution. Exactly 75 years after its 
first introduction to the (Dutch) stockmarket in 1912, Philips was listed at the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1987.  
Since 1989, Philips’ articles of association allow the issuance of preferred share to 
a trust office (the ‘Stichting Preferente Aandelen Philips’) as a takeover defense 
mechanism. Until 1991, N.V. Gemeenschappelijke Bezit van Aandelen Philips’ 
Gloeilampenfabrieken is the holding firm whose sole purpose is to hold all Philips 
electronics shares.  Since 1991 the holding company is transformed into a holding- and 
management company from which the Philips group of companies is managed. 
Generally, the profile of the shareholders constituency in the 25 biggest Dutch 
quoted firms has internationalized dramatically since the middle of the 1990s (table 3.1). 
In 1995, ‘only’ 37% of the shares were held internationally, whereas this percentage more 
than doubled in the subsequent 10 years.   A possible explanation for this effect is that the 
historically already very open Dutch capital market has benefited from a liberal political 
climate allowing easy inflow of foreign capital. Another explanation may be that since 
the mid-1990s cross listings became increasingly popular with large Dutch listed firms  
(such as ABNAMRO,  Aegon,  AKO Nobel,  ASML, Corporate Express,  ING,  KPN,  
Philips,  Unilever,  ASMI and  VanderMoolen).  The fact that these large Dutch firms 
generate the largest part of their turnover outside the Netherlands further amplifies the 
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desirability of the international character of their shareholder constituency (Handboek 
Corporate Governance 2008,  p. 207).  In addition, Philips’ shares are held widely with a 
high free float percentage. Under the Dutch financial market regulations, investors have 
to report an investment when it exceeds 5% of the issued share capital (and then 
subsequently when the shareholding exceeds higher thresholds). Since 1998 Janus 
Investments US (a US quoted investment company) with a shareholding of 5.41% is the 
only registered holder exceeding the lowest (5%) threshold. 
 
Stock distribution of Dutch listed firms (percentages)
1995 2005
Non Dutch investors 37 75
Dutch institutinal investors 24 10
Dutch non-financial firms 19 2
Dutch retail investors 19 5
Dutch government investors 0 1
Unknown 1 7  
 
Table 3.1: Distribution of shares in Dutch listed firms (in percentages) 
This table, based on Committee on Corporate Governance (1997) and Abma (2006) presents the 
distribution of shares of firms listed in the Netherlands. A distinction is made between Dutch and foreign 
shareholders and Dutch shareholders are separated in institutional, no-financial, retail and government 
shareholders.  
 
In summary, Philips’ governance is characterized by (a) the fact that for a long 
period it has restricted shareholder rights in favor of the Philips family, (b) the absence of 
significant ‘block’ shareholders as a counter-balancing force, and (c) a general shift 
towards a more international shareholder constituency. 
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3.5 Strategy, financial market communication, shareholder wealth effects per CEO 
 
This section provides an impression of the development of Philips under management of 
the various CEO’s. We also describe the CEO backgrounds, their strategy and 
communication to the financial markets. 
 
3.5.1 Van Riemsdijk (1971-1977) 
In the period 1971-1977 the firm was relatively stable. The workforce was around 
370,000 to 380,000 employees, while the book value of total assets (taking into account 
inflation) decreased with 10.5%. Sales increased from € 8.2 billion to € 14.1 billion, 
which was primarily caused by inflation (table 3.2, panel A). Average investments in 
capital expenditure were 0.03 per year. Average investments in research and development 
were 0.063 per year (table 3.2, panel B)12.  After adjusting for inflation, sales per fte was 
stable at approx. € 73,000 and EBITDA per fte was stable at around € 9,000 to € 10,000. 
Net accounting return was on average 0.061 per year and ranged from 0.017 to 0.095. 
Total shareholder return for this period was negative, with -0.036 on average per year, 
ranging from 0.475 to 0.425. However, abnormal returns for this period were even more 
negative, with -0.042 on average per year, ranging from -0.113 to 0.055 (table 3.2, panel 
C).   
                                                 
12For the first four years in this period R&D data were not available 
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        Panel a: Size
Year Total Assets
(unadjusted
in € mln.)
Total Assets
(inflation 
adjusted
in € mln.)
Total Sales
(in € mln.)
Market Value
Equity
(in € mln.)
Employees
1971 9,661 31,301 8,222 1,957 367,000
1972 10,043 30,181 9,041 3,134 371,000
1973 10,976 30,542 10,239 3,062 400,000
1974 12,837 32,593 11,313 2,124 397,000
1975 13,632 31,407 12,304 1,967 397,000
1976 13,656 28,918 13,811 2,317 391,000
1977 14,116 28,016 14,142 2,132 383,900
1978 13,939 26,574 14,160 2,002 380,400
1979 15,950 29,183 15,083 1,831 378,600
1980 17,991 30,908 16,579 1,391 372,600
1981 19,390 31,220 19,245 1,603 348,100
1982 19,646 29,842 19,508 1,923 336,200
1983 21,672 32,022 20,957 3,526 343,000
1984 24,747 35,398 24,415 4,561 344,000
1985 23,997 33,554 27,247 5,296 345,600
1986 22,975 32,060 24,975 5,626 344,200
1987 22,661 31,781 23,921 4,838 336,700
1988 23,982 33,399 25,448 3,244 310,300
1989 24,948 34,368 25,967 4,933 304,800
1990 23,413 31,466 25,305 3,944 272,800
1991 21,628 27,975 25,859 4,118 240,000
1992 22,165 27,648 24,846 4,014 235,100
1993 21,003 25,659 26,694 4,391 238,500
1994 21,836 25,976 27,670 7,833 241,400
1995 23,706 27,648 29,252 9,751 253,600
1996 24,991 28,546 27,094 9,537 250,400
1997 26,973 30,147 29,658 19,248 252,000
1998 28,153 30,849 30,459 23,742 234,500
1999 29,496 31,625 31,459 31,249 227,500
2000 38,541 40,275 37,862 61,896 219,500
2001 38,454 38,454 32,339 41,699 189,500  
Table 3.2: Strategy and performance, Panel A Size 
This table presents financial and non-financial information relevant to Philips’ strategy and performance for 
the period 1971-2001. Financial information is recalculated in euro and inflation adjusted to 2001. Panel A 
presents size related variables. Total Assets (measured as book value at year end), is both in nominal terms 
and inflation adjusted terms. Total Sales is measured cumulative total revenue reported for the respective 
financial year.  Market Value of Equity is as the number of shares outstanding times share price, both at 
year end. The number of employees is measured at year end.  
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   Panel b: Strategy and investments
Year Total Assets
growth
Cap. Exp. to 
Total Assets
R&D Exp. to 
Total Assets
ACQ. JV/ALL DIV. 
1971 0.115 0.084 NA 0 3 1
1972 0.039 0.013 NA 2 4 1
1973 0.093 0.032 NA 3 6 1
1974 0.170 0.038 NA 2 3 0
1975 0.062 0.035 NA 1 0 1
1976 0.002 -0.004 0.061 0 0 0
1977 0.034 0.013 0.066 1 1 2
1978 -0.013 -0.004 0.073 2 2 0
1979 0.144 0.034 0.069 1 1 2
1980 0.128 0.050 0.069 3 2 3
1981 0.078 0.031 0.068 1 0 1
1982 0.013 0.034 0.073 3 4 0
1983 0.103 0.001 0.069 2 3 0
1984 0.142 0.037 0.066 1 1 0
1985 -0.030 -0.009 0.076 2 10 4
1986 -0.043 0.001 0.083 3 9 3
1987 -0.014 0.005 0.087 4 11 2
1988 0.058 0.001 0.087 2 7 3
1989 0.040 0.001 0.083 2 5 10
1990 -0.062 -0.037 0.085 3 14 13
1991 -0.076 -0.052 0.081 8 7 19
1992 0.025 0.006 0.075 7 9 10
1993 -0.052 -0.032 0.073 2 9 17
1994 0.040 -0.001 0.077 5 9 13
1995 0.086 0.022 0.074 10 9 11
1996 0.054 0.027 0.074 12 8 12
1997 0.079 0.008 0.068 0 6 27
1998 0.044 -0.026 0.073 4 4 20
1999 0.048 0.026 0.077 6 5 6
2000 0.307 0.044 0.072 8 2 12
2001 -0.002 -0.034 0.086 0 1 2  
Table 3.2:  Strategy and performance, Panel B Strategy and investments 
This table presents financial and non-financial information relevant to Philips’ strategy and performance for 
the period 1971-2001. Panel B presents information related to Philips’ strategy and investments. Total 
Asset Growth is measured as growth of total assets in nominal terms at year end compared to prior year 
end, in percentages to picture total growth. Net Capital Expenditure over Total Assets at year end, in 
percentages, are a proxy for organic investments (with Net Capital Expenditure being the difference in 
fixed assets reported at year end compared fixed assets at prior year end).  Annual Research and 
Development Expenditure over Total Assets at year end, in percentages, are a second proxy for organic 
investments. The number of acquisitions (ACQ.), joint venture and alliances (JV/ALL) and the number of 
divestments (DIV.) depicts non-organic growth. 
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  Panel c: Performance
Year EBITDA/BVTA Sales 
per fte 
EBITDA 
per fte 
NI/BV 
equity
TSR
in %
AR
in %
Div yield
in %
1971 0.101 73 9 0.053 -0.261 0.006 0.046
1972 0.130 73 11 0.090 0.425 -0.113 0.033
1973 0.146 71 11 0.095 -0.177 -0.088 0.044
1974 0.118 72 10 0.070 -0.475 0.055 0.065
1975 0.083 71 7 0.017 0.294 -0.100 0.055
1976 0.118 75 9 0.050 -0.082 -0.034 0.053
1977 0.115 73 8 0.054 0.023 -0.018 0.062
1978 0.114 71 8 0.058 -0.099 0.115 0.070
1979 0.094 73 7 0.046 -0.141 0.014 0.076
1980 0.081 76 7 0.024 -0.350 -0.084 0.101
1981 0.091 89 8 0.025 0.306 -0.129 0.087
1982 0.093 88 8 0.029 0.311 0.088 0.077
1983 0.102 90 10 0.040 0.482 0.056 0.044
1984 0.114 102 12 0.067 0.309 -0.041 0.042
1985 0.124 110 12 0.057 0.120 0.090 0.039
1986 0.125 101 12 0.065 -0.345 0.125 0.037
1987 0.113 100 11 0.051 -0.498 -0.270 0.048
1988 0.109 114 12 0.063 0.245 -0.275 0.072
1989 0.104 117 12 0.098 0.370 0.213 0.051
1990 0.029 125 3 -0.402 -0.850 0.000 0.000
1991 0.129 139 15 0.118 0.364 -0.058 0.000
1992 0.098 132 11 -0.088 -0.399 -0.059 0.000
1993 0.120 137 13 0.160 0.714 -0.078 0.017
1994 0.139 136 15 0.153 0.251 0.111 0.024
1995 0.131 135 14 0.173 0.121 -0.023 0.025
1996 0.093 124 11 -0.034 0.188 -0.217 0.026
1997 0.141 132 17 0.219 0.552 0.206 0.017
1998 0.082 142 11 0.413 0.035 -0.281 0.015
1999 0.121 148 17 0.099 0.827 -0.070 0.013
2000 0.157 180 29 0.478 0.115 0.177 0.007
2001 0.016 171 3 -0.282 -0.156 0.027 0.011  
Table 3.2: Strategy and performance, Panel C Performance 
This table presents financial and non-financial information relevant to Philips’ strategy and performance for 
the period 1971-2001. Financial information is recalculated in euro and inflation adjusted to 2001. Panel C 
presents information related to Philips’ accounting performance and stock market performance. Accounting 
performance measures are EBITDA/BVTA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
over book value of total assets) to reflect accounting return, inflation adjusted sales per full time equivalent 
employee measured at year end and inflation adjusted EBITDA per full time equivalent employee 
measured at year end to reflect productivity. Net accounting return is measured as Net Income over Book 
Value of Total Equity. Stock market performance is measured using Total Shareholder Return (the 
difference between natural logarithm of the return index at year end compared to the natural logarithm of 
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the return index at prior year end), annual Abnormal Return (calculated as the cumulated daily abnormal 
returns) and Dividend Yield (calculated as dividend paid over total market value of equity at year end). 
 
Although Philips was technologically superior, the 1970s were a difficult time, as 
competition from Asia entered Philips' markets. Many of Philips' smaller, less-profitable 
factories were closed when larger to create more efficient units.  Philips also continued its 
innovative efforts in recording, transmitting, and reproducing television pictures. 
Competition from Japanese firms with more efficient production intensified. Philips’ 
restructuring could be characterized as rationalization without forced layoffs. In its 
communications to the market, Philips did not mention M&A explicitly as part of its 
strategy. 
When Van Riemsdijk became CEO, Philips did not have a track record of 
deploying acquisitions or alliances to achieve its strategic goals. The number of events is 
limited, and there is no mentioning of the role of corporate restructuring in achieving 
Philips strategic goals. We find 29 qualifying announcements, 8 of which related to 
acquisitions, 5 related to divestitures and 16 are related to alliances and joint ventures. 
The average CAR generated in this period was -0.07, which results in a total shareholder 
wealth loss of € 386 million for this period. Acquisitions accounted for an average CAR 
of -0.016, or a wealth loss of € 244 million. Joint ventures and alliances accounted for an 
average CAR of -0.006, or a wealth loss of € 208 million. Divestitures and sell-offs 
accounted for an average CAR of +0.006, or a wealth gain of € 66 million. 
 
3.5.2 Rodenburg (1977-1981) 
In the period 1977-1981 the book value of total assets decreased with 11.4%, and the 
workforce was reduced with almost 36,000 employees (or 9.3%). The market value of 
equity decreased with € 529 million (or 24.8%). And, although the inflation adjusted 
Sales per fte increased from € 73,000 to € 89,000 per fte, inflation adjusted EBITDA was 
stable at € 8,000 per fte. The relative investment in capital expenditure for the period is 
0.025 on average per year. During Rodenburg’s tenure, the relative investments in 
research and development were on average 0.069 per year.  
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Net accounting return decreased to an average of 0.041 per year, ranging from 
0.024 to 0.058. Total shareholder return for this period was negative, with -0.052 on 
average per year, ranging from -0.35 to +0.305. Abnormal Returns for this period were -
0.020 on average per year, ranging from -0.129 to +0.115.   
Rodenburg’s communication with the financial markets focused on Philips’ need 
to reorganize and streamline its operations in the light of the intense Japanese 
competition. In doing so, he defined a key role for technology for Philips to achieve its 
financial goals. Philips strategy was aimed at gaining traction in the area of professional 
products, e.g. computers, defense-systems, and telecommunication. As Japanese 
companies, with their large, automated plants, flooded the market with inexpensive 
consumer electronics, Philips, with factories scattered throughout Europe and rising labor 
costs, saw its market share continue to decline. In 1980, Consumer Electronics was 
largely restructured. This is generally regarded as Philips' first reorganization, including 
lay-offs. In market analyses,  it was recognized that Philips actively deployed acquisitions 
and divestments in order to strengthen certain business lines and eliminate others. 
As before, the period of Rodenburg only has a limited number of events. We find 
a total of 21 qualifying announcements, 8 of which related to acquisitions, 7 related to 
divestitures and sell offs and 6 related to alliances and joint ventures. The average CAR 
generated in this period was -0.007, corresponding with a shareholder wealth loss of € 
182 million. Acquisitions accounted for an average CAR of -0.004, or a wealth loss of € 
67 million. Joint ventures and alliances accounted for an average CAR of -0.011 or a 
wealth loss of € 63 million. Divestitures and sell offs accounted for an average CAR of -
0.007, or a wealth loss of € 52 million. 
 
3.5.3 Dekker (1982-1986) 
In the period 1982-1986 the book value of total assets increased with 7.4%, and the 
workforce increased with 8,000 fte’s (or 2.4%). The market value of equity significantly 
increased with € 3.7 billion (or almost 200%).  Sales per fte (after adjusting for inflation) 
increased from € 88,000 to € 101,000 per fte, and inflation adjusted EBITDA shows 
strong increase from € 8,000 to € 12,000 per fte. The relative investment in capital 
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expenditure for the period was 0.013 on average per year. During his tenure, the relative 
investments were on average 0.073 per year.  
Net accounting return in this period more than doubles and increased to an 
average of 0.052 per year, ranging from 0.029 to 0.065. Total shareholder return for this 
period was 0.176 on average per year, ranging from -0.345 to +0.482. Abnormal returns 
for this period were 0.064 on average per year, ranging from –0.041 to +0.125.  
Contrary to his predecessors, Dekker had a commercial background with a more 
than solid international track record. Before Dekker became CEO, Philips traditionally 
insisted on technological autarky. This strategy supported growth into a multibillion 
electronics firm, among the biggest in the world. However, this strategy also required 
heavy spending in R&D (Philips had the world third largest R&D budget only after IBM 
and AT&T). Using many of his business relations with Asian, US and European partners, 
Dekker deployed a strategy of concluding joint ventures to share R&D efforts so as to 
reduce Philips' own R&D spending. This change in strategy took place in 1984, when 
Dekker was 2 years in office.  
Wisse Dekker was very active in public relations and was also known as ‘the great 
communicator’. He frequently communicated about this change in strategy to the 
financial markets in interviews, in analyst and shareholder meetings and through 
publications, such as the annual report. The importance of Philips share value for 
management increased with the issuance of bonus shares (1982) and share options (1986) 
to Philips’ management. Dekker saw acquisitions and joint ventures as a means to 
concentrate the firm's resources on its most profitable and fastest growing product lines. 
Frequent communication with press, analysts and shareholders on M&A became an 
integral part of Philips' communication strategy. 
Although we only registered a limited number of events (33 in total), the rise of 
the number of alliances and joint ventures (21) is remarkable compared to the number of 
acquisitions (8) and divestitures and sell offs (4). The average CAR around the 
transactions was -0.008, corresponds with a shareholder wealth loss of € 1,399 million. 
Acquisitions accounted for an average CAR of 0.003, or a wealth gain of € 37 million. 
Joint ventures and alliances accounted for an average CAR of -0.011, or a wealth loss of 
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€ 1,209 million. Divestitures and sell offs accounted for an average CAR of -0.013, or a 
wealth loss of € 227 million. 
 
3.5.4 Van Der Klugt (1986-1990) 
In the period 1986-1990 the book value of total assets initially increased, but started to 
decrease from its high of € 34 billion in 1989 to € 31.5 billion in 1990. The workforce 
decreased with more than 71,000 employees (or 20.7%). The market value of equity 
decreased with € 1.7 billion (or almost 30%).  Sales per fte (after adjusting for inflation) 
increased from € 101,000 to € 125,000 per fte, but inflation adjusted EBITDA plummeted 
particularly in 1990 to € 3,000 per fte. Relative investments in capital expenditure 
amounted 0.006 on average per year. In the period Van Der Klugt, the relative 
investments in research and development amounted to 0.085 on average per year.  
Net accounting return in this period declined to -0.025 on average per year, 
ranging from -0.402 to 0.098. Total shareholder return for this period was -21.5% on 
average per year, ranging from -85.0% to +37.0%. Abnormal Returns for this period were 
-4.2% on average per year, ranging from –27.5% to +21.3%.   
When Van Der Klugt became president, he publicly stated to continue his 
predecessors focus on returns and to improve efficiency and to continue his predecessors’ 
policy of concluding alliances (to improve Philips' position in various markets or to share 
development efforts). Van Der Klugt continued to seek acquisitions and joint ventures to 
improve the firm's market position. He sold many units and divisions in an attempt to 
restore Philips' results and to compensate earnings suffering from strong price decline 
caused by devaluation of the dollar and the yen. In addition to the listing at the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange, a second listing at the New York Stock exchange is 
obtained in 1987, while in the same year a seasoned equity offering (€ 440 million) is 
placed.   
The importance of Philips share value for management further increases with the 
incorporation of an annual share options program (1986, 1989 and further) to Philips’ 
management.  Towards the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, earnings were falling 
dramatically. Effects from cost reduction measures did not materialize, as operational 
results were suffering badly from a weakening dollar and weak operational performance 
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in almost all the Philips divisions. However, towards external stakeholders and towards 
shareholders Van Der Klugt continued to paint a rosy picture claiming that the firm was 
still on track. With the release of the plummeting 1989 results in May 1990, he lost his 
credibility and was forced to step down by Dekker.  With the growing importance of the 
capital market for Philips, frequent communication towards press, analysts and 
shareholders on M&A became an integral part of Philips' communication strategy. 
We see a strong increase of qualifying events (to 74 in total) with a further growth 
of the number of alliances and divestitures (38) compared to the number of acquisitions 
(13) and divestitures and sell offs (23). The average CAR generated was negligible 
(0.000, corresponding with a shareholder wealth loss of € 70 million). Acquisitions 
accounted for an average CAR of 0.028, or a wealth gain of € 1.587 million. Joint 
ventures and alliances accounted for an average CAR of 0.010, or a wealth gain of € 
1.525 million. Divestitures and sell-offs accounted for an average CAR of 0.001, or a 
wealth loss of € 26 million. 
 
3.5.5 Timmer (1990-1996) 
In the period 1990-1996 the book value of total assets initially declined from € 31.5 
billion in 1990 to € 25.6 billion in 1993. From its low in 1993, asset book value increases 
to € 28.5 billion in 1996. The workforce is reduced with some 22,000 employees (or 
8.2%). The market value of equity strongly increased with € 5.6 billion (or almost 142%) 
from € 3.9 billion in 1990 to € 9.5 billion in 1996.  Sales per fte (after adjusting for 
inflation) over the period increased to € 132,000 per fte on average, and inflation adjusted 
EBITDA per fte returned to earlier levels of € 11,000-14,000 per fte. Relative 
investments in capital expenditure (measured in relation to total assets) for this period 
amounts -0.010 on average per year. The investments in research and development 
(measured in relation to total assets) amount to 0.077 on average per year.  
Net accounting return improved to 0.08 on average per year, ranging from -0.088 
to 0.173. Total shareholder return for this period was 0.206 on average per year, ranging 
from -0.399 to +0.714. Abnormal Returns for this period were -0.54 on average per year, 
ranging from –0.217 to +0.111.   
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Within Philips, Timmer had gained a strong reputation of restoring profitability in 
distressed business lines. He was appointed almost 18 months ahead of plan, due to the 
early resignation of Van Der Klugt. The day after which he was formally appointed CEO, 
he immediately launched his famous reorganization plan, which made him very popular 
with the press and the financial markets. During his tenure more than 50.000 people were 
laid off. Restructuring of this magnitude was until then unknown in the Netherlands and 
because of this he was given many nick-names such as ‘the butcher’, ‘the killer’ and ‘the 
hurricane’. Nonetheless, he personally did not feel bad about it. His restructuring, also 
known as ‘operation centurion’, was successful and changed the mindset of Philips 
employees for the better. Timmer communicated openly about the state the firm was in, 
therewith creating a platform for the actions that he deemed necessary. He announced his 
plans to cut in certain R&D (semi-conductor and computers). He initiated R&D projects 
to develop high-value, software-rich products and services, and concluded R&D contracts 
with universities and institutions. He launched new alliances (with Nintendo to develop 
CD-based video games, with Motorola to produce video circuits) and he sold most of 
Philips' computer business, Magnavox, and the stake in Whirlpool and Matshushita. The 
increased emphasis on R&D hardly paid off, with high profile failures CD-i, DCC, 
HDTV.  
Timmer frequently communicated with analysts and other financial market 
intermediaries about his strategic intentions. In the first three years of his CEO tenure, 
Timmer made another unprecedented move: he withheld all dividend payments. Timmer 
recognized the need to professionalize the Investor Relations function. In 1994, the 
Philips annual report for the first time refers to the existence of a separate Investor 
Relations Department.  
The number of qualifying events more than doubled compared to the previous 
period, to 181 announcements. The effect of a higher number of events can partly be 
attributed to the length of Timmer’s tenure of more than 6 years. In total, 44 
announcements are related to acquisitions, 84 to divestitures and sell offs and 53 are 
related to alliances and joint ventures. The average CAR generated in this period was 
0.002, which adds up to a shareholder wealth gain of € 1.299 million.  Acquisitions 
accounted for an average CAR of 0.003, or a wealth gain of € 881 million. Joint ventures 
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and alliances accounted for an average CAR of 0.001, or a wealth gain of € 61 million. 
Divestitures and sell offs accounted for an average CAR of 0.003, or a wealth gain of € 
357 million.  
 
3.5.6 Boonstra (1996-2001) 
In the period 1996-2001 the book value of total assets increased steeply with € 9.9 billion 
(or 34.7%), from € 28.5 billion to € 38.4 billion.  The workforce is reduced with some 
60,900 employees (or 24.3%). The market value of equity increased very strongly. It 
initially increased with more than € 52 billion from € 9.5 to € 61.9 billion. However, in 
the subsequent year 2001 the market value of equity declined with more than € 20 billion 
(or 33%).  Sales per fte (after adjusting for inflation) increased from € 124,000 to € 
174,000 per fte, and inflation adjusted EBITDA per fte for the period increased slightly to 
€ 15,000 per fte on average. Relative investments in capital expenditure amounts to 0.004 
on average per year. Investments in research and development amounted to 0.075 on 
average per year.  
Net accounting return strongly improved to 0.149 on average per year, ranging 
from -0.282 to 0.478. Total shareholder return for this period was 0.26 on average per 
year, ranging from -0.156 to +0.827. Abnormal Returns for this period were -0.026 on 
average per year, ranging from –0.281% to +0.206%.  
When Boonstra became CEO, the financial markets were very positive about his 
assignment. His tough Anglo Saxon management style, his focus on shareholder value 
and his open contest of the Philips culture caused that analysts and other financial 
markets intermediaries reported positively. He clearly set the firm priority on 
profitability, announcing that only after restoring profitability, other strategic matters 
would be dealt with.  He also almost immediately announced to cut activities with no or 
little chance to profitability – therewith indirectly unwinding some of the initiatives of 
Timmer. With his main focus to improve profitability, cost reductions were an important 
theme. He paid attention to the firm’s culture, attempting to improve its aggressiveness 
and responsiveness, while reducing bureaucracy and improving accountability. 
Strategically, Boonstra focused on limitation of activities and technologies in which he 
wanted Philips to be leading. He aimed at mass products for the consumer electronics 
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market. The divestiture of the largest music company in the world, Polygram, is a 
consequence of this strategy.  
When communicating to shareholders and analysts, Boonstra categorically 
declined talking about his strategic intentions. Initially, he postponed his financial market 
communication on the firm’s strategy for several times. Ultimately, when a strategy 
update became unavoidable, he claimed that the strategy had formed itself in practise. 
With the press corps and business media, he was heavily criticized for his lack of 
strategic vision and his unwillingness to communicate about matters pertaining to 
strategy. The market openly credited him for his cost reduction and rationalization 
efforts, but after two years at the helm of the company the market questioned his skills to 
create value with Philips.  
The number of qualifying events was significantly lower than in the prior period, 
with 113 announcements. In total, 19 announcements were related to acquisitions, 73 to 
divestitures and sell-offs and 21 were related to alliances and joint ventures. The average 
CAR generated in this period was 0.005, or a shareholder wealth loss of € 14.8 billion. 
Acquisitions accounted for an average CAR of 0.011%, or a wealth gain of € 5.4 billion. 
Joint ventures and alliances accounted for an average CAR of -0.003, or a wealth loss of 
€ 558 million. Divestitures and sell offs accounted for an average CAR of 0.010, or a 
staggering wealth loss of € 19.6 billion. 
 
3.5.7 Overview 
With the exception of Timmer, all CEO’s have generated shareholder wealth losses 
around their strategic restructuring announcements (Table 3.2, Panel B). Measured in 
euro terms, Boonstra accounted for the highest shareholder wealth loss, generating a total 
loss of Euro 19.6 billion upon divestiture and sell off announcements. Remarkably, he 
also accounted for the largest wealth gain of Euro 5.4 billion on acquisition 
announcements (Table 3.3 and figure 3.2). In summary, restructuring announcements 
with the highest shareholder wealth effects have incurred in the second half of the 1990s. 
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Panel A: Averages 
ACQ. (N) JV/ALL (N) DIV. (N) Totaal per CEO (N)
van Riemsdijk -0.016 (8) -0.006 (16) 0.006 (5) -0.007 (29)
Rodenburg -0.004 (8) -0.011 (6) -0.007 (7) -0.007 (21)
Dekker 0.003 (8) -0.011 (21) -0.013 (4) -0.008 (33)
van der Klugt -0.028 (13) 0.010 (38) 0.001 (23) 0.000 (74)
Timmer 0.003 (44) 0.001 (53) 0.003 (84) 0.002 (181)
Boonstra 0.011 (19) -0.003 (21) -0.010 (73) -0.005 (113)
Total (100) (155) (196) (451)
Panel B: Totals 
ACQ. (N) JV/ALL (N) DIV. (N) Totaal per CEO (N)
van Riemsdijk -0.130 (8) -0.100 (16) 0.032 (5) -0.198 (29)
Rodenburg -0.031 (8) -0.068 (6) -0.048 (7) -0.147 (21)
Dekker 0.025 (8) -0.227 (21) -0.050 (4) -0.252 (33)
van der Klugt -0.365 (13) 0.369 (38) 0.020 (23) 0.024 (74)
Timmer 0.121 (44) 0.035 (53) 0.281 (84) 0.438 (181)
Boonstra 0.209 (19) -0.059 (21) -0.738 (73) -0.588 (113)
Total (100) (155) (196) (451)
ACQ. (N) JV/ALL (N) DIV. (N) Totaal per CEO (N)
van Riemsdijk -244 (8) -208 (16) 66 (5) -386 (29)
Rodenburg -67 (8) -63 (6) -52 (7) -182 (21)
Dekker 37 (8) -1,209 (21) -227 (4) -1,399 (33)
van der Klugt -1,570 (13) 1,525 (38) -26 (23) -70 (74)
Timmer 881 (44) 61 (53) 357 (84) 1,299 (181)
Boonstra 5,377 (19) -558 (21) -19,611 (73) -14,792 (113)
Total 4,415 (100) -452 (155) -19,493 (196) -15,530 (451)
Average CAR [-3,3] per CEO
Total CAR [-3,3] in Euro mln. per CEO
Total CAR [-3,3] per CEO
 
Table 3.3: Shareholder wealth effects around restructuring announcements 
This table presents shareholder wealth effects around restructuring announcements per CEO.  Shareholder 
wealth effects are calculated are cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the announcement date. Panel 
A presents the average CAR per announcement type for each CEO. Panel B presents total CAR per 
announcement type for each CEO both in percentages and in Euro terms. 
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3.6 Philips’ financial reporting and annual report disclosure 
 
The combination of increasingly fierce Japanese competition, decentralized (and hence 
expensive) local production, strong reduction in product life cycles and volatile foreign 
currency movements put a heavy strain on firm profitability. Under these circumstances, 
so as not to lose confidence from the investor community, Philips management was in 
constant search for accounting policies that would show the highest profit in the 
particular situation (Brink, 1992). 
In the period 1971-2001, three main changes of Philips financial reporting can be 
distinguished (Volmer, 2007). First, under Van Riemsdijk and Rodenburg, Philips 
charges reduction in share values resulting from technological progress to the revaluation 
account in the balance sheet rather than to the profit and loss account. Deferred taxation 
relating to revaluations is treated similarly. Second, under Rodenburg, Dekker and Van 
Der Klugt,  Philips’ uses a variety of accounting techniques such as crediting a gearing 
adjustment13 to income,  creating a tax expense for deferred tax on realized revaluations,  
charging exchange gains and losses to equity rather than the profit and loss account, 
calculating fixed provisions for risks of obsolesce and bad debt at the level of risk 
estimated at year end14, adjusting goodwill directly to equity,  calculating pension plan 
costs based on future wage trends and expected rate of returns of pension assets. Finally, 
under Timmer and Boonstra, Philips abolishes current value accounting15. This 
accounting change is barely motivated in Philips annual report which merely states that 
“one of the reasons to return to historical cost valuation is to improve the communication 
with shareholders “(Philips annual report, 1992, p.26).  Dutch financial press reacts 
lukewarm, stating ‘In an accounting technical sense, all this can be regarded as a step 
backwards. But when it all becomes so complex that only a specialist can understand it, 
then it can be said that they have missed their objective. And the less perfect but more 
understandable method used now should be preferred primarily because it increases 
                                                 
13realized revaluation surplus on assets financed by non-equity 
14the silent reserve is abolished 
15in line with a move to US GAAP 
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comparability with other companies'. (Het Financieele Dagblad,1992, p.3, from Schattke 
and Vergoosen, 1996). 
Philips’ accounting was renowned for its technical sophistication, and its annual 
report won the Dutch Sijthoff price for the best annual report frequently (1954, 1959, 
1971, 1986, 1998 and 2005. This is more than any other firm and is an impressive 
sequence, given that a winner is excluded for the next five years.).  However, many 
changes in Philips’ accounting principles were driven by the wish to skim profits in 
periods of prosperity and enhance it in periods of decline. Consequently, there is no 
statistical correlation between Philips’ reported net income and operating cash flow 
(Volmer, 2007).  Analysts had difficulty interpreting the effects of the accounting 
changes and the arbitrary use of restructuring charges (Schattke and Vergoossen, 1996). 
Schattke and Vergoossen (1996) conclude that Philips’ financial reporting blurred the 
potentially adverse effect of the firms’ economic conditions.  
To examine Philips’ voluntary disclosure in annual reports we construct an index 
based on Botosan (1997). We describe a disclosure index (DSCORE) based on the 
information Philips provide in its annual reports to the shareholders. Although the annual 
report is only one means of corporate reporting, it should serve as a good proxy for the 
level of voluntary disclosure provided by Philips across all means of disclosure. This is 
because annual report disclosure levels are positively correlated with the amount of 
disclosure provided via other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  
When we compare 30 years of firm disclosure in the Annual Reports, the 
disclosure score (DSCORE) of the Philips Annual Reports show a remarkable pattern 
(table 3.5). From the early seventies to the mid-1980s we see a continuous increase in 
disclosure. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s we see a strong decline. From the early 
1990s till 2000, with the exception of the year 1995, the disclosure level remains lower 
than that in the early 1980s.  DSCORE visualizes that Philips’ level of voluntary disclose 
was relatively high in the 1980s but has deteriorated in the second half of the 1990s.  This 
is not in line with what we expected to find, taking into account that while capital markets 
were booming to unprecedented highs in the 1990s, the importance of a firm’s financial 
reputation was widely recognized (Dolphin, 2004) .Earlier research found that firms 
coordinate their disclosure policies across different media. Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
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document a significant correlation between annual report and investor relations disclosure 
rankings.  This suggests that a measure of disclosure level produced by examining one 
aspect of corporate reporting could proxy for the general level of disclosure provided by a 
firm. 
Year DSCORE annual report Year DSCORE annual report 
number of pages number of pages
1971 0.40 48 1987 0.50 101
1972 0.40 48 1988 0.47 98
1973 0.37 48 1989 0.50 99
1974 0.37 48 1990 0.53 72
1975 0.37 48 1991 0.60 81
1976 0.43 56 1992 0.57 76
1977 0.47 60 1993 0.40 76
1978 0.53 64 1994 0.47 84
1979 0.57 64 1995 0.67 88
1980 0.57 60 1996 0.47 96
1981 0.60 68 1997 0.50 120
1982 0.60 88 1998 0.37 144
1983 0.70 88 1999 0.50 172
1984 0.60 108 2000 0.43 171
1985 0.57 100 2001 0.53 186
1986 0.47 100  
Table 3.5: DSCORE Rating (Botosan 1997) and annual report 
This table presents Philips’ DSCORE rating, based on the index developed by Botosan (1997) measuring 
Philips disclosure in its annual report per year. The original items by Botosan (1997) are adjusted to 
measure voluntary disclosure by leaving out the legally required financial analysis items since these do not 
contribute to a measure of voluntary disclose. The items “8 quarters financial information” are excluded 
and replaced with “10 years historical financial information”. The reason for this change is to allow more 
insight into the long-term cyclical nature of Philips business and to take out the short term quarterly focus, 
which seems less relevant in our research covering thirty years. Four additional items based on Aksu and 
Kosedag (2006) are included, called “description of share classes”, “description of voting rights”, “segment 
analysis”, and “discussion of corporate strategy”.  
 
In summary, Philips’ communication with the financial markets used accounting 
techniques and other financial information to explain its performance retroactively. The 
complexity of the techniques used, and the frequent changes in accounting methods 
applied, caused that Philips accounting and financial information in its annual reports fell 
short of revealing the true state the company was in.  The level of voluntary disclosure in 
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the annual reports declines from the mid-1980s and further deteriorates in the second half 
of the 1990s.  
Next, Philips’ investor relations efforts and its appreciation by the financial 
market participants are examined to investigate patterns over time.   
 
3.7 Financial markets’ appreciation of Philips’ Investor Relations 
 
Analyzing the shareholder value effects of major restructuring announcements, a 
remarkable pattern emerges. The transactions with the biggest value implications for the 
Philips shareholders have been conducted in the last decade of our period of research 
(Table 3.3 and figure 3.2). More in particular in the second half of the 1990s. 
A closer look is taken at the appreciation of Philips’ investor relations activities. 
The weighted average of IR ratings for Philips is significantly below the rating for the 
main companies in the Amsterdam index, for the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 (Table 
3.6). For the years 1994, 1995, 2000 and 2001 the weighted average of IR ratings for 
Philips is equal to or higher than the rating for the main companies in the Amsterdam 
index.  
 
Philips Major companies 
Year public analysts press
portfolio 
managers
weighed 
average
weighed 
average
1994 6.86 6.96 6.39 7.20 6.96 6.96
1995 7.71 7.49 7.07 7.02 7.26 6.98
1996 6.21 6.20 6.18 6.00 6.12 6.91
1997 7.00 7.08 6.63 7.00 6.97 6.98
1998 6.81 6.94 6.43 6.70 6.75 6.92
1999 6.60 6.68 5.99 6.46 6.48 6.79
2000 7.20 7.34 6.78 7.33 7.24 6.84
2001 6.27 6.88 6.81 6.62 6.70 6.69
Philips breakdown in types of respondents
 
Table 3.6: Investor Relations Rating (Rematch) 
Table 3.6 presents the appreciation of Philips’ investor relations by financial market participant group. A 
comparison is made with the weighted average for all major companies. The relative weights are from 
Rematch and reflect investor relations users (40% for portfolio managers, 35% for analysts, 15% for press 
and 10% for public). Major companies are all major companies that were part of the AEX index throughout 
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the entire period 1994-2001, and are ABNAMRO, AEGON, Ahold, AkoNobel, DSM, ReedElsevier, 
Heineken, ING, KoninklijkeOlie, Philips, Unilever, Versatel, VNU and WoltersKluwer. 
 
Financial market appreciation of Philips’ investor relations activities over the 
years is highly volatile and diminishes in our reference period. In 1995 Philips investor 
relations efforts are rated positively, Philips is mentioned among the companies 
positively distinguishing themselves with respect to investor relations criteria credibility, 
clarity, disclosure and timeliness and Philips even wins the Investor Relations Award. As 
from 1996 appreciation of investor relations activities diminishes. In 1997 the lack of 
clarity on the new strategic direction is reflected in diminishing investor appreciation of 
the investor relation activities as Rematch reports “that the quest for a new company 
strategy is mirrored in negative connotations for clarity and openness”. Appreciation for 
Philips’ annual report diminishes and is even said to distinguish itself negatively from the 
other Dutch publicly quoted companies.  In 1997 Rematch reports that over time Philips 
is the company with the highest IR-volatility. In 1998 Rematch reports ‘disturbing 
signals’: the company is mentioned both positively and negatively with respect to the 
different investor relations criteria.  Initial appreciation for Boonstra when he became 
CEO diminishes in the subsequent years. In 2001, Boonstra was heavily criticized as a 
bad performer in terms of making a positive contribution to the firm’s image, for which 
he receives a ‘red’ card.   
In addition to Philips’ investor relations rating, Philips’ annual report ratings are 
relevant. In the period 1970-2001 Rematch has rated the appreciation of Philips annual 
report twice, in 1996 and in 2001.  In 1996, the Philips annual report (with 6.9) was rated 
well below the rating for the main companies (7.24). In 2001, the Philips annual report 
(with 7.35) was rated significantly better than the rating for the main companies. 
In summary, as voluntary disclosure diminishes in the second half of the 1990s, 
the financial market’s appreciation of Philips’ investor relations is volatile and strongly 
decreases towards the end of the 1990s.  Next, the financial markets’ perception of 
Philips’ disclosure and share trading volumes in this period is investigated.  
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3.8 Financial markets perception and trading volumes 
 
For 1990-2001, the number of analysts following Philips are analyzed and the dispersion 
and variability of their forecasts. This is a proxy for the financial markets perception of 
Philips’ disclosure practice.  There is a positive causal relationship between a firm’s 
disclosure practices and the number of analysts following and their forecast accuracy. 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  There is also positive causal relationship between a firms’ 
investor relation activity, the number of analysts following, and the firm’s book-to-price 
ratio (Bushee and Miller, 2005). Firms can attract analysts, improve the accuracy of their 
forecasts, reduce information asymmetries and limit market surprises by adopting more 
helpful disclosure practices. Our finding of diminishing financial market appreciation of 
Philips’ investor relations activities and diminishing Philips’ disclosure practices, 
suggests that we should find a decreasing number of analysts following Philips and an 
increasing variability and dispersion of their forecasts. We would expect to find these 
effects in the second half of the 1990s. 
In the firm’s analyst following pattern we note that after an initial increase the 
number of analysts following Philips remains stable for a number of years. We note a 
sharp decrease in 1998 (Table 3.7, panel A). This period coincides with the third year in 
office of Cor Boonstra , and hints at decreasing investor relations activity (Bushee and 
Miller, 2005).  This period coincides with the period in which Boonstra persists in his 
reluctance to reveal a new corporate strategic direction and consciously avoids 
communicating about it.   
Analyst forecast variability and dispersion serve as a proxy for information 
asymmetry.  We measure the average EPS forecasts, deflated by share price (Bamber, 
1986), per year to allow longitudinal comparison. We calculate the annual standard 
deviation to identify changes over time.  Due to the deflation effect with a very 
significant increase in share-price this comparison only provides  very low average 
standard deviations per year, from which we draw no conclusions (Table 3.7, panel A). 
Next, we investigate the development of the standard deviation of EPS forecasts 
(undeflated) per month for the period 1990-2001 (Table 3.7, panel B).  We exclude 1990 
where in particular in the second half year large accounting measures made forecasting 
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by analysts exceptionally challenging. The analysis reveals an upward trend in average 
monthly standard deviation in the period 1995-2001 and a sharp increase in 2000 and 
2001.  Both are a reflection increasing information asymmetry.   
Share trading volumes (Table 3.7, panel A) have a significant positive correlation 
with the absolute value of unexpected earnings (Bamber, 1986).  The development of the 
liquidity of Philips share shows that liquidity increases dramatically in the period 1995-
2000. The standard deviation for Philips for this period is 0.02-0.03. The increase of the 
Philips’ liquidity metric over the years confirms that the financial markets reacting to 
Philips’ unexpected dissemination of information in the period 1995-2000.  This result is 
in line with Bamber (1986). 
In summary, in the 1990s a decreasing number of analysts follow Philips, and the 
forecast variability and dispersion increases. Share trading volumes increase too. In this 
period the appreciation of the financial markets of Philips’ investor relations declines 
strongly. 
NAL
Year mean median . deviation mean median . deviation
1990 1.17% 1.01% 0.79% 0.11         0.11         0.04         19
1991 1.26% 1.02% 0.84% 0.07         0.07         0.02         31
1992 1.51% 1.13% 1.77% 0.09         0.10         0.04         37
1993 1.69% 1.43% 1.12% 0.13         0.13         0.01         37
1994 1.86% 1.44% 1.45% 0.16         0.16         0.01         37
1995 3.31% 2.59% 3.24% 0.12         0.11         0.01         36
1996 2.75% 2.75% 2.18% 0.11         0.11         0.01         38
1997 2.99% 2.61% 1.88% 0.09         0.09         0.01         37
1998 2.96% 2.70% 1.62% 0.07         0.07         0.01         32
1999 3.16% 3.05% 1.40% 0.06         0.06         0.00         41
2000 2.30% 1.37% 2.08% 0.01         0.01         0.01         35
2001 1.38% 1.30% 0.74% 0.01         0.01         0.01         29
Trading volumes EPS forecast
 Panel A Trading Volumes, EPS (deflated) forecast and analyst following
 
Table 3.7: Panel A, Philips share trading volumes, number of analysts following and 
their EPS forecast 
Panel A presents Philips’ share trading volumes applying a volume liquidity metric as in Bamber (1986) 
defined as percentage of shares traded per day over number of shares outstanding that day. The liquidity 
metric is calculated on a daily basis and averaged per year. NAL counts the number of analysts providing 
an annual earnings forecast for Philips.  The annual earnings per share (EPS) forecast is measured at year 
end following Lang and Lundholm (1996), deflated and averaged over the number of analysts (NAL). 
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3.9 Discussion 
 
We formulated our research question as “How do firms adapt their communication about 
their strategy to changing demands of the financial markets?” In answering this question 
we investigated Philips in the period 1971-2001.  
In our study, the 1990s are interesting from the perspective of the exogenously 
changing financial markets, and their demands to the firm’s communication 
requirements. The 1990s are characterized by growing media influence, evidenced by 
rapidly expanding business media. Both the frequency of news reports and the depth of 
business news showed important growth in the 1990s. This fuelled an increasingly strong 
herd instinct among financial market participants. The importance of the investor 
relations function rose to unprecedented highs, as a direct consequence of the growth of 
the financial markets and the increased importance for firms to communicate through the 
business media. 
In this period Philips had two CEO’s, Timmer (first half of the 1990s) and 
Boonstra (second half of the 1990s) each with their own style of communication with the 
financial markets. Timmer was famous for tough reorganizations, which made him very 
popular with the press and the financial markets. Timmer communicated openly about his 
views on the firm, therewith creating a platform for the actions that he deemed necessary.  
He frequently communicated with analysts and other financial market intermediaries 
about his strategic intentions and professionalized the Investor Relations function in 
Philips.  With only two years in Philips, CEO Boonstra initially was warmly welcomed 
by the media for his tough Anglo Saxon management style and his perceived focus on 
shareholder value. He mainly focused on restoring Philips’ earnings through cost 
reductions and change of culture. Boonstra narrowed Philips’ strategy aiming at mass 
products for the consumer electronics market. His divestitures were a consequence of this 
strategy. However, Boonstra categorically declined talking about his strategic intentions. 
He first postponed his strategy update to the financial markets. Later on, when a strategy 
update became unavoidable, he claimed that the strategy had formed itself in practice. 
Press and business media, heavily criticized Boonstra for his lack of strategic vision and 
his unwillingness to communicate about strategy. The market openly credited him for his 
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cost reduction and rationalization efforts, but the market questioned his skills to create 
value with Philips.  
The financial market appreciation of Philips communication changes in the 1990s. 
Early 1990s Philips investor relations efforts are rated positively, and Philips is 
mentioned among the companies positively distinguishing themselves with respect to 
investor relations criteria credibility, clarity, disclosure and timeliness.  Philips even wins 
the Investor Relations Award.  In the second half of the 1990s, the appreciation of Philips 
Investor Relations activities declines and the lack of clarity on the new strategic direction 
is reflected in lower appreciation of the investor relation activities. Rematch  reports “that 
the quest for a new company strategy is mirrored in negative connotations for clarity and 
openness”.  Although Philips is known for innovative financial reporting techniques, 
these techniques are too complex for the market to understand the underlying 
fundamentals. The appreciation for Philips’ annual report declines and is even said to 
distinguish itself negatively from the other Dutch publicly quoted companies.  In his last 
year in office, Boonstra is heavily criticized as a bad performer in terms of making a 
positive contribution to the company’s image, for which he receives a ‘red’ card. 
The number of analysts that follow Philips changes during the 1990s.  After an 
initial increase in the 1990s this number remains stable, before it sharply declines in the 
third year in office of Boonstra. The sharp decline hints at decreasing investor relations 
activity.  In this period Boonstra persists in his reluctance to reveal a new corporate 
strategic direction and consciously declines communicating about it.   
The standard deviation of the monthly analysts EPS forecast shows an upward 
trend in the 1990s and a particularly sharp increase in 2000 and 2001. Such an increase 
reflects increasing information asymmetry. Share trading volumes indicate that the 
liquidity of Philips shares increases dramatically in the second half of the 1990s. This is 
the reaction of the financial markets to a growing level of unexpected information.  
With corporate restructuring in the presidency of Timmer, a shareholder wealth 
gain was generated, divided over acquisitions, joint ventures and alliances and 
divestitures. With corporate restructuring in the presidency of Boonstra a huge 
shareholder wealth loss was generated, particularly attributable to divestitures. 
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The answer to our research question is that firms need to adapt their 
communication to the changing demands of the financial markets to assure that its 
securities are fairly valued. Shareholder wealth losses around restructuring 
announcements indicate that Philips was unable to adapt its communication to the 
exogenously changing demands of the financial markets and was unable to convincingly 
communicate its strategy in the second half of the 1990s. Increased liquidity, declining 
investor relations appreciation, decreasing number of analysts following Philips and the 
increase of the standard deviation of their EPS forecasts provide support to this negative 
answer to our research question.  
 
3.10 Conclusions 
 
Our aim with this case study is to investigate the relation between communication of a 
firm’s strategy and shareholder wealth creation. We provide insights that empirical 
studies have not addressed: the value aspects of investor communication around major 
restructuring announcements.  The case of Philips illustrates that financial markets have 
become increasingly demanding with respect to adequate communication skills and 
efforts. Especially in the period under Boonstra, Philips has not been able to convincingly 
communicate its strategic intentions to the market. At the time Boonstra took the helm, 
financial markets were booming and developing rapidly. In the same period, mass 
communication through a growing number of business news media fuelled investor 
appetite for investment information. With his Anglo Saxon background and reputation, 
the markets expected Boonstra to change Philips’ strategy and were eager to learn more 
about it. But Boonstra failed to convincingly communicate his strategic intentions. In the 
second half of the 1990s Philips’ financial market communication was clearly insufficient 
to meet the financial market’s demand for information.  In the absence of a strategic 
perspective, financial markets could not assess the value of restructuring announcements, 
and punished the lack of information. Their reaction to such announcements has led to 
massive shareholder wealth losses in the second half of the 1990s. We conclude that a 
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high level of consistent voluntary disclosure and adequate investor relations are key in 
assuring that the firm and its securities are fairly valued. 
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Figure 3.3: Development of Philips share price and abnormal returns     
Figure 3.2 presents the development of Philips share price cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The first graph 
shows the share price development, and the second graph highlights the share price development and development of 
CAR in the period in which Boonstra was CEO ((1996-2001).  
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Chapter 4: 
Corporate governance and acquisitions 
Acquirer Wealth Effects in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines acquirer wealth effects around acquisition announcements by Dutch firms. 
In the Netherlands the market for corporate control is virtually absent. Dutch firms can use 
several types of defense mechanisms as a protection against hostile takeovers and as a restriction 
of shareholders’ influence. As a result, shielded by defense mechanisms, Dutch managers can 
exercise more discretion in their corporate investment decisions than their counterparts in Anglo-
Saxon countries.  
Several studies examine acquirer wealth effects of US firms during the days around their 
acquisition announcements. The evidence of these studies is mixed. Some studies find zero or 
positive shareholder returns around acquisition announcements (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1990; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz2004, 2005; 
Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2006), whereas other studies find negative returns (e.g., Franks, Harris 
and Titman, 1991; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). When 
taking the change in dollar value into account, the results of Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2004, 2005) suggest that overall shareholders lose money. In the 1980s shareholders lost a total 
of $7 billion, while in the period 1991-2001 the loss amounts to $216 billion. Strikingly, in 1998-
2001 period dollar returns add up to a loss of $240 billion, which is mainly the result of a small 
number of large losses by firms with high market valuations. The acquisition literature knows a 
few studies on shareholder wealth effects of European acquiring firms. The studies on European 
acquisitions find on average positive shareholder returns for acquiring firms (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). 
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Even though several studies find on average positive returns around acquisition 
announcements, the percentage of shareholders experiencing negative returns is still high. A 
widely proposed explanation for the negative shareholder returns is agency problems as a result 
of the separation between ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Managers rather make non-value maximizing acquisitions to build their empire than pay 
out excess cash to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). In other words, by pursuing their own objectives 
and thereby increasing their own utility rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth, managers 
invest beyond the optimal size. A possible consequence of this overinvestment problem is that 
managers overpay for targets that provide private benefits (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990), 
such as entrenchment benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), which result in negative returns for 
the acquiring firm’s shareholders. In a recent contribution to the agency literature Jensen (2005) 
argues that managers may be motivated to acquire by high share prices. Agency costs of 
overvalued equity arise in case managers make poor acquisitions in order to aim to fulfill 
unrealistic expectations of the stock market. 
Adequate corporate governance should diminish agency problems in acquisition 
decisions. One of the forces that discourage managers from empire building is the market for 
corporate control in the sense that firms making value-decreasing acquisitions are more likely to 
be acquired later (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). However, takeover defenses decrease the probability 
of being taken over, which could lead to an insulation of managers from the discipline of the 
market for corporate control (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian, 2002; Field and Karpoff, 2002). 
Previous studies find takeover defenses to negatively influence firm value and long-run share 
performance (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2005). 
Specifically, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct a governance index, which is a score 
for the number of takeover defenses and other anti-shareholder provisions out of a set of 24 
provisions. The authors find firms with weaker shareholder rights have a lower firm value, make 
more acquisitions, are less profitable and have lower sales growth. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2005) refine this study by investigating which provisions from the governance index are the 
main drivers that negatively influence firm value. Their study suggests that just six out of the 24 
provisions play a key role in explaining firm value. The six provisions consist of four provisions 
that limit shareholder voting power – i.e. staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of 
the bylaws, supermajority requirements for mergers and supermajority requirements for charter 
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amendments – and two provisions that prevent hostile takeovers – i.e. poison pills and golden 
parachute arrangements. Although these studies contribute the negative relation to agency 
problems, they do not specify the reasons behind the negative impact. Masulis, Wang and Xie 
(2006) go one step further and examine the impact of takeover defenses of US firms on 
shareholder returns around acquisition announcements. They find that firms with more anti-
takeover defenses exhibit lower shareholder returns around acquisition announcements relative to 
firms with less defenses. These findings suggest that managers, who are insulated from the 
market for corporate control by incorporating takeover defenses, are more likely to make non-
value maximizing acquisition decisions. 
In this chapter, we describe the acquisition activity of Dutch industrial firms and the 
related wealth effects of the acquiring firms’ shareholders for the period from 1993 until 2004. 
We are especially interested in the impact of corporate governance on shareholders’ wealth 
changes following acquisition announcements by Dutch firms. As Dutch firms deploy several 
types of defense mechanisms (Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997; De Jong, Kabir, Marra and 
Röell, 2001; De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley, 2005; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2006), 
managers can exercise more discretion with their acquisition decisions. In particular, firms that 
reach a certain size are required to adopt the structured regime, as a result of which qualifying 
firms are obliged to set up a supervisory board. This supervisory board inherits many powers, 
which are otherwise held by shareholders. Apart from the structured regime, Dutch firms can 
introduce three types of securities that restrict shareholders’ influence on company decisions and 
act as defense mechanism against hostile takeovers. First, certificates through which holders have 
the same rights as holders of common shares with the exception of voting rights. Second, Dutch 
firms can install the option to sell preferenceshares to friendly shareholders during takeover 
threats, which is equivalent to US firms using poison pills as a takeover defense. Third, through 
priority shares, firms can provide friendly shareholders with special rights such as merger 
approval, new public offerings, nomination of board members, charter amendments and company 
liquidation. Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000) also examine abnormal returns of acquisition 
announcements disclosed by Dutch firms, however, focus exclusively on cross-border 
acquisitions. Besides, the authors do not relate corporate governance characteristics to acquirer’s 
returns. On the contrary, our study relates specific details of the corporate governance 
mechanisms of acquiring firms with shareholders’ wealth of these firms. We expect firms that are 
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well governed to make value enhancing acquisition decisions. We also distinguish between deals 
in which shareholders experience large losses and deals without such large losses. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) suggest that wealth destructing deals are more likely to take place 
when managerial discretion plays a larger role. The authors find firms with high valuations to be 
more likely to make losses of more than one billion dollar when announcing an acquisition. 
However, they do not provide direct evidence of the impact of corporate governance on the 
likelihood of these deals. We investigate whether good corporate governance mechanisms 
prevent firms from performing wealth-destructing acquisitions.  
Our findings suggest a minor influence of corporate governance on acquisition 
announcements in the Netherlands. On average, acquirer returns are 1.1% and the average 
increase in shareholders’ wealth is €18 million. In explaining acquirer returns, we find just one 
governance variable to be statistically significant, i.e. the structured regime dummy. The 
regression coefficient suggests 1.0% lower acquirer returns following acquisition announcements 
of firms that operate under the structured regime as compared to firms that do not operate under 
such a regime. This is in line with the notion that shareholders have limited power over firm’s 
decisions when these firms adopt a structured regime. We find the same striking result as 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz(2005) that during 2001 and 2002 average acquirer percentage 
returns are positive, whereas the total euro wealth effect for shareholders is negative. 
Consequently, we investigate which firms are more likely to make wealth destructing deals. A 
binary logit analysis suggests that managers of firms that provide room for exercising discretion 
in their acquisition decisions are more likely to make deals in which shareholders lose more than 
€150 million. Specifically, a firm’s Tobin’s q, leverage and firm size increase the probability of 
making large losses during acquisition announcements. A higher likelihood of making value-
destructing acquisitions of firms with more leverage may seem counterintuitive; however, 
managers of Dutch firms avoid the disciplining role of debt, especially when they overinvest (De 
Jong, 2002). Therefore, shareholders of firms with high leverage can perceive acquisition 
announcements as highly risky, which may bring about a stronger negative response resulting in 
large loss deals. In line with our expectations, a smaller relative size of the executive board and 
firms that have priority shares are more likely to make value-destructing acquisitions. However, 
preference shares decreases the likelihood of value-destructing acquisitions. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the Dutch situation and 
previous findings of factors that influence shareholders’ wealth effects. Subsequently, Section 4.3 
discusses the research design. Section 4.4 describes the empirical results and we end the chapter 
by providing a conclusion in Section 4.5.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
This section first provides a description of the Dutch setting. Subsequently, we briefly discuss 
previous studies on the factors that influence shareholder returns around acquisition 
announcements.  
 
4.2.1 The Dutch situation 
The basis of Dutch corporate law is the shareholder-controlled firm with a management board 
and supervisory board. Shareholders’ rights consist of electing members of the management 
board and supervisory board, formally approving dividend policy and the annual accounts. 
Shareholders are also allowed to vote on major decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions. 
However, firms that are incorporated within the Netherlands are able to severely restrict the 
power of shareholders in four ways.16 
Firms with a book value of shareholders’ equity of at least €11.4 million, with more than 
100 persons employed within the Netherlands and the legal obligation to set up a works council 
are required to adopt the structured regime. These firms are obliged to set up a supervisory board 
that takes over several powers from shareholders, including the authority over major decisions, 
the election of the management and supervisory board and the establishment and approval of 
annual accounts. It is important to note that shareholders retain their right to vote on mergers and 
acquisitions. Multinationals with more than half of its employees abroad are exempted from the 
                                                 
16De Jong, Kabir, Marra and Röell (2001) provide an extensive description about the ownership and control of listed 
firms in the Netherlands. 
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requirement of adopting a structured regime. However, they can operate under this regime on a 
voluntary basis which is applied by most multinationals.  
Apart from the structured regime, firms can implement three types of securities that 
restrict shareholders’ influence on company decisions and act as takeover defenses. First, Dutch 
firms can set up a trust office that holds the firm’s shares and issues certificates to the investors.  
Although certificate holders retain their dividend rights, they can freely trade their certificates 
and attend the General Meeting of Shareholders. However, they cannot vote. The trust office 
takes over all voting rights and is normally friendly to the incumbent managers. In practice, 
certificates enable managers to pursue their own objectives and provide a defense against firms 
that are willing to acquire the firm. Second, when firms experience a takeover threat, they can sell 
preference shares to friendly shareholders or a trust office. The main purpose of preference shares 
is to change the balance of power between shareholders as preference shares carry full voting 
rights, even though they may not be fully paid-up. The shareholders have to pay 25% of the 
nominal value upfront and the maximum amount of preference shares that can be issued is 50% 
or 100% of the current outstanding nominal capital. To be able to issue preference shares without 
shareholders’ consent, firms set up a trust office with an option on these shares. Third, Dutch 
firms may have priority shares that carry special rights, such as merger approval, new public 
offerings, nomination of board members, charter amendments and company liquidation, to 
friendly shareholders as takeover defense. As shareholders’ power with firms are severely 
restricted and Dutch firms widely implement these takeover defenses, the provisions of Euronext 
Amsterdam since 1989 allow firms to only use two types out of the latter three takeover defenses.  
 
The use of these takeover defenses has implications for firm value. Consistent with 
previous research on takeover defenses, De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005) find all 
four takeover defense mechanisms to be negatively related to firm performance, measured by 
Tobin’s q. A possible reason for the lower Tobin’s q is the minor influence shareholders can 
exert on firms’ decisions. De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2004) provide evidence that the 
use of certificates, priority shares and the adoption of a structured regime decreases the 
probability that shareholders vote against proposals during General Meetings of Shareholders. On 
the other hand, their results show a positive relation between the use of preference shares and the 
probability of votes against proposals. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006) also show that 
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shareholders of Dutch firms have a weak position, as they find that firms adopting the structured 
regime and firms that use preference shares relax their dividend policy.  
Other noticeable governance characteristics of Dutch firms include ownership structure, 
cross-listings in the US and UK and the low disciplining impact of leverage. First, the ownership 
structure of Dutch firms is relatively concentrated (Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997; De Jong, 
Kabir, Marra and Röell, 2001), while the voting rights in Dutch firms are more concentrated than 
ownership rights. This unequal distribution is due to the takeover mechanisms in which blocks of 
shares are controlled by trust offices (De Jong, Kabir, Marra and Röell, 2001). Furthermore, 
Dutch firms with a less concentrated ownership structure are more likely to adopt takeover 
defenses (Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997). Many Dutch firms have a cross-listing in the US, 
the UK or in both countries. In our sample, this holds for 32% of the firms. By means of a cross-
listing in one of these two countries, firms can bond themselves in terms of legal liability 
exposure and reputation (Coffee Jr, 1999, 2002). In other words, a cross-listing in the US or UK 
leaves less room for discretionary behavior (De Jong, Mertens and Van der Poel, 2006). Leverage 
is another device to discipline managers to make value-maximizing decisions (Jensen, 1986). 
However, De Jong (2002) finds that this does not apply for managers of Dutch firms. The author 
provides evidence that in case managers are most likely to overinvest, they avoid the disciplining 
role of debt.  
 
4.2.2 Acquirer wealth effects around acquisition announcements 
As previously mentioned, studies on the shareholder wealth effects of acquiring firms directly 
around acquisition announcements provide mixed results. These wealth effects depend on firm 
and deal specific characteristics.  
According to Jensen (1986), managers rather make nonvalue-maximizing acquisitions 
than pay out excess cash to shareholders. In line with this overinvestment hypothesis, Lang, Stulz 
and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) show that acquisitions by firms with a low Tobin’s q 
negatively influence shareholders’ wealth. Besides, as firms with a low Tobin’s q are not likely to 
have positive net present value projects, the probability that managers of these firms make 
nonvalue-maximizing acquisitions increases when having enough free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). 
Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this theory. 
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Bidders with a high Tobin’s q increase shareholders’ wealth when acquiring low q targets (Lang, 
Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991). These studies interpret high q firms as well managed 
firms that acquire poorly managed firms (i.e. low q firms).  
A recent theory by Jensen (2005) is based on observed acquisition behavior of highly 
valued firms (i.e. high q firms). In these firms agency problems due to overvalued equity bring 
about more managerial discretion, increasing the probability of bad acquisitions when firms have 
run out of good ones. Jensen’s argument is that in case the stock market attaches unrealistic high 
share prices to firms, managers will under normal business practice not be able to deliver the 
performance implies by the pricing. This leads to ‘managerial heroin’, i.e. using the overvalued 
equity to make long run value-destroying acquisitions. 
According to financial economic theory, the disciplining role of leverage has a positive 
impact on the acquirer returns (Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell, 1993). Debt serves as a 
monitoring device, providing less leeway for managers in making acquisition decisions (Jensen, 
1986). Hence, leverage increases the probability of value enhancing acquisitions. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find that firm size is negatively associated with shareholder 
returns of acquisition announcements. The authors relate the size effect with the difference of 
deal (e.g. equity/cash payment, private/public target) and firm characteristics (e.g. Tobin’s q and 
leverage) between small and large firms.  
 
In terms of deal characteristics, previous studies find that US firms that fully finance their 
acquisitions with cash experience higher abnormal returns than equity financed deals (e.g., 
Servaes, 1991; Franks, Harris and Titman, 1991; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). 
Acquiring firms finance with equity to force target shareholders in sharing the risk that the price 
for the target was too high (Hansen, 1987). An alternative explanation is that the acquiring firms 
are overvalued and aim to decrease their overvaluation by acquiring less overvalued targets with 
cheap equity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). However, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show 
opposite results for European firms. Acquirer returns of European firms that pay with equity are 
higher than that of European firms that pay with cash. The returns for both payment methods are 
significantly positive. A possible explanation for this opposite result is that European firms 
acquire private firms more often, which is in line with US evidence that equity payments with the 
acquisition of private firms yield positive abnormal returns, whereas equity payments with the 
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acquisition of public firms yield negative abnormal returns (Chang, 1998; Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz, 2004). Overall, firms experience a positive shareholders’ reaction in case they 
announce an acquisition of a private firm and a negative shareholders’ reaction in case of a public 
firm in both the US and in Europe (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2006).  
 
More diversified firms trade at a discount, due to amongst others inefficient investment 
and cross-subsidization (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2000). As a result, diversifying acquisitions negatively contribute to shareholders’ 
wealth. This negative impact applies to US firms (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990), European 
firms (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006) and, more specifically, to Dutch firms (Corhay and 
Tourani Rad, 2000). Global diversification seems to have a similar impact on acquisitions as 
industrial diversification. In particular, the excess value of more globally diversified firms is 
smaller than less globally diversified firms (Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002). Besides, cross-border 
acquisitions provides lower abnormal returns than domestic acquisitions in the US (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). The impact of cross-border deals by European firms provides mixed 
results. Consistent with results for US firms, Martynova and Renneboog (2006) find larger 
acquirer returns for domestic acquisition announcements relative to cross-border announcements 
for a sample of 2,419 European acquisitions. However, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) examine 
the returns of 228 acquisitions with a value of at least 100 million dollars and find the opposite 
result. The latter results are mainly driven by UK acquirers. In contrast to Continental Europe, the 
UK knows a highly active market for corporate control and has a high degree of shareholder 
protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Corhay and Tourani Rad 
(2000) examine cross-border acquisitions by Dutch firms and find small average positive 
abnormal returns for acquisitions in Western Europe (1.44% for 11 days around the 
announcement) and the US (0.25% for 5 days after the announcement and 4.83% for 91 days 
around the announcement), but no significant abnormal returns for acquisitions in Eastern 
Europe.  
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4.3 Research design 
 
This section first discusses the data selection procedure, followed by a description of variables 
that we use for the analysis. Finally, we will describe our empirical models. 
 
4.3.1 Dataset 
Our data collection starts with all Dutch exchange-listed firms over the period 1993-2004. We 
focus on industrial firms, i.e. we exclude financial and service companies. In total, we study the 
acquisition announcements of 90 firms. For each firm we search the electronic version of the 
Dutch financial daily, Het Financieele Dagblad. We retrieve all newspaper articles with the 
company names in the title or the body of the text and manually identify articles with the initial 
announcements of acquisitions. In total, we include 865 acquisition announcements by 64 firms. 
For the 64 firms (in 312 firm years) we collect financial and corporate governance 
characteristics from several sources. We obtain share and index returns from Datastream. 
Financial data is obtained from the REACH database (Review and Analysis of Companies in 
Holland by Bureau Van Dijk) and Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen. Board and ownership 
data is taken from the Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen,Jaarboek Nederlandse 
Ondernemingen and yearly overviews of WMZ notifications in Het Financieele Dagblad.17 
Takeover defenses and cross-listings are taken from the Effectengids, a yearly guide with all 
exchange-listed securities in Amsterdam. The information on the application of the structured 
regime is obtained from the Monitoring Report 1997 and firm’s annual reports. In order for a 
firm-year to be included we require that data is available for all items. 
                                                 
17The 1996 Act on Disclosure of Holdings in Listed Companies, provides that any person, who directly or indirectly, 
acquires or disposes of an interest in the capital and/or the voting right of public limited liability company 
incorporated under Dutch law with an official listing on a stock exchange, must give a written notice of such 
acquisition or disposal, if as a result of such acquisition or disposal the percentage of capital interest or voting rights 
held by such person falls within another percentage range held by such person prior to the acquisition or disposal. 
The relevant percentage ranges referred to in the Disclosure of Holdings Act are 0% to 5%; 5% to 10%; 10% to 25%; 
25% to 50%; 50% to 66%; and over 66%. 
 
Corporate governance and acquisitions 
 
101 
 
 
4.3.2 Variables definition 
This section defines the firm and deal variables that we use in our empirical analysis. The Tobin’s 
q is the market value of the firm divided by the replacement value of the assets as calculated in 
De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005). In the Netherlands, firms base the value of their 
assets either on its replacement value or on its historical costs. In case of the replacement value, 
no change was necessary. In case of historical costs, we adjust this value towards its replacement 
value. We measure free cash flow similar to Lehn and Poulsen (1989), i.e. operating income 
before depreciation minus total income taxes plus deferred taxes from the previous year to the 
current year minus gross interest expense on debt minus dividends paid divided by book value of 
total assets. The return on assets is calculated as the firm’s operating profits standardized by the 
book value of total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by the book value of total assets and 
firm size is the natural log of a firm’s book value of total assets. The relative size of the board is 
the number of executive board members divided by the total number of board members (i.e. both 
executive and supervisory board members). The percentage of block shareholdings is the 
percentage of shares held in a block outside the firm. A blockholding is defined as a stake of at 
least 5%. Insider ownership is the percentage blockholdings by insiders, supervisory and 
executive board members. We define a dummy that takes on the value of one for firms with a 
cross-listing in the US or the UK, and zero otherwise. To control for takeover defenses, we define 
four dummy variables that take on the value of one if the firm has preference shares, if the firm 
has priority shares, if the firm has certificates and if the firm operates under the restricted regime. 
To examine the overall impact of takeover defenses, we also define a takeover defense index, 
which aggregates all four takeover defense dummies.  
In terms of the deal characteristics, we construct a dummy for deals in which firms use 
equity in their payments. Note that mixed payments (i.e. both cash and equity) are also included 
in this dummy. Furthermore, we define a dummy for observations in which we know that the 
target is listed. Acquisitions are classified as diversifying and focus shifting, based on the 
description of the announcement in the newspaper. The relative size of the acquisition is 
calculated twofold. If firms disclose the transaction value, we calculate the relative size as the 
transaction value divided by the market capitalization of the acquirer. However, if the transaction 
value is not available, the relative size is the ratio of target sales to acquirer sales.  
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4.3.3 Market reaction model 
We measure the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around acquisition 
announcements using the abnormal returns generated by a market model as described by 
MacKinlay (1997). Our estimation window runs from day -120 to day -20. We aggregate the 
abnormal returns over a period of five days, starting two days prior to the acquisition 
announcement until two days after the acquisition announcement. Apart from the percentage 
returns, we also calculate the euro wealth effects by multiplying the five days CAR by the 
beginning of the year’s market value of the acquirer’s equity.  
Next, we investigate the determinants of the aggregated acquirer returns by means of an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which we explain the five days CAR by the acquirer 
Tobin’s q, free cash flows, return on assets, leverage, ln(size), a dummy for equity payment, a 
dummy for listed target, a dummy for diversifying acquisition, a dummy for domestic target, a 
dummy for European target, a dummy for US target, relative size of the acquisition, relative size 
of the executive board, block shareholders, insider ownership, a dummy for cross-listing US/UK, 
a dummy for priority shares, a dummy for preference shares, a dummy for certificates and a 
dummy for restricted regime. The model incorporates year fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects, based on five major industry groups according to two-digit SIC industry codes. All 
regression p-values are based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.  
 
4.3.4  Wealth destructing deals model 
We classify acquisitions as wealth destructing if shareholders lose more than 150 million Euros 
during the acquisition announcement. To investigate what type of firms make wealth destructing 
acquisition announcements, we estimate the following binary logit regression, in which we 
explain whether the deal is wealth destructing by the acquirer Tobin’s q, free cash flows, return 
on assets, leverage, ln(size), a dummy for equity payment, a dummy for listed target, a dummy 
for diversifying acquisition, a dummy for domestic target, a dummy for European target, a 
dummy for US target, relative size of the acquisition, relative size of the executive board, block 
shareholders, insider ownership, a dummy for cross-listing US/UK, a dummy for priority shares, 
a dummy for preference shares, a dummy for certificates and a dummy for restricted regime. The 
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model incorporates year fixed effects and industry fixed effects, based on five major industry 
groups according to two-digit SIC industry codes. All regression p-values are based on 
Huber/White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.  
 
4.4 Results 
 
This section first provides a description of the sample. Statistics of firm and deal variables and 
the features of shareholders’ wealth change around acquisition announcements will be discussed. 
Subsequently, we examine the factors that influence shareholders’ wealth change and conclude 
with an analysis of deals with which shareholders lose more than €150 million.  
 
4.4.1 Sample description 
As previously mentioned, our dataset consists of 312 firm years in which 64 firms announce 865 
acquisitions. Table 4.1 panel A shows more detailed information about the characteristics of these 
firm years.  
Our sample represents the larger industrial firms within the Netherlands, with an average 
market capitalization of 3.08 billion euros. They show good performance, as the average return 
on assets is 33.6% and the average Tobin’s q is 1.548. However, the return on assets exhibits a 
large variation across the sample as its standard deviation is relatively high. The mean free cash 
flow is positive, indicating that firms are able to spend internal funds on additional investments. 
With an average of 27.9%, the leverage of Dutch firms is low as compared to US firms. In terms 
of corporate governance, the board consists for 63.8% of executives. Specifically, the median 
number of executive board members is six, whereas the median number of supervisory board 
members is just three. The data on blockholders confirm the concentrated ownership structure 
within the Netherlands. The largest outside blockholder owns on average 17% of the firm. Taking 
into account all blockholders, the average ownership is 29.1%. Although the median percentage 
insider ownership is zero, the average is 5.8%. Furthermore, 31.7% of the sample firms have a 
cross-listing in the US and or in the UK, suggesting that managers of these firms exercise less 
discretion in their decisions (De Jong, Mertens and Van der Poel, 2006).  
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Takeover defense mechanisms in the Netherlands severely restrict shareholders’ power 
within the firm. Consistent with previous studies about the Dutch governance situation, the 
results indicate that Dutch firms widely implement takeover defenses in terms of priority shares 
(43.3%), preferred shares (67.3%), certificates (37.2%) and the adoption of the structured regime 
(67.9%). Aggregating all takeover defenses within a firm, the median Dutch firm adopts two out 
of the four mechanisms.  
Panel B of Table 4.1 provides the deal characteristics of our sample. Firms release the 
transaction value of their deals only 152 out of the 865 times. These 152 deals show an average 
transaction value of 521 million euros. The median is only one sixth of the average value, which 
implies that the dataset includes some very large deals. Besides, the transaction value varies 
considerably as the standard deviation is relatively high. This also applies for the transaction 
value relative to the acquiring firm’s market capitalization and the ratio of target to acquirer sales. 
The results also show that Dutch firms acquire public firms in 7.2% of all acquisitions. Compared 
to the sample of European firms in Martynova and Renneboog (2006), in which 36.8% of all 
acquisitions concern listed targets, this percentage is rather low. Furthermore, firms announce a 
diversifying deal in 20.5% of the sample and a shift in focus in 4.9% of the sample. The high 
percentage of diversifying acquisition announcements is remarkable, as previous studies find 
diversifying acquisitions to be value-decreasing (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Corhay and 
Tourani Rad, 2000; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). Firms finance their target with a 
combination of cash and equity in 3.6% of our sample. In 5.9% of the acquisitions, firms 
announce to pay with equity. Note that this percentage also includes the mixed payments. The 
low percentage may be caused by the low amount of listed target firms. In 19.1% of the 
acquisitions, firms announce to finance their deal with cash. In all other cases, firms do not 
disclose how they finance their target. In line with Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000), Dutch firms 
know a strong international orientation. They make domestic acquisitions only in 24% of all 
sample deals, whereas in 44.5% of the deals the target comes from another European country and 
in 19.2% of the deals the target is located in the US.18 
 
                                                 
18 Most of the takeover activity is concentrated in Europe and the US. For example, only 4.1% of the deals concern 
Asian targets, 1.2% are acquisitions of African firms and 2.7% concern non-US companies from the American 
continents. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of acquirer and deal characteristics 
The table presents the means, medians, standard deviations and the number of observations of firm and deal 
variables. The market capitalization is the beginning of the year market value of equity. The return on assets is 
calculated as operating profits standardized by book value of total assets. We measure the Tobin’s q as the ratio of a 
firm’s market value to replacement value of assets as calculated in De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005). 
We calculate free cash flow as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989). Leverage is total debt divided by book value of total 
assets. The relative size of the board is the number of executive board members divided by total number of board 
members. The takeover index is the aggregate value of all four takeover defense dummies (i.e. priority shares, 
preference shares, certificates and structured regime). The transaction value is the amount paid for the target.  
Panel A: Acquirer characteristics at a firm year level
 Mean Median St.dev. N
Financial characteristics
Market capitalization (€ thousands) 3,081,620 593,857 7,776,843 312
Return on assets 0.336 0.108 3.737 312
Tobin's q 1.548 1.344 0.769 312
Free cash flow/total assets 0.032 0.034 0.035 312
Leverage 0.279 0.245 0.188 312
Governance characteristics
Number of supervisory board members 3.510 3.000 1.645 312
Number of executive board members 6.048 6.000 2.205 312
Relative size of executive board 0.638 0.636 0.108 312
Percentage largest outside blockholder 0.170 0.090 0.182 312
Total percentage outside blockholders 0.291 0.225 0.237 312
Total percentage inside blockholders 0.058 0.000 0.141 312
Dummy cross listing US and/or UK 0.317 0.000 0.466 312
Takeover defense index 2.157 2.000 1.007 312
Dummy priority shares 0.433 0.000 0.496 312
Dummy preference shares 0.673 1.000 0.470 312
Dummy certificates 0.372 0.000 0.484 312
Dummy structured regime 0.679 1.000 0.467 312
Panel B: Deal characteristics at a deal level
 Mean Median St.dev. N
Transaction value (€ thousands) 520,761 90,756 1,201,059 152
Transaction value/market capitalization 0.136 0.031 0.255 152
Sales target/sales acquirer 0.094 0.015 0.291 555
Dummy listed target 0.072 0.000 0.259 865
Dummy diversifying acquisition 0.205 0.000 0.404 865
Dummy focus shifting acquisition 0.049 0.000 0.215 865
Dummy payment in cash and equity 0.036 0.000 0.186 865
Dummy payment in equity 0.059 0.000 0.236 865
Dummy payment in cash 0.191 0.000 0.393 865
Dummy domestic acquisition 0.240 0.000 0.428 865
Dummy European acquisition (excluding NL) 0.445 0.000 0.497 865
Dummy US acquisition 0.192 0.000 0.394 865
all deals
all deals
Chapter 4 
106 
 
 
 
To get an impression about the shareholders’ wealth effects around acquisition 
announcements, Table 4.2 provides statistics of the percentage abnormal returns (panel A) and 
the euro wealth transfers (panel B) for different event windows.  
Table 4.2: Acquirer returns around acquisition announcements for different event windows 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the percentage abnormal returns and the wealth transfer in millions of 
euros for different event windows. The acquisition announcement day is day zero. Abnormal returns are calculated 
by using the market model as described in MacKinlay (1997), with the estimation window running from day -120 to 
day -20. We aggregate the abnormal returns for the different event windows. The euro wealth transfer is the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the event window times the acquirer’s market capitalization at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. The table shows *, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptives of the market reaction to acquisition announcements for different event windows
[-20, 20] [-10, 10] [-5, 5] [-2,2] [-20,-3] [3,20]
Mean 1.30% *** 0.96% *** 1.13% *** 1.07% *** 0.08% 0.15%
Minimum -55.76% -68.33% -36.09% -22.48% -66.47% -39.07%
25% -6.16% -3.97% -2.63% -1.45% -4.31% -3.85%
Median 1.00% 0.45% 0.54% 0.61% -0.16% -0.15%
75% 7.29% 5.40% 4.43% 3.31% 4.37% 4.16%
Maximum 68.22% 71.17% 40.39% 39.27% 32.57% 50.23%
Standard deviation 12.42% 9.04% 6.78% 4.95% 7.86% 7.69%
N 865 865 865 865 865 865
 
Panel B: Descriptives of the wealth transfer in € millions around acquisition announcements for different event windows
[-20, 20] [-10, 10] [-5, 5] [-2,2] [-20,-3] [3,20]
Mean 23.04 1.89 6.57 17.89 * -28.70 33.84
Minimum -9,040.49 -6,377.08 -5,144.17 -2,726.24 -6,545.32 -3,646.44
25% -66.75 -55.36 -41.87 -20.13 -51.37 -54.05
Median 3.05 1.49 1.49 2.22 -0.37 -0.42
75% 87.75 52.87 51.62 37.06 53.80 47.92
Maximum 16,146.15 9,302.80 3,717.78 1,790.41 7,199.73 11,871.74
Standard deviation 1,033.73 665.18 482.74 294.73 673.89 839.78
N 865 865 865 865 865 865
Event window
Event window
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Panel A of the table shows significantly positive abnormal returns around acquisition 
announcements for four out of the six event periods, indicating that acquisitions in the 
Netherlands on average enhance shareholder wealth. During the five days around the acquisition 
announcement, shareholders experience a significant increase of 1.07% in their returns. The share 
price does not experience a significant change from 20 days until 3 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement and 3 days until 20 days after the announcement, suggesting that the information 
about the acquisition is discounted into the market price immediately around the release of the 
information.  
Panel B provides the abnormal euro returns around acquisition announcements. 
Shareholders experience an average significant increase in their wealth of €17.89 million during 
the five days around an acquisition announcement. Wealth changes in the other event windows 
are not significantly different from zero. Note that the standard deviation of the euro returns are 
extremely large, suggesting both large gains and losses for shareholders of acquiring firms. The 
extreme values provide support for this suggestion. For instance, the minimum value for the five 
days window indicates a loss of about €2.7 billion and the maximum value indicates a gain of 
about €1.8 billion. The extreme values of the other event windows are even larger.  
As Table 4.2 suggests that most of the announcement returns occur during the five days 
around the acquisition announcement, Figure 4.1 provides the average development of the share 
price over the forty days around the announcement and Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the 
cumulative abnormal returns over the five days event window.  
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Figure 4.1: The development of abnormal returns around acquisition announcements 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of the days around acquisition announcements. The day 
of the announcement is day zero.  
 
Figure 4.2: The distribution of abnormal returns
This figure provides the distribution of the five days cumulative abnormal returns around acquisition announcements. 
The horizontal axis shows the five days cumulative abnormal returns and the vertical axis shows the frequency in 
which this return occurs.  
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Figure 4.1 shows a slight price run-up prior to the acquisition announcement, which does 
not differ significantly from zero. The sharp increase in average abnormal returns starts at two 
days prior to the announcement day and lasts for about five days. Afterwards, the cumulative 
abnormal returns remain relatively stable around the 1.2%. Figure 4.2 shows that the distribution 
of the cumulative abnormal returns appears to be normally distributed. Besides, acquisition 
announcements are more often value increasing than value decreasing. The results further show 
that the distribution of abnormal returns is somewhat skewed towards positive returns. 
When disclosing a planned acquisition, firms usually provide reasons why they take over 
another firm. As the motivation behind acquisitions is important information for the market, table 
4.3 lists the stated motivations, the frequency of these motivations and the related acquirer 
returns.  
 
Table 4.3: Stated motives for acquisitions and the related abnormal returns 
This table presents the frequency of acquirers’ motives for the acquisition as disclosed in their acquisition 
announcements. Cost reduction consists of economies of scale, synergy, efficiency and access to low wage labor. 
The table also provides the average cumulative abnormal returns over five days surrounding the acquisition 
announcements per stated motive. The table shows *, ** and *** for CAR values that are significantly different from 
zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
We categorize the motives into seven groups; 1) cost reduction, 2) geographic expansion, 
3) broadening the firm’s product line, 4) increasing the firm’s market share, 5) diversification, 6) 
another motive, which do not belong to the first five groups, and 7) no motive provided. The 
most common motives are an increase in market share that occurs in 37% of all announcements 
and geographic expansion that occurs in 17% of all announcements. Both motives yield 
significantly positive abnormal returns (1.21% and 1.19%, respectively), indicating that these 
types of acquisitions are value enhancing for shareholders. The acquisitions in which firms can 
Stated motives for acquisitions Number Percentage CAR
Cost reduction 60 7% 1.32% *
Geographic expansion 150 17% 1.19% ***
Broadening product line 61 7% 0.93%
Increasing market share 321 37% 1.21% ***
Diversification/vertical integration 22 3% 1.56% *
Other motive 19 2% 0.86%
No motive 232 27% 0.74% **
Total 865 100% 1.07% ***
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reduce their costs in the form of economies of scale or access to low wage labor also provides 
positive abnormal returns (1.32%). A remarkable result is that shareholders respond positively to 
diversifying reasons, while previous studies find diversifying acquisitions to be negatively related 
with the market reaction. The abnormal returns are 1.56%, which is the highest percentage 
compared to all other reasons. Note that in 3% of all acquisition announcements, firms state that 
the prime motive to acquire a firm is to diversify, whereas 20.5% of all acquisitions are 
diversifying acquisitions. Furthermore, firms do not provide a motive for their acquisition in 27% 
of the sample, yet the abnormal returns are significantly positive. The data do not show a 
significant response to firms that aim to broaden their product line or give another motive. The 
main conclusion from Table 4.3 is that the stated motive does seem to explain the acquirer’s 
wealth change, as shareholders respond significantly to some of the stated motives and not to 
others.  
The market response and total wealth effects around acquisitions depend on the period in 
which the acquisition takes place (Harford, 2005; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005). In 
particular, the abnormal returns are higher at the beginning of merger waves than later during the 
merger wave. Table 4.4 presents the percentage abnormal returns and the euro wealth effects per 
year. A more visual overview can be drawn from Figure 4.3.  
Table 4.4: The characteristics of shareholders’ wealth effects per year 
The table shows descriptives of the cumulative abnormal returns over five days surrounding acquisition 
announcements and the related euro wealth effects per year. The euro wealth effects are the cumulative abnormal 
returns for the event window times the acquirer’s market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year. The table 
shows *, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
year n Mean Median % positive Total Mean Median
1993 61 1.42% *** 1.03% 69% 1,075.61 17.63 *** 2.03
1994 83 -0.05% -0.26% 41% -1,190.58 -14.34 -2.55
1995 97 0.00% -0.32% 42% -1,602.75 -16.52 -2.06
1996 86 1.09% *** 0.73% 59% 749.88 8.72 2.21
1997 89 1.66% *** 0.78% 57% 2,820.43 31.69 1.54
1998 102 0.85% 0.72% 64% 839.57 8.23 3.68
1999 116 2.20% *** 1.93% 61% 7,756.35 66.87 * 5.91
2000 83 1.10% * 1.19% 59% 4,103.12 49.44 11.84
2001 44 1.31% * 1.79% 66% -660.20 -15.00 4.58
2002 44 0.80% 0.56% 52% -4.66 -0.11 5.45
2003 27 1.22% 2.34% 59% 468.61 17.36 9.75
2004 33 1.31% *** 1.47% 73% 1,123.02 34.03 3.73
ALL 865 1.07% 0.61% 57% 15,478.40 17.89 2.22
Wealth effects in € millionsCAR [-2,2]
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Figure 4.3: The number of acquisition announcements and the total wealth effects per year 
This figure shows the number of acquisitions and the total aggregated wealth effects over five days around 
acquisition announcements per announcement year. The left vertical axis provides the number of acquisitions, the 
right vertical axis shows the total wealth effects in millions of euros and the horizontal axis shows the announcement 
year.  
The results indicate that during the first half of the nineties, several value decreasing 
acquisitions take place. Though not statistically significant, the years 1994 and 1995 show zero 
and small negative abnormal returns and large negative wealth effects for the shareholders. 
During these years, the least amount of positive reactions to acquisition announcements occur. 
Afterwards, shareholders experience an increase in their wealth, with 1999 as most successful 
year. In that year, the total wealth gain due to acquisition announcements is €7.7 billion and the 
average abnormal return is 2.2%. The economic downturn started halfway 2000. The 
consequences of this downturn appear in 2001, which shows a decrease in the number of 
acquisitions. The total wealth losses are €660.2 million and €4.7 million in the year after. 
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Strikingly, the average abnormal returns are positive during these years. These results suggest 
that, consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004, 2005), the negative wealth effects 
are a result of a few extremely large losses. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) argue that 
managers of highly valued firms can exercise more discretion and hence, are more likely to make 
value-destroying acquisitions. Firm size can also drive the results (Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz, 2004). Acquisitions by small firms are generally value enhancing, but the euro gains are 
small as well. On the contrary, larger firms make larger acquisitions that can result in large euro 
losses. Both effects together can result in positive returns and negative wealth effects at the same 
time. In Section 4.4.3, we examine the value-destructing deals into more detail. Finally, in the 
last two years of our sample the number of acquisitions is still low, yet the acquisition 
announcements that take place do yield positive abnormal returns.  
 
4.4.2 Explaining wealth effects 
So far, we discussed the characteristics and abnormal returns of our sample of acquisition 
announcements by means of a univariate analysis. This section discusses the factors that 
influence shareholders’ wealth around an acquisition announcement. Table 5 shows the results of 
four ordinary least squares regressions with the five days abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable. 
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Table 4.5: Regression analysis of acquirer return around acquisition announcements 
The table provides the results of ordinary least squares regressions that explain the abnormal returns during five days 
around acquisition announcements. All variables in this table are defined in Table 1. All regressions include year and 
industry dummies. P-values are documented in parentheses and based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected 
standard errors. The table shows *, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
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Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), the first regression indicates 
that larger firms are more likely to make value reducing acquisitions. Furthermore, firms that 
finance their deal with equity experience 2.2% higher abnormal returns than firms that do not use 
equity as payment. Although this result is not in line with previous research on US firms, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find similar results for European firms. A possible explanation 
for the positive relation is the high amount of private targets that get acquired. The results further 
show that the target’s country of origin does not influence shareholders’ wealth. None of the 
country dummies is significant. Firm and deal characteristics that do not influence acquirer 
returns are the firm’s Tobin’s q, free cash flow, return on assets, leverage, whether the target is 
listed and whether the deal is diversifying. 
The size of the target relative to the acquirer firm size is an indication for the impact of 
the deal for the acquiring firm. Unfortunately, few firms disclose the price they pay for the target 
(152 out of 865) and we do not know the target sales of all deals (555). To examine the impact of 
the deal size, we construct the variable ‘relative size of acquisition’ in which we set the value to 
the relative price paid, calculated as price paid for the target divided by the market value of the 
acquirer firm’s equity. If this value is not available, we take the ratio of target sales to acquirer 
sales. Regression 2 of Table 4.5 includes the relative size of the acquisition. We find the relative 
size to be positively related with acquirer returns, suggesting that larger acquisitions are more 
likely to be firm value enhancing. Another effect of including this relative size is that the equity 
payment dummy loses its significance, which may a result of the smaller sample size. However, 
when running regression 1 with the same observations as regression 2 (results are not tabulated), 
the equity payment dummy remains significant, implying that the dummy is an artifact of the 
relative size of an acquisition. Firms that acquire relatively large targets are more likely not to 
have enough cash available, increasing the probability to pay with equity. A comparison between 
the R-squared of regression 1 (with 644 observations) and regression 2 implies a significant 
increase in explanatory power (p=0.000).  
To examine the impact of corporate governance on shareholders’ wealth around 
acquisition announcements, Regression 3 includes the variables relative size of the board, 
percentage of block shareholders, percentage insider ownership, a dummy for being cross-listed 
in the US or UK and the takeover defense index. We expect a better governance structure within 
a firm to bring about less discretion for managers, resulting in higher abnormal returns. The 
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results suggest a marginal impact of corporate governance on firm’s decisions as only the 
coefficient for takeover defense index is significant. In line with Masulis, Wang and Xie (2006) 
and in line with our expectations, the coefficient is negative. Ceteris paribus, for each 
implemented takeover defense mechanism, shareholders’ wealth decreases with 0.4%. To 
investigate which of the takeover defense mechanisms drive the negative effect, we include the 
four defense dummies in regression 4. The restricted regime dummy appears to mainly drive the 
takeover defense effect. In particular, the abnormal returns around acquisition announcements are 
1.0% lower for firms that have adopted a structured regime as compared to firms that have not 
adopted such a regime. Comparing the 1.0% with the average of 1.07% abnormal returns for the 
whole sample, the impact of a structured regime is high.  
 
4.4.3 Which firms make wealth-destructing deals? 
As previously mentioned, our results suggest that a small number of acquisitions drive down the 
total shareholders’ wealth around acquisition announcements. In this section, we investigate 
whether firm and deal characteristics differ for wealth-destructing deals versus non-wealth 
destructing deals. In particular, we expect these wealth-destructing deals to occur in firms where 
managers are able to exercise discretion and make acquisitions that maximize their own utility. 
Corporate governance should prevent managers from making large loss deals. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) examine wealth-destructing deals with a loss of at least $1 billion 
disclosed by US firms. We focus on deals with losses of more than €150 million, because our 
sample exclusively consists of Dutch firms that are on average smaller than US firms and we aim 
to construct a sample that is large enough to draw robust conclusions19. From our sample of 865 
acquisition announcements, 80 acquisitions announced by 9 firms are wealth-destructing. The 
total wealth destruction of these 80 acquisition announcements is €38 billion. Table 4.6 presents 
descriptives and mean comparisons of the sample with and without these wealth-destructing 
deals. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19Our sample includes eight deals with shareholders’ losses of more than €1 billion.  
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Panel A provides the firm characteristics. Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz (2005), firms that make value-destroying acquisitions are larger (market capitalization of 
€12.0 billion vs. €1.5 billion) and have a higher Tobin’s q (2.067 vs. 1.459). The higher Tobin’s q 
is in line with the arguments that a high valuation of firms increases the likelihood of managers to 
act in their own interest (Jensen, 2005; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005). According to 
Jensen (1986), managers in firms with excess free cash flows are more likely to make value 
reducing acquisitions. However, this theory does not apply to wealth-destructing acquisitions, as 
firm years in which wealth-destructing acquisitions occur do not have significantly more free 
cash flows. Governance characteristics also provide some significant results. Although both the 
supervisory board and the executive board are larger in firms with wealth-destructing deals, the 
relative size of the executive board is smaller (60.4% versus 64.4%). The smaller relative number 
of executives in the board implies better monitoring and therefore a lower probability to make 
large losses. Moreover, the percentage of outside blockholders that are other monitoring agents is 
lower within firm years with wealth-destructing deals (20.7% vs. 30.5%). Insider ownership 
should increase the incentives of managers to act firm value maximizing and hence not to make 
large losses around acquisition announcements. Insider ownership of 1.1% for firm years with 
wealth-destructing acquisitions and of 6.6% for firm years without such deals is evidence that is 
consistent with this line of reasoning.  
A remarkable result is that firms making wealth-destructing deals are more often cross-
listed in the US and/or the UK (73.9% vs. 24.4%). A cross-listing is amongst others a bonding 
mechanism for managers to act value-maximizing (Coffee Jr., 1999, 2002), however, the results 
suggest the opposite. An alternative explanation comes from the fact that Dutch firms with a 
cross-listing in the US and/or UK are typically larger. The significant difference may be an 
artifact of firm size. Another surprising result is the lower amount of takeover defense 
mechanisms in firm years with value-destructing deals (1.8 vs. 2.2). Distinguishing between the 
different takeover defense mechanisms gives 21.7% of all firm years with wealth-destructing 
acquisitions have certificates, 39.1% have adopted the structured regime, 58.7% have preference 
shares and 65.2% have priority shares. For firm years without the wealth-destructing deals, these 
percentages are 39.8%, 72.9%, 68.8% and 39.5%, respectively. Therefore, only the relatively 
high application of priority shares for firm years with wealth-destructing deals as compared to 
firms without such deals meets our expectations.  
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Panel B provides the differences in deal characteristics between wealth-destructing deals 
and non-wealth-destructing deals. As wealth-destructing deals have a large impact on the euro 
value of firms, we expect the transaction value for these deals to be larger as well. The table 
shows a higher transaction value for value-destructing deals, yet the difference is not statistically 
significant. This also applies for the transaction value standardized by the market value of equity 
of the acquirer. Unexpectedly, the ratio of target sales to acquirer sales, which is also a proxy for 
the size of the deal, is smaller for value-destroying deals (3.8% vs. 9.9%). Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (2005) suggest that the absolute change of returns around acquisition announcements 
reflect both the net present value of the acquisition itself and the information that is revealed 
about the firm by announcing an acquisition. The large loss deals may be a reflection of the 
information about the firm beyond the acquisition announcement. Furthermore, targets of value-
destructing deals are more often listed (15% vs. 6.4%) and located in the US (30% vs. 18.1%). In 
contrast to Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), we find less equity payments in wealth-
destructing deals. In particular, 1.3% of the wealth-destructing deals are financed with equity, 
whereas this is 6.4% for non-wealth-destructing deals (this is 0% vs. 3.9% for mixed payment 
methods).  
Now that we know the characteristics of firms announcing wealth-destructing deals and 
the characteristics of such a deal itself, we aim to predict the likelihood that a wealth-destructing 
acquisition occurs. In a logit regression with exclusively a dummy for the firm being in its 
highest valuation year, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) find that firms make wealth 
destructing deals when their valuation is high. This result is consistent with the arguments of 
Jensen (2005), who reasons that a high valuation of firms increases the likelihood of managers to 
act in their own interest. Apart from the Tobin’s q, we include additional firm, governance and 
deal variables in the regression in which the dependent variable that takes on the value of one if 
the deal is value-destructing and zero otherwise. We are particularly interested in whether good 
corporate governance structures provide more protection for shareholders. 
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Table 4.7: Regression analysis explaining the likelihood of a wealth-destructing acquisition 
announcement 
The table provides the results of a binary logit regression that explains the likelihood of an acquisition announcement 
to be wealth destructing. A deal is classified as wealth-destructing when the negative wealth effect is more than €150 
million. All variables in this table are defined in Table 1. The regression includes year and industry dummies. P-
values are in parentheses and based on Huber/White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. The table shows 
*, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
  
Coefficient
(p -value)
Intercept -28.020 ***
(0.000)
Tobin's q 0.995 ***
(0.000)
Free cash flow/total assets 4.451
(0.634)
Return on assets 0.059
(0.393)
Leverage 3.696 ***
(0.005)
ln(size) 1.509 ***
(0.000)
Dummy equity payment -1.105
(0.298)
Dummy listed target 0.472
(0.279)
Dummy diversifying 0.455
(0.194)
Dummy European target, but not Dutch 0.339
(0.452)
Dummy Domestic target 0.841
(0.131)
Dummy US target 0.329
(0.521)
Relative size of the board -3.981 *
(0.079)
Block shareholders 0.720
(0.553)
Insider ownership 0.986
(0.744)
Dummy cross-listing US or UK 0.700
(0.215)
Dummy priority shares 0.995 *
(0.056)
Dummy preference shares -0.899 *
(0.072)
Dummy certificates 0.193
(0.715)
Dummy structured regime -0.163
(0.774)
Number of observations 865
McFadden R -squared 35.68%
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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With a McFadden R-squared of 35.68%, the model can reasonably predict the likelihood 
that firms make value-destructing acquisitions. The significantly positive Tobin’s q is in line with 
the theory that managers of highly valued firms are more likely to make value decreasing 
decisions. Leverage shows a significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that firms with more 
leverage are more likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions in spite of the fact that leverage 
acts as a monitoring device (Jensen, 1986). As De Jong (2002) argues that Dutch managers are 
not disciplined by leverage, shareholders can perceive acquisition announcements of firms with 
high leverage as highly risky and hence respond negatively to the announcement. Furthermore, 
larger firms are also more likely to make wealth-destructing deals. This result is consistent with 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), who find a size effect in explaining acquirer returns 
around acquisition announcements. As larger firms make larger deals, they are also more likely to 
make larger losses.  
The governance variables suggest that the relative size of the board, priority shares and 
preference shares influence the likelihood of a wealth-destructing deal. In line with our 
expectations, a larger proportion of executives on the board give the executives more possibilities 
to exercise discretion, increasing the probability to make value-destroying acquisitions. 
Furthermore, firms with priority shares, providing friendly shareholders with special rights such 
as merger approval, are better protected against takeover defenses and therefore more likely to 
make wealth-destructing deals. On the other hand, preference shares, another takeover defense 
mechanism, negatively influence the probability of wealth-destructing acquisitions. The other 
governance variables – i.e. block shareholders, insider ownership, being cross-listed in the US or 
UK, certificates and structured regime – do not show a significant impact. Free cash flows, return 
on assets and none of the deal characteristics influence the probability of value-destructing deals 
either. In sum, the significant coefficients of firms’ Tobin’s q, leverage and size imply that 
managers exercise discretion in their acquisition decisions resulting in a higher probability of 
making wealth-destructing acquisitions. Corporate governance does have an effect on acquirer 
wealth gains in acquisitions; however, the results suggest a rather minor effect.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides an extensive description of the acquisition market within the Netherlands 
for the period starting in 1993 until 2004. We investigate the change in shareholders’ wealth 
during the days around acquisition announcements and the impact of a firm’s governance 
structure on shareholders’ wealth change. From an international perspective, the Netherlands 
provides an interesting setting, as the market for corporate control is virtually absent. Dutch firms 
can implement four types of defense mechanisms – priority shares, preference shares, certificates, 
adoption of structured regime – that severely restrict shareholders’ power. Limited shareholder 
power leaves much room for managers to exercise discretion in their acquisition decisions. We 
examine shareholders’ wealth change in terms of the percentage abnormal returns and the 
absolute euro change.  
We investigate a sample of 865 acquisitions in the period 1993-2004 and find that, even 
though shareholders have limited power, their average wealth increases around acquisition 
announcements. We also find that an adequate corporate governance structure has a minor 
influence on acquisition announcements. In explaining acquirer returns, only one governance 
factor provides significant results. Specifically, firms that adopt the structured regime have lower 
acquirer returns, which is in line with managers exercising discretion when shareholders’ power 
is low.  
In addition to returns expressed as the corrected percentage share price change, we also 
measure the changes in the market values of the firm’s equity in euros. We find the same striking 
result as Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) that during 2001 and 2002 average acquirer 
returns are positive, whereas the total euro wealth effect for shareholders is negative. In order to 
shed light on this counter-intuitive finding, we examine which firms are more likely to announce 
deals that result in a wealth loss of more than €150 million. Our results indicate that high q firms, 
firms with high leverage and larger firms are more likely to make value-destructing acquisitions. 
The finding that high q firms are dominantly present among the group of wealth destructing 
companies is in line with Jensen’s (2005) prediction of agency problems resulting from 
overvalued equity. The positive impact of leverage on the likelihood of managers to announce 
value-destructing deals is in line with the results of De Jong (2002), who finds Dutch managers to 
avoid the disciplining role of leverage, especially when they overinvest. Once more, the results 
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on explaining the likelihood of wealth destructing deals suggest a minor impact of corporate 
governance. A smaller relative amount of executive board members and firms that do not have 
priority shares decrease the likelihood of value-destructing acquisitions.  
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Chapter 5: 
Summary and suggestions for further research 
 
 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
In this chapter we summarize our findings. In chapter 2 we investigated the relation 
between board interlocks and firm risk in Dutch firms. Dutch firms are interesting from a 
governance perspective since they operate with a two tier board structure, separating 
daily management from supervision. This allowed us to investigate the effect of 
supervisory directors’ connectivity on firm risk. We found that supervisory board 
interlocks reduce the firm’s systematic risk and that bankers on the board increase the 
firm’s ability to mitigate downside risk. Both effects are empirical support for the view 
that interlocks are a node through which information on business practices flows and 
network resources are engaged. However, we also found that interlocks of the chairman 
of the supervisory board increase the firm’s risk. This can be explained through busyness, 
arguing that more interlocks of the chairman lead to a weaker corporate governance and 
reduced monitoring. An alternative explanation is that the chairman actively uses network 
information and resources to steer the firm’s decision making towards higher risk 
decisions. 
In chapter 3 we investigated the increasing importance of communication between 
firms and financial markets, particularly in the 1990s. We studied the financial market 
reactions to major strategic announcements of Royal Philips NV in the period 1971-2001. 
Amidst exogenously changing financial markets we analyzed Philips’ financial market 
communication and the markets’ appreciation of Philips’  investor relations activities and 
their reaction in terms of share liquidity, analyst following, dispersion of their forecasts. 
We found strong negative announcement reactions, particularly in the late 1990s. We 
conclude that Philips communication inadequately addressed the investor needs for 
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information, and that particularly in the late 1990s Philips has been incapable to 
convincingly communicate its strategic intentions to the market. A high level of 
consistent voluntary disclosure and adequate investor relations are key in assuring that a 
firm and its securities are fairly valued.  
In chapter 4 we examined 865 acquisitions by Dutch industrial firms over the 
period 1993–2004. Theoretical work based on principal–agent problems predicts that 
managers of exchange-listed corporations may pursue acquisitions even when these do 
not add value for the shareholders. Corporate governance structures serve to constrain 
managers in their acquisition activity. In this chapter we measured the shareholder wealth 
effects of acquisitions and the factors that determined these wealth effects, including the 
governance characteristics of corporations. Firms in the Netherlands are interesting from 
the perspective of corporate governance, because the managerial board has a relatively 
strong position vis-à-vis shareholders. Several takeover defenses commonly used in the 
Netherlands not only limit shareholder influence during takeover battles, but also in 
absence of such fights. On the other hand, ownership is relatively concentrated, which 
may provide shareholders with the incentives and power to monitor the management. The 
average abnormal share return following acquisition announcements is 1.1%, which is a 
significant positive effect. There is only a significant negative impact of the so-called 
structured regime, a situation where several shareholder rights are delegated to the 
supervisory board. This result suggests that governance improves acquisition decisions.  
 
5.2 Suggestions for further research 
 
In chapter 2 we investigated the relation between board interlocks and firm risk. Based on 
statistical analyses we concluded that board interlocks may reduce risk. Our explanation 
for this phenomenon is that interlocks may serve as a node through which information 
may be obtained and network resources may be shared. There are various ways in which 
board interlocks may reduce (systematic) risk. A possible risk reduction effect may be 
related to the information effect’ of board interlocks.  In order to identify a possible 
information effect we can, for instance, divide our dataset into subsamples. We would 
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expect the effect to be strongest in intransparant firms. Such a division into subsamples 
could be based on firm transparency (intransparant firms versus transparent firms). A 
similar division into subsamples could be made to distinguish a ‘network resources 
effect’, or other risk reduction effects of board interlocks. Further research is needed to 
further investigate the nature of the interlocks. The effect on firm risk may be different 
depending on the nature of the interlock. The nature of interlocks may be functional, 
industrial, professional or otherwise, each with its own specific effect on firm risk. 
Adding industry relatedness to the connectivity variables may also prove useful in better 
understanding of the risk reduction effects of board interlocks. Another finding in our 
research is that the relation between board interlocks and systematic risk is negative 
whereas the relation between interlocks of the chairman and downside risk is positive.  In 
other words, board interlocks reduce firm risk but interlocks of the chairman increase 
firm risk. This difference is interesting and may be explained in several ways. 
Explanations for this could be found in the difference of network information obtained, or 
differences in deploying information and network resources in the firm’s decision making 
process or the difference in responsibility between the chairman en other supervisory 
board members.  
In chapter 3 we investigated the increasing importance of communication between 
firms and financial markets, particularly in the 1990s, using Philips as a case study. An 
aspect for further research are Philips’ announcements on capital expenditures, 
reorganizations and lay-offs that have been excluded from this study. Such 
announcements are a direct consequence of the firm’s strategy. The relation between such 
announcements and the financial markets reaction could provide valuable additional 
insights on how these announcements have been communicated to the market. A case 
study method was selected for our research since the nature of our research question 
required a rich and holistic approach in which the complex setting, with many important 
variables, could be investigated. Further research may address the concern of lack of 
representativeness of the case study approach. For such research the financial market 
communication of a sample of firms should be investigated and the financial markets’ 
reaction to these companies’ restructuring announcements. The findings of this case study 
can be used as hypotheses to be tested.  
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In chapter 4 we measured shareholder wealth effects of acquisitions and the 
factors that determine these effects, including the firms’ governance characteristics. We 
find positive announcement returns and conclude that takeover defenses used by Dutch 
firms had only very limited negative effect on shareholder value around acquisitions. A 
possible explanation for this effect is that high concentration provides shareholders with 
both an incentive and the means to exercise control over management. Further research 
could investigate the relation between acquisition announcement returns and ownership. 
Various aspects of ownership could be included such as shareholder characteristics, 
distribution of ownership, firm and industry characteristics and board representation. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch translation) 
 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten wede relatie tussen meervoudige bestuursfuncties en 
ondernemingsrisico bij Nederlandse bedrijven. Nederlandse bedrijven zijn interessant 
vanuit het perspectief van bestuur, omdat zij werken meteen tweeledige 
bestuursstructuur, waarbij dagelijks bestuur is gescheiden van toezicht. Hierdoor waren 
wij in staat om het effect te onderzoeken van dubbelfuncties van commissarissen op het 
ondernemingsrisico. Wij vonden dat meervoudige bestuursfuncties van de leden van raad 
van commissarissen het systematisch bedrijfsrisico vermindert en dat bankiers in de raad 
van commissarissen de mogelijkheden van de onderneming vergroot om neerwaarts 
risico te beperken. Beide effecten zijn empirische steun voor de opvatting dat 
dubbelfuncties een knooppuntzijn, waarlangs informatie over zakelijke gebruiken stroomt 
en waarlangs middelen uit het netwerk kunnen worden ingeschakeld. Maar we vonden 
ook dat meervoudige bestuursfuncties van de voorzitter van de raad van commissarissen 
van het bedrijf het ondernemingsrisico verhoogt. Dit kan worden verklaard door drukte, 
met het argument dat meer bestuursfuncties van de voorzitter leiden tot een zwakkere 
bestuursstructuur en een verminderd toezicht op het dagelijks bestuur. Een alternatieve 
verklaring is dat de voorzitter actief netwerkinformatie en middelen gebruikt om de 
besluitvorming van het bedrijf te sturen in de richting van beslissingen met een hoger 
risico. 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we het toenemende belang van communicatie tussen 
bedrijven en financiële markten, met name in de jaren 1990. We bestudeerden de 
financiële markt reacties op belangrijke strategische aankondigingen van Koninklijke 
Philips NV in de periode 1971-2001. Temidden van exogeen veranderende financiële 
markten analyseerden we Philips' financiële markt communicatie en de waardering van 
de markten van Philips’ investor relations activiteiten, en de gevolgen voor de liquiditeit 
van het aandeel, het aantal analisten dat het aandeel actief volgt en de spreiding van hun 
voorspellingen. We vonden sterk negatieve koers reacties op aankondigingen, met name 
in de late jaren 1990. We concluderen dat Philips’ communicatie onvoldoende tegemoet 
kwam aan de informatie behoefte van beleggers, en dat vooral in de late jaren 1990 
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Philips is niet in staat is geweest om haar strategische intenties overtuigend aan de markt 
te communiceren.  
In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we 865 overnames onderzocht door Nederlandse 
industriële bedrijven over de periode 1993-2004. Theorie op basis van de principle-agent 
tegenstelling voorspelt dat managers van beursgenoteerde bedrijven acquisities kunnen 
doen, zelfs wanneer deze geen waarde toevoegen voor hun aandeelhouders. 
Bestuursstructuren dienen ervoor om managers in hun acquisitieactiviteiten te beperken. 
In dit hoofdstuk meten we effecten van acquisities op aandeelhouderswaarde en de 
factoren die deze waarde-effecten bepalen, inclusief de bestuurs-kenmerken van deze 
bedrijven. Bedrijven in Nederland zijn interessant vanuit het perspectief van 
bestuursstructuur, omdat het dagelijks bestuur een relatief sterke positie ten opzichte van 
de aandeelhouders heeft. Verschillende beschermingsconstructies, vaak in Nederland 
gebruikt, beperken niet alleen de invloed van aandeelhouders bij het overname gevechten, 
maar zonder dergelijke. Anderzijds is het eigendom van Nederlandse bedrijven relatief 
geconcentreerd, waardoor aandeelhouders de prikkels en macht heeft om het bestuur 
controleren. Het gemiddelde abnormale koerseffect rondom overname aankondigingen is 
1,1%, en dat is een significant positief effect. Er is slechts een belangrijke negatief effect 
bij de zogenaamde structuur regeling, een situatie waarin meerdere 
aandeelhoudersrechten aan de raad van commissarissen worden gedelegeerd. Dit resultaat 
suggereert dat bestuursstructuur acquisitie beslissingen verbetert. 
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This dissertation consists of three studies in the field of corporate governance. The
research examines the impact of the way Dutch firms are managed and controlled on risk
characteristics and the implications for shareholder value. The first study examines the
relation between board interlocks and firm risk. In particular, we measure the effect of
supervisory directors’ connectivity on firm risk. We find yet unknown aspects of connecti -
vity and based on our findings the validity of the motivation behind recent Dutch civil law
amendments can be questioned. In the second study we examine how firms adapted their
communication with investors to the changing demands of the financial markets in the
1990s. Using Royal Philips NV as a case study we find that Philips’ communication was not
able to satisfy the demands of the changing financial markets. As a consequence, its share -
holders have suffered billion euro value losses. In the third study, we measure the effect of
managers’ discretion offered by takeover defenses on shareholder wealth. Dutch firms are
known for the frequent use of takeover defenses, protecting managers and providing them
a relatively strong position towards shareholders. We find that acquisitions conducted by
Dutch firms generate significant positive abnormal announcement returns, which suggests
that shareholders have other means to control management.
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